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Many people have a passionate hatred of abstraction, chiefly, I think, because of its
intellectual difficulty; but as they do not wish to give this reason, they invent all
sorts of others that sound grand. They say that all reality is concrete, and that in
making abstractions we are leaving out the essential. They say that all abstraction
is falsification, and that as soon as you have left out any aspect of something actual
you have exposed yourself to the risk of fallacy in arguing from its remaining aspects
alone. Those who argue in this way are, in fact, concerned with matters quite other
than those that concern science.
[Bertrand Russell (1931), The Scientific Outlook, page 85.]
The laws of science are written in this grand book, the universe, which stands con-
tinually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns
to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written
in the language of mathematics and its characters are triangles, circles, and other ge-
ometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word
of it.
[Galileo Galilei (1623), Il Saggiatore (The Assayer).]
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The foundation of Game Theory was laid in an article by John von Neumann (1928), starting
with the following sentence:
“Die Frage, deren Beantwortung die vorliegende Arbeit anstrebt, ist die folgende:
n Spieler, S1, S2, . . ., Sn, spielen ein gegebnes Gesellschaftsspiel G. Wie
muß einer dieser Spieler, Sm, spielen, um dabei ein mo¨glichst gu¨nstiges
Resultat zu erzielen?”
The theory received widespread attention only after publication of the fundamental book of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p.31), where the aim of Game Theory is described as follows:
“[W]e wish to find the mathematically complete principles which define “rational
behavior” for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the gen-
eral characteristics of that behavior. And while the principles ought to be perfectly
general – i.e., valid in all situations – we may be satisfied if we can find solutions,
for the moment, only in some characteristic special cases.”
Informally, Game Theory is a mathematical discipline that analyzes conflict situations. A con-
flict situation – the game – is a situation in which a certain number of individuals – the players –
interact and thereby jointly determine the outcome. Each participating player has partial control
over the situation, but never full control. Each player is endowed with certain individual prefer-
ences over the set of possible outcomes and strives to obtain the outcome that is most profitable
to him. Under some minor assumptions these preferences can be represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function that characterizes the preferences by a real valued function whose
expected value the player strives to maximize. The aim of Game Theory is to prescribe which
strategy each player in a game should play such that his partial influence on the situation is ex-
ploited in order to promote his interest optimally. Hence, the aim of Game Theory is to provide
a solution – to give a characterization of rational behavior – for every game.
2 Introduction
Traditionally, games have been divided into two classes: cooperative games and noncoop-
erative games. In this monograph, only noncooperative games are dealt with. A noncoop-
erative game is a game in which there are no possibilities for communication, correlation or
(pre)commitment, except for those that are explicitly captured by the rules of the game. A
solution of such a game is a set of recommendations, that tells each player how to behave in
every situation that may arise. This solution should be consistent, i.e. no player should have
an incentive to deviate from his recommendation. Hence, a solution must be self-enforcing: for
each player it should not be in his interest to deviate as long as his opponent players obey their
recommendations. In game theoretic terminology this means that the solution should be a Nash
equilibrium (Nash (1950, 1951)), i.e. a strategy combination – consisting of one strategy for each
player – with the property that no player can gain (in terms of utility) by unilaterally deviating
from it.
Many research areas in which conflicts between agents arise – as in economics and other
social sciences – benefit from the presence of game theoretic tools. Many papers in such areas
have the following structure: a problem is modeled as a game, the game is analyzed by com-
puting its equilibria, and the properties of the latter are translated back into insights relevant to
the original problem (see van Damme (1995)). However, solving for Nash equilibria can be a
tedious, error-prone affair. Even when the game that is object of study is very simple. And even
if an equilibrium is found, it may not be the case that the equilibrium has a sound game theo-
retic underpinning, since, in general, a game possesses multiple Nash equilibria. Consequently,
having numerical methods to compute and to select on equilibria might cause further progress in
research programs where game models arise.
The appropriate method for computing Nash equilibria for a game depends on a number of
factors. The first and most important factor involves whether one wants to obtain simply one
sample equilibrium or all equilibria.
The second factor of importance concerns whether, or not, the number of players is greater
than two. For two person games there exist methods for finding exact sample Nash equilibria.
For games with more than two players, however, this is in general not possible anymore. The
methods that work for two person games can typically not be directly extended for games with
more than two players. This factor was already recognized in von Neumann (1928):
“[D]as 3-Personen-Spiel ist etwas wesentlich anderes als das von zwei Personen.”
The third factor that determines the choice of method concerns the type of Nash equilibrium one
wishes to find. It is well-known that not all Nash equilibria are equally attractive. Therefore
refinement criteria for selecting among multiple equilibria are proposed. There exists a large
literature on equilibrium refinements. For a condensed writing on the issue of equilibrium selec-
tion, see van Damme (1987).
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For most methods that find a sample equilibrium, it is not guaranteed that the equilibrium
found will satisfy a given refinement condition or selection criterion. So, any method intended
to find a sample Nash equilibrium that satisfies particular refinement conditions needs to be
modified. Since the set of equilibria satisfying particular refinement conditions is a subset of the
set of all Nash equilibria, a method that finds all Nash equilibria can serve as a basis for a method
to find the set of all refined Nash equilibria – as long as the set of refined Nash equilibria can be
characterized as a subset of the whole set of Nash equilibria in a computable way.
Noncooperative game theory is divided in two parts: static games and dynamic games. A
static game is a game that takes place in one moment of time: all players make their choice
once and simultaneous and, dependent on the choices made, each player obtains its payoff. In a
dynamic game, strategic decisions have to be made during several stages. Crucial in such games
is the information available to a player about choices made prior to the occasion, the duration of
the game, and the way outcomes are evaluated in terms of payoff.
A successful application of game theory to problems in which conflict situations arise, is
often hindered by the fact that the dynamics complicates the problems rapidly with regard to
computational purposes. Even in absence of dynamics, problems become complicated rapidly
when the number of players, or the number of actions available to the players grows. A solution
to this is found in the development of new algorithms that are tailor-made to specific problems
and that are easily implementable. Moreover, such algorithms should compute equilibria with a
sound game theoretic underpinning, in the common case that a game possesses multiple equilib-
ria. See also Judd (1997, 1998) and McKelvey and McLennan (1996) for an expression of the
important role of computational methods in the further development of economic theory.
In Chapter 2 the mathematical preliminaries are given. The chapter contains an overview of
some mathematical notions used later on. The exposition is not complete as the reader is assumed
to have a basic knowledge of set theory, topology, vector spaces, matrix theory, measure theory,
probability theory, stochastic processes, complex numbers, and differential calculus. The goal
of Chapter 2 is to make the monograph as accessible as possible. Of special importance for the
developments of this monograph is the section dealing with differential topology.
Part I of this monograph is devoted to games in normal form. In these games there are a finite
number of players which all have a finite number of actions at their disposal to influence the
outcome of the game. Given the simultaneously and independently chosen actions, an outcome
results which immediately determines the payoff to each one of the players. Assumed is that
players may randomize their actions, i.e. they decide on probability distributions on their action
sets. Payoffs are then equal to the expected value of the payoffs. Each player is assumed to
maximize its expected payoff. A Nash equilibrium for such a game is a tuple of strategies –
consisting of one strategy for each player – where each player’s strategy is an optimal strategy
against the other players’ strategies.
4 Introduction
The first method to compute a Nash equilibrium for a normal form game is the one developed
by Lemke and Howson (1964). Their algorithm, which belongs to the class of path following
algorithms, provides a way to find at least one Nash equilibrium for any two person game. It
solves bimatrix games – normal form games in which two players are involved – by solving a
linear complementarity problem. Although multiple Nash equilibria can be found, there is no
guarantee that all Nash equilibria are found. As long as the data of the problem are rational, the
algorithm can provide exact solutions, since all computations are done in the rational field.
Rosenmu¨ller (1971) and Wilson (1971) independently and simultaneously extended the algo-
rithm of Lemke and Howson to find Nash equilibria for n-person games. They both discovered
that n-person games can be formulated as a non-linear complementarity problem. Based on
features of these nonconstructive methods, Garcia, Lemke and Lu¨thi (1973) were the first to
propose a simplicial algorithm. Their method was derived from the work of Scarf (1967, 1973)
for computing a Nash equilibrium of n-person games thereby launching the first implementable
algorithm to solve such games. Later, a more efficient simplicial algorithm was proposed in van
der Laan and Talman (1982).
The literature mentioned above only covered the issue of computation but did not concern
the issue of selection. For bimatrix games, the modification of the Lemke-Howson algorithm by
Eaves (1971) causes that the resulting algorithm will only terminate at a perfect equilibrium, a
refinement introduced in Selten (1975). A second procedure to search for a perfect equilibrium of
a bimatrix game was developed by van den Elzen and Talman (1991). For the same class of games
Wilson (1992) presented an algorithm to compute simply stable equilibria. For the class of n-
person games, Yamamoto (1993) describes a path-following procedure for the computation of a
proper equilibrium, a refinement introduced in Myerson (1978). This procedure is not directly fit
for implementation though. Talman and Yang (1998) describe an algorithm for the computation
of a proper equilibrium that is implementable.
For bimatrix games, the algorithm of van den Elzen and Talman (1999) computes the Nash
equilibrium selected by the ‘linear tracing procedure’ (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). The
generalization to n-person games is covered by the simplicial method presented in Herings and
van den Elzen (2002). Simplicial methods solve a non-linear equilibrium problem by solving a
piecewise linear approximation of the problem. With the exception of the algorithm presented in
this monograph, all known algorithms that have been shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium
for a generic n-person game, are simplicial methods. A potential drawback of these methods is
that they do not exploit the differentiable structure that is present in n-person games.
For an n-person game, an algorithm that exploits its differentiable structure is developed in
Chapter 3. Besides just computing a sample equilibrium, it partly solves the problem of multi-
plicity by applying the linear tracing procedure. The linear tracing procedure has been introduced
by Harsanyi (1975) and is used extensively in the selection theory proposed by Harsanyi and Sel-
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ten (1988). It concerns a mathematical construct that transforms subjective a priori expectations
into equilibrium expectations. It is proved that the linear tracing procedure is well-defined for
almost all normal form games. This means that for almost all normal form games the algorithm
is able to compute – or, converges to – an equilibrium.
Next, in Chapter 4, a method to numerically solve for all Nash equilibria for the same class
of games is described. Again, the method is based on an adjustment process that connects trivial
solutions to equilibrium solutions via paths. The computation of all equilibria seems practically
infeasible since the number of equilibria grows exponentially in the size of the game – given
by the number of players and the number of strategies each player has at its disposal. As a
partial resolution to this problem, the algorithm is developed such that during the course of the
algorithm more and more equilibria are found. A similar point has been made to use branch-and-
bound methods, as opposed to the present heuristic methods, to solve problems of the traveling-
salesman type and applying the up-to-date best solutions during the course of the computations
(see Sierksma (2001)). Moreover, it is possible to improve on computing time considerably by
applying parallel computing.
Dynamic games of finite duration, where players obtain their payoffs after all decisions are
made and the game has terminated, are called games in extensive form. It is possible to apply
algorithms to solve for normal form games for this class of games. This is possible in two
manners. First, the game in extensive form can be reformulated as a game in agent normal form.
This is achieved by treating the players for each information set at which a player has to act as a
separate agent of this player. All agents corresponding to the same player obtain the payoff of that
player in the original extensive form game. The resulting game can be solved as a normal form
game. The second method is to start solving the smallest subgames and subsequently solving
all subgames backwards until the whole game is solved. For this method the algorithm to solve
normal form games has to be used successively.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the tracing procedure is defined for normal form games and
for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. For extensive form games,
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) first transform the game into one in standard form and subsequently
define the tracing procedure for that class of games. Computation of the Nash equilibrium se-
lected by the tracing procedure in extensive form games is the topic of von Stengel, van den
Elzen, and Talman (2001), who invoke the sequence form to calculate such equilibria efficiently.
Part II of this monograph is devoted to stochastic games. More precisely, finite discounted
stochastic games with infinite time horizon are being studied. Such a stochastic game starts in an
initial state, some element of a finite set of states. Given the initial state, all players simultane-
ously and independently have to make a strategic decision. Dependent on the strategic decisions
made, each player obtains a payoff. Dependent on the strategic decisions and possibly on chance
the state of the subsequent period is determined. In this subsequent period, players again have to
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make a strategic decision in order to partially influence the payoffs and the flow to the very next
state – the game dynamics. This procedure continues ad infinitum.
In order to keep such problems with infinite horizon analyzable, chance is probabilistically
conditioned on the present state and the chosen strategies and not on time. This has as direct
result that strategies can be chosen time independent, or stationary. Focal point in Part II will be
stationary equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which players use strategies that are state dependent but
time independent. Several motivations for analyzing stationary equilibria can be found in Maskin
and Tirole (2001). Stationary strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent
with rationality, stationarity captures the notion that ‘bygones are bygones’ more completely
than does the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, and it embodies the principle that ‘minor
causes should have minor effects’, that is, only those aspects of the past that are ‘significant’
should have an appreciable influence on behavior. The pragmatic motivations they give are that
in applied theory, the focus on stationary strategies allows for clean, unobstructed analysis of the
influence of the state variables. Moreover, stationary strategies substantially reduce the number
of parameters to be estimated in dynamic (econometric) models and stationary models can be
simulated.
For most normal form games there is a vast multiplicity of equilibria, see McLennan (1999).
There is no reason to expect that the situation is different for the multiplicity of stationary equi-
libria in stochastic games. For this reason, it is essential to provide an algorithm that selects a
particular stationary equilibrium. Besides selecting on stationary equilibria, selection is further
restricted by extending the linear tracing procedure in a natural way to stochastic games. Since
the expected utility property is not satisfied in stochastic games, it is not possible to transform a
stochastic game into one in standard form. The way to extend the tracing procedure to the class
of stochastic games is neither straightforward nor unique. In Chapter 5 four natural extensions
of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games are presented. It is shown that the
four extensions are essentially different, and one of the four extensions is proposed as the most
natural extension. This natural extension of the linear tracing procedure, the stochastic trac-
ing procedure, transforms subjective a priori stationary expectations into stationary equilibrium
expectations.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered both finite and infinite
horizon two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action spaces.
Shapley proved that such games have a value and that both players possess optimal stationary
strategies with respect to the discounted payoff criterion.
Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971) extended Shapley’s model to general n-
person stochastic games. For the model with finite state space and finite action spaces they
showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium. In Breton, Filar, Haurie, and Schultz (1986),
Schultz (1986), Filar, Schultz, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (1991), and Breton (1991) the problem
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of finding discounted stationary equilibria in the general n-person stochastic game is reduced
to that of finding a global minimum in a nonlinear program with linear constraints. Solving
this nonlinear program is equivalent to solving a certain nonlinear system for which it is known
that the objective value in the global minimum is zero. But, as is noted in Breton (1991), the
convergence of an optimization algorithm to the global optimum is not guaranteed.
In Chapter 6, it is proved that the stochastic tracing procedure as defined in Chapter 5 is
well-defined for almost all stochastic games. This means that for almost all stochastic games
there exists a unique path connecting the best responses of each player to subjective a priori
stationary expectations about its opponents to a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game.
What remains is to determine the starting point and from there to follow numerically the path
up to the stationary equilibrium. It is shown that the algorithm is globally convergent. This
algorithm is the first globally convergent algorithm to solve for an equilibrium in an arbitrary
n-person stochastic game. As another by-product of the convergence proof, an extension of a
recent result of Haller and Lagunoff (2000) is found. Their main result is that the set of stationary
equilibria in a stochastic game is generically finite. A corollary to the main result of Chapter 6 is
that this finite number of equilibria is odd.
The algorithms developed for normal form games in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and the algo-
rithm developed for stochastic games developed in Chapter 6 have in common that they are based
on following paths from a trivial solution to a solution of the original problem. In Chapter 4 the
paths are smooth by definition, whereas in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 the paths became smooth af-
ter applying a transformation of variables as in Garcia and Zangwill (1981). In all these chapters,
homotopy functions are described such that the paths correspond to a subset of the set of zeros
of the homotopy function. To implement the algorithm, the only thing that is needed is having a
numerical method to trace the homotopy-path after the starting point has been determined. There
are several methods available to numerically trace homotopy-paths: predictor-corrector meth-
ods, and simplicial methods. Predictor-corrector methods approximately follow ‘exact’ solution
curves, whereas simplicial methods follow approximate solution curves exactly. For more the-
ory on path-tracking methods the reader is referred to Allgower and Georg (1990, 1993, 1997),
Garcia and Zangwill (1981), and Eaves and Schmedders (1999).
In this monograph, all implementations of the algorithms are based on a path-following
method that is professionally programmed in FORTRAN. It concerns the software-package HOM-
PACK for which Watson, Billups, and Morgan (1987) is the condensed reference. As the proof
of the pudding is in eating, this monograph ends with an application in Part III. More precisely,
an application of stochastic games to an environment where a finite number of (potential) firms
compete dynamically in the market for some homogeneous product is considered. In a given
period, each firm is either an incumbent or a potential entrant. In each period, incumbents make
a decision about the quantity to produce in that period and about whether to leave the market or
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to stay. Potential entrants only have to decide whether to enter or not in a given period.
Since all firms are assumed to have identical cost structures, the market structure (the state)
in a certain period is determined by the number of firms that are active in production in that
period. The instantaneous profits to an incumbent firm depend on the current market structure,
the firm’s own production quantity and its competitors’ production quantities. When a potential
entrant decides to enter, it has to make some sunk costs, which can be avoided by not entering.
Tomorrow’s market structure depends on the number of active firms today and the entry and exit
decisions made by the firms.
In such dynamic entry-and-exit models, common understanding is that potential entrants will
enter into the market up to the point where all excess profits are eroded. Dominant incumbent
positions are possible only under specific circumstances, such as the presence of substantial
barriers to entry, or when incumbents can credibly threaten to punish rivals with losses upon
entry.
In Chapter 7, the case where there are two firms, no fixed costs and no entrance costs, is
studied in more detail. Demand functions are assumed to be linear. The market is sufficiently
big to admit two firms, i.e. two firms involved in Cournot competition that are both able to
make positive profits. One would expect – as common understanding suggests – that in such
an economic environment the market will be served by both firms in all periods. This repeated
Cournot equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium indeed. However, by applying the numerical
method described in Chapter 6 it is found that, when the discount factor is large enough, there
is also an equilibrium inducing an alternating monopoly. At even periods one firm serves the
market and at odd periods the other. The alternating monopoly equilibrium allows firms to take
bi-periodically the full monopoly profit. The alternating monopoly equilibrium induces temporal
market segregation, the temporal counterpart of the more frequently studied regional market
segregation.
It can be shown that equilibrium profits are higher in the alternating monopoly equilibrium
than in the repeated Cournot equilibrium, implying that firms have strong incentives to coordinate
on the alternating monopoly equilibrium.
In a situation where both firms have already entered the market, coordination on the alter-
nating monopoly equilibrium is still possible. In the state where both firms are present, each
one will leave the market next period with a small probability. As soon as one firm has left, the
alternating monopoly gets into action. Chapter 7 highlights the potential of numerical work and
in particular how it may lead to new economic insights.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Preliminaries
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter some mathematical concepts and results used in this monograph are presented. As
the exposition given here does not yield a complete overview of the mathematical notions used
later on, the reader is assumed to have a basic knowledge from set theory, topology, vector spaces,
matrix theory, measure theory, probability theory, stochastic processes, complex numbers, and
differential calculus. For a (more) complete exposition on the concepts presented in this chapter,
the reader is referred to Chapter 2 of Herings (1996).
Section 2.2 starts with introducing some notation being used in this monograph, and in par-
ticular, in this chapter.
In Section 2.3 the concept of a relation is presented. In particular, a special type of rela-
tion, called correspondence, is introduced. Definitions, characterizations, and results concerning
several forms of continuity of correspondences are given. Further, two fixed point theorems
are formulated. The importance of fixed point theorems is the use of them in existence proofs.
For instance, the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be easily proved by applying Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem. Browder’s fixed point theorem can be used, for instance, for proving the
feasibility of the linear tracing procedure.
Section 2.4 concludes this chapter with some notions from differential calculus and differen-
tial topology. The definitions of a manifold, a manifold with generalized boundary, and a regular
constraint set, and some results like the inverse function theorem and the transversality theorem
are given. These concepts are very useful to describe the structure of the linear tracing procedure
in Chapter 3 and the structure of the stochastic tracing procedure in Chapter 6.
All concepts and results mentioned in this chapter are fairly well-known, and therefore no
proofs are given. However, references are provided for all results. The presentation is minimal
in the sense that no results are given that are not explicitly needed.
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2.2 Some notation
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . .}, Z = {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .} denotes the
set of integers, Z+ = {0, 1, . . .} denotes the set of non-negative integers, R denotes the set of
real numbers, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers and C denotes the set of complex
numbers. For m ∈ Z+, the set of integers {1, . . . ,m} is denoted by Im and the set of integers
{0, . . . ,m} is denoted by I0m. The set N∗, defined by N∗ = N ∪ {+∞}, is called the set of
extended natural numbers.
Let some m ∈ N be given. The m-dimensional Euclidean space is denoted by Rm = mi=1R
and is defined as the m-fold Cartesian product of R. Finally, Cm = mi=1C denotes the m-fold
Cartesian product of C.
Let X and Y be two sets. If with every element x of X is associated exactly one element
y of Y , then a function f from X into Y is defined, denoted by f : X → Y . Let a function
f : X → Y be given. The set X is called the domain of f . If x is an element of X , then f(x)
denotes the element y of Y associated with x and is called the image by f of x. Let S be a
subset of X and let T be a subset of Y . The image of S by f , denoted by f(S), is defined by
f(S) = { y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ S, y = f(x) } and the inverse image of T by f , denoted by f−1(T ),
is defined by f−1(T ) = {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ T }. The image of f by X is called the range of f .
The function g : S → Y , defined by g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ S, is denoted by f|S , and is called
the restriction of f to S. If X¯ is a set containing X , and g : X¯ → Y is a function satisfying
g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ X , then g is called an extension of f to X¯ . The function f is said to
be injective if f−1({y}) contains at most one element for every element y of Y , and f is said to
be surjective if f(X) = Y . If the function f is injective and surjective, then the function which
associates every element y of Y the element x of X satisfying f(x) = y is called the inverse of f
and is denoted by f−1 : Y → X . The function f is called a homeomorphism if it is continuous,
injective, surjective, and has a continuous inverse. The sets X and Y are called homeomorphic
if there exists a homeomorphism f : X → Y .
Let X be a topological space. The topological space X is called an arc if X and the closed
unit interval [0, 1] are homeomorphic, X is called a loop if X and the unit circle in R2, being
the set {x ∈ R2 | ‖x‖2 = 1 }, are homeomorphic. If X is an arc and f : [0, 1] → X is a home-
omorphism, then f({0, 1}) is called the relative boundary of X , f(0) and f(1) are called the
boundary points of X , and X \f({0, 1}) is called the relative interior of X . It can be shown that
both the relative boundary and the relative interior of X are independent of the homeomorphism
chosen. A continuous function f : [0, 1] → X is called a path. The elements f(0) and f(1) are
called the beginning and end points of the path f , respectively, and f(0) and f(1) are said to be
joined by the path f .
A set X is said to be finite if the number of its elements is a non-negative integer. A set X is
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said to be countable if there exists an injective function f from X into a subset of N. If X is a
finite set of elements, then |X| denotes the cardinality of X , i.e. the number of elements of X .
Let a set X be given. A function f : N → X is called a sequence in X and is denoted by
(xn)n∈N, where xn = f(n), for all n ∈ N. If (xn)n∈N is a sequence in X and (nm)m∈N is a
sequence in N such that nm < nm+1, for all m ∈ N, then (xnm)m∈N is called a subsequence of
(xn)n∈N.
2.3 Relations, correspondences, and fixed points
Let X and Y be two sets. A relation ϕ from X into Y associates with every element x of X
a subset ϕ(x) of Y , and is denoted by ϕ : X → Y . The inverse image by ϕ of T , denoted by
ϕ−1(T ), is defined by ϕ−1(T ) = {x ∈ X |ϕ(x)∩T 6= ∅ }. The set { (x, y) ∈ X×Y | y ∈ ϕ(x) }
is called the graph of ϕ. If Y is a topological space and ϕ(x) is compact for every x ∈ X , then
the relation ϕ is said to be compact-valued. If Y is a topological space and ϕ(x) is closed for
every x ∈ X , then the relation ϕ is said to be closed-valued. If Y is a vector space and ϕ(x) is
convex for every x ∈ X , then the relation ϕ is said to be convex-valued.
A relation ϕ from a set X into a set Y such that ϕ(x) 6= ∅ for every x ∈ X is called a
correspondence. Notice that a correspondence ϕ : X → Y can be considered as a function if
ϕ(x) contains exactly one element for every x ∈ X .
Now upper hemi-continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.1 (Upper hemi-continuity) Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x¯ of
X be given. A correspondence ϕ : X → Y is upper hemi-continuous at x¯ if for every open set
V of Y satisfying ϕ(x¯) ⊂ V there exists an open set U of X containing x¯ such that ϕ(U) ⊂ V .
The correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous if it is upper hemi-continuous at every x ∈ X .
Notice that a correspondence being both upper hemi-continuous and a function is a continuous
function. Often it is possible to give easy characterizations of upper hemi-continuity.
Theorem 2.2 Let a subset S of Rm, a subset T of Rn, an element x¯ of S, and a compact-valued
correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. Then the correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous at
x¯ if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈N in S converging to x¯ and every sequence (yn)n∈N in
T with yn ∈ ϕ(xn), for all n ∈ N, there exists a subsequence of (yn)n∈N converging to some
element of ϕ(x¯).
See Hildenbrand (1974), Theorem 1, page 24.
Theorem 2.3 Let a subset S of Rm, a compact subset T of Rn, an element x¯ of S, and a
compact-valued correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. Then the correspondence ϕ is upper
hemi-continuous at x¯ if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈N in S converging to x¯ and every
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sequence (yn)n∈N in T with yn ∈ ϕ(xn), for all n ∈ N, converging to y¯ ∈ Rn it holds that
y¯ ∈ ϕ(x¯). The correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous if and only if the graph of ϕ is closed
in S × T .
See Debreu (1959), 1.8.d, page 17.
Next, lower hemi-continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.4 (Lower hemi-continuity) Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x¯ of
X be given. A correspondence ϕ : X → Y is lower hemi-continuous at x¯ if for every open set V
of Y satisfying ϕ(x¯)∩V 6= ∅ there exists an open set U of X containing x¯ such that ϕ(x)∩V 6= ∅
for all x ∈ U . The correspondence ϕ is lower hemi-continuous if it is lower hemi-continuous at
every x ∈ X .
Often it is possible to give easy characterizations of lower hemi-continuity.
Theorem 2.5 Let a subset S of Rm, a subset T of Rn, and an element x¯ of S be given. Then the
correspondence ϕ is lower hemi-continuous at x¯ if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈N in S
converging to x¯ and for every element y¯ of ϕ(x¯) there exists a sequence (yn)n∈N in T such that
yn ∈ ϕ(xn), for all n ∈ N, and yn → y¯.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Theorem 2, page 27.
Finally, continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.6 (Continuity) Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x¯ of X be given.
A correspondence ϕ : X → Y is continuous at x¯ if it is both upper and lower hemi-continuous
at x¯. The correspondence ϕ is continuous if it is continuous at every x ∈ X .
Let ϕ be a relation from a set X into a set Y . The element x of X is called a fixed point of
ϕ if x ∈ ϕ(x). Related to the concept of a fixed point is the notion of a zero point. Let ϕ be
a relation from a set X into Rm. The element x of X is called a zero point of ϕ if 0 ∈ ϕ(x).
As already mentioned, several fixed point theorems are essential for the theory developed in this
monograph. The first one is known as Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
Theorem 2.7 (Kakutani’s fixed point theorem) Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset
of Rm and let ϕ : S → S be a convex-valued correspondence such that the graph of ϕ is closed
in S × S. Then there exists an element x of S such that x ∈ ϕ(x).
See Kakutani (1941), Theorem 1, page 457, and Corollary of Theorem 1, page 458.
Notice that by Theorem 2.3 the correspondence ϕ in Theorem 2.7 has a closed graph if and only
if ϕ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. If the correspondence ϕ is a
function, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem is obtained (see Brouwer (1912)). Secondly and finally,
an extension of Browder’s fixed point theorem as formulated in Theorem 2 in Browder (1960) is
given. The following theorem is a special case of Theorem 3 in Mas-Colell (1974).
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Theorem 2.8 (Browder’s fixed point theorem) Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset
of Rm and let ϕ : [0, 1] × S → S be a convex-valued correspondence such that the graph of ϕ
is closed in [0, 1] × S × S. Then the set Fϕ = { (λ, x) ∈ [0, 1] × S |x ∈ ϕ(λ, x) } contains a
connected set F cϕ such that ({0} × S) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅.
See Mas-Colell (1974), Theorem 3, page 230.
Notice that by Theorem 2.3 the correspondence ϕ in Theorem 2.8 has a closed graph if and
only if ϕ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. For more on fixed point
theorems and its applications to economics and game theory, the reader is referred to Border
(1985).
2.4 Differential topology
This section is mainly based on Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973) and Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt
(1983, 1986). For a nice introduction into the field of differential topology the reader is referred
to Milnor (1965) and Guillemin and Pollack (1974).
Let r ∈ N, an open set U of Rm, and a non-empty subset T of Rn be given. A function
f : U → T is called r times continuously differentiable if all partial derivatives up to the order
r are continuous functions. The set of r times continuously differentiable functions from U into
T is denoted by Cr(U, T ). The set C∞(U, T ) is defined by C∞(U, T ) =
⋂
r∈NC
r(U, T ). An
element of C∞(U, T ) is called a smooth function. It follows easily that C∞(U, T ) ⊂ · · · ⊂
C1(U, T ) ⊂ C0(U, T ).
The following result is known as the inverse function theorem.
Theorem 2.9 (Inverse function theorem) For r ∈ N∗, let an open subset U of Rm, an element
x¯ of U , and a function f ∈ Cr(U,Rm) be given. If ∂xf(x¯) is an invertible matrix, then there
exist open sets U1 and U2 of Rm such that x¯ ∈ U1, the function g ∈ Cr(U1, U2), defined by
g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ U1, is injective and surjective, g−1 ∈ Cr(U2, U1), and ∂xg−1(g(x¯)) =
(∂xg(x¯))
−1
. If U1 and U2 are open sets of Rm and g is a function of Cr(U1, U2) such that g is
injective, surjective, and g−1 ∈ Cr(U2, U1), then ∂xg(x¯) is invertible for every x¯ ∈ U1.
See Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem C.3.1, page 20.
Let r ∈ N∗, S ⊂ Rm and T ⊂ Rn be given. A function f : S → T is called r times continuously
differentiable if for every element x of S there exists an open set U of Rm containing x and a
function g ∈ Cr(U,Rn) such that g(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ S∩U . The set of r times continuously
differentiable functions from S into T is denoted by Cr(S, T ). A function f : S → T is called
a Cr diffeomorphism if f is injective, surjective, f ∈ Cr(S, T ), and f−1 ∈ Cr(T, S). The sets
S and T are called Cr diffeomorphic if there exists a Cr diffeomorphism f : S → T . Although
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the above definitions are of a local character, the following results show that they can be made
global.
Theorem 2.10 For r ∈ N∗, let a subset S of Rm, a subset T of Rn, and a function f ∈ Cr(S, T )
be given. Then there exists an open subset U of Rm containing the set S and there exists a
function g ∈ Cr(U,Rn) such that g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ S.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.5, page 103.
Intuitively, for some k ∈ N, a k-dimensional manifold is a set which is locally like Rk. The
following definitions make this statement more precise.
Definition 2.11 (Topological manifold) For k ∈ Z+, a subset X of Rm is a k-dimensional
topological manifold if for every element x of X there exists an open set U of X containing x,
an open set V of Rk, and an injective and surjective function φ : U → V such that φ ∈ C0(U, V )
and φ−1 ∈ C0(V, U), i.e. φ : U → V is a homeomorphism.
Definition 2.12 (Cr manifold) For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, a subset X of Rm is a k-dimensional
Cr manifold if for every element x of X there exists an open set U of X containing x, an open
set V of Rk, and an injective and surjective function φ : U → V such that φ ∈ Cr(U, V ) and
φ−1 ∈ Cr(V, U), i.e. φ : U → V is a Cr diffeomorphism.
The pair (U, φ) in Definition 2.12 is called a chart of X around x and (V, φ−1) are called local
Cr coordinates for U . The function φ is called a Cr coordinate system for X around x.
Definition 2.13 (Piecewise Cr manifold) For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, a subset X of Rm is a k-
dimensional piecewise Cr manifold if X is a k-dimensional topological manifold being a finite
union of Cr manifolds.
If X is a k-dimensional topological manifold, a k-dimensional Cr manifold, or a k-dimensional
piecewise Cr manifold, then the dimension of X is said to be k. In Definition 2.13 it is allowed
that the dimension of some of the Cr manifolds whose union is equal to X is less than k.
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let a k-dimensional Cr manifold X , an element x¯ of X , and a
coordinate system φ of X around x be given. Then the set ∂φ−1(φ(x¯))(Rk) is called the tangent
space of X at x¯ and is denoted by Tx¯X . It can be shown that the set Tx¯X does not depend on the
choice of the coordinate system φ.
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, a characterization of a k-dimensional Cr manifold is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.14 For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, a subset X of Rm is a k-dimensional Cr manifold if and
only if for every element x of X there exists a Cr coordinate system φ : U → V of Rm around x
satisfying φ(x) = 0 and φ(X ∩ U) = { y ∈ V | yi = 0, ∀ i ∈ Im−k }.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Theorem 3.11, page 89.
2.4 Differential topology 15
Notice that, by definition, the function φ : U → V in Theorem 2.14 is a Cr coordinate system of
R
m around x if x ∈ U , U and V are open sets of Rm, φ is injective and surjective, φ ∈ Cr(U, V ),
and φ−1 ∈ Cr(V, U).
Definition 2.15 (Manifold with generalized boundary) For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, a subset X
of Rm is a k-dimensional Cr manifold with generalized boundary (MGB) if for every element
x of X there exists a Cr coordinate system φ : U → V of Rm around x and an integer `(x),
0 ≤ `(x) ≤ k, satisfying φ(x) = 0 and
φ(X ∩ U) = { y ∈ V | yi = 0, ∀ i ∈ Im−k, and yi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ Im−k+`(x) \ Im−k }.
If X is a k-dimensional Cr manifold with generalized boundary, then the dimension of X is
said to be k. It follows that the dimension k, for every MGB X , and the integer `(x), for
every element x of X , are independent of the choice of the coordinate system. Intuitively, a
k-dimensional manifold with generalized boundary is in a neighborhood of x¯ ∈ X like the set
{x ∈ Rk |xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I`(x¯) }.
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. Define the set Bl(X) by
Bl(X) = {x ∈ X | `(x) = l },
for all l ∈ I0k . The set B0(X) is called the relative interior of X . The set X \B0(X) is called the
relative boundary of X . These definitions of relative interior and relative boundary are consistent
with the corresponding definitions in Section 2.2 for arcs. In case X = B0(X) it follows that the
set X is a k-dimensional Cr manifold by Theorem 2.14. If X = B0(X) ∪ B1(X), then the set
X is called manifold with boundary. The following theorem yields that the relative boundary of
a manifold with boundary is a manifold.
Theorem 2.16 For k ∈ Z+, r ∈ N∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. For every l ∈ I0k ,
the set Bl(X) is a (k − l)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.4, page 98.
Compact 1-dimensional MGB’s have a particular nice structure, as follows from the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.17 For r ∈ N∗, let the set X be a compact 1-dimensional Cr MGB. Then the set X
has a finite number of components, each being Cr diffeomorphic to either the unit circle in R2,
or the closed unit interval in R.
See Mas-Colell (1985), H.6, page 35.
An interesting class of sets are the so-called regular constraint sets. Let U be an open set of Rm
and let, for some n1 ∈ Z+, for some n2 ∈ Z+, functions g˜j : U → R, for all j ∈ In1 , and
h˜j : U → R, for all j ∈ In2 , be given. Define the set M [g˜, h˜] by
M [g˜, h˜] = {x ∈ U | g˜j(x) = 0, ∀ j ∈ In1 , and h˜j(x) ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ In2 }.
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For every element x of U , define the set J0(x) = { j ∈ In2 | h˜j(x) = 0 }. In the above definitions
n1 and n2 are allowed to be zero, in which case g˜ and h˜ are denoted by ∅, respectively.
Definition 2.18 (Regular constraint system and regular constraint set) For n1, n2 ∈ Z+, for
r ∈ N∗, let U be an open set of Rm and let g˜j : U → R, for all j ∈ In1 , and h˜j : U → R, for
all j ∈ In2 , be Cr functions. The pair of functions (g˜, h˜) is a Cr regular constraint system if for
every element x¯ of M [g˜, h˜] the set
{ ∂xg˜j(x¯)> | j ∈ In1 } ∪ { ∂xh˜j(x¯)> | j ∈ J0(x¯) }
is an independent set. The set S is a Cr regular constraint set (RCS) if there exists a Cr regular
constraint system (g˜, h˜) such that S = M [g˜, h˜].
Theorem 2.19 For r ∈ N∗, let the subset X of Rm be a Cr RCS and let the pair of functions
(g˜, h˜) be a Cr regular constraint system such that M [g˜, h˜] = X , where g˜ has n1 components.
Then X is a k-dimensional Cr MGB with k = m − n1. Moreover, `(x) = |J0(x)| for every
element x of X .
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.2, page 94.
Theorem 2.19 shows that the dimension of a non-empty RCS is well-defined. In many cases
Theorem 2.19 can be used to show that a certain set is an MGB.
Next, the tangent space of a manifold with generalized boundary is defined.
Definition 2.20 (Tangent space) For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr
MGB. Let x¯ be an element of X and let the function φ be a Cr coordinate system for Rm around
x¯ with the properties given in Definition 2.15. The tangent space of X at x¯, denoted by Tx¯X , is
the set ∂φ−1(0)({0} × Rk).
It can be shown that the tangent space Tx¯X as defined in Definition 2.20 does not depend on the
choice of the coordinate system. Moreover, in case the set X \ B0(X) is empty, the definition
of the tangent space as given in Definition 2.20 coincides with the definition given before. Since
∂φ−1(0) is a C∞ diffeomorphism, it holds by Theorem 2.9 that ∂xφ−1(0) is an invertible matrix
and therefore Tx¯X is a k-dimensional vector space.
In case a set X is an RCS the following theorem gives an easy way to determine the tangent
space of X at an element of X .
Theorem 2.21 For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let the subset X of Rm be a k-dimensional Cr RCS, let
x¯ be an element of X , and let the pair of functions (g˜, h˜) be a regular constraint system such that
X = M [g˜, h˜]. Then Tx¯X = {x ∈ Rm | ∂g˜(x¯)(x) = 0 }.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.2.2, page 111.
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For r ∈ N∗, let the subsets X of Rm and Y of Rn be Cr manifolds, let x¯ be an element of X ,
and let f be a function of Cr(X,Y ). Let U be an open set of Rm such that X ⊂ U and let the
function g ∈ Cr(U,Rn) be such that g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ X . Such a function g exists by
Theorem 2.10. It can be shown that ∂g(x¯)|Tx¯X is a function from Tx¯X into Tf(x¯)Y . Moreover,
the function ∂g(x¯)|Tx¯X does not depend on the choice of the function g. The derivative of f at
x¯, denoted by ∂f(x¯), is defined by ∂f(x¯) = ∂g(x¯)|Tx¯X . The element x¯ is called a regular point
of f if ∂f(x¯)(Tx¯X) = Tf(x¯)Y . Otherwise x¯ is called a critical point of f . Let an element y¯ of
Y be given. The element y¯ is called a critical value of f if it is the image of a critical point of f .
Otherwise y¯ is called a regular value of f . Notice that every element y of Y \ f(X) is a regular
value of f .
Let C1 manifolds X , Y , and Z, Z being a subset of Y , an element x¯ of X , and a function
f ∈ C1(X,Y ) be given. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally at x¯ ∈ X , denoted
by f t>Z at x¯, if
f(x¯) 6∈ Z, or f(x¯) ∈ Z and Tf(x¯)Z + ∂f(x¯)(Tx¯X) = Tf(x¯)Y.
The function f is said to intersect Z transversally if f t>Z at every x ∈ X . The following
theorem follows always immediately form the definition of transversality.
Theorem 2.22 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let a k1-dimensional C1 manifold X , a k2-
dimensional C1 manifold Y , and a k3-dimensional C1 manifold Z, Z being a subset of Y , be
given, and let f ∈ C1(X,Y ) be such that f t>Z. If k1 − k2 + k3 < 0, then f−1(Z) = ∅.
See Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973), Proposition 4.2, page 51.
The following result is complementary to Theorem 2.22.
Theorem 2.23 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X , a k2-
dimensional Cr manifold Y , and a k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z, Z being a subset of Y , be
given, and let f ∈ Cr(X,Y ) be such that f t>Z. If k1 − k2 + k3 ≥ 0, then f−1(Z) is a
(k1 − k2 + k3)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Mas-Colell (1985), I.2.1, page 43.
The following result is an easy corollary to Theorems 2.22 and 2.23.
Theorem 2.24 For k1, k2 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X , a k2-
dimensional Cr manifold Y , and a function f ∈ Cr(X,Y ) be given. Let the element y¯ of Y
be a regular value of f . If k1 − k2 < 0, then f−1({y¯}) = ∅, and if k1 − k2 ≥ 0, then f−1({y¯})
is a (k1 − k2)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Mas-Colell (1985), H.2.2, page 38.
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For Theorem 2.26 the notion of Lebesgue measure zero in X for a subset of a manifold X needs
to be defined. For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let the subset X of Rm be a k-dimensional Cr manifold
and let S be a subset of X . Then the set S is said to have Lebesgue measure zero in X if
there exists a countable cover {Un |n ∈ N } of S and charts (Un, φn), for all n ∈ N, such that
φn(Un ∩ S) has Lebesgue measure zero for every n ∈ N. In case X is an m-dimensional Cr
manifold, being a subset of Rm, Theorem 2.25 will be used to show that the notions of Lebesgue
measure zero and Lebesgue measure zero in X coincide.
Theorem 2.25 Let a subset S of Rm with Lebesgue measure zero and a function f ∈ C1(S,Rm)
be given. Then f(S) has Lebesgue measure zero.
See Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973), Proposition 1.3, page 30.
For r ∈ N∗, let the subset X of Rm be an m-dimensional Cr manifold and let S be a subset
of X . Using Theorem 2.25 it follows that if the set S has Lebesgue measure zero, then S has
Lebesgue measure zero in X . Now assume that the set S has Lebesgue measure measure zero in
X . Then there exists a countable cover {Un |n ∈ N } of S and charts (Un, φn), for all n ∈ N,
such that the set V n = φn(Un ∩ S) is of Lebesgue measure zero for every n ∈ N. For every
n ∈ N, since (φn)−1 ∈ Cr(V n,Rm), it follows, from Theorem 2.25 and the fact that a subset of a
set with Lebesgue measure zero has Lebesgue measure, that (φn)−1(V n) has Lebesgue measure
zero. Consequently, the set
⋃
n∈N(φ
n)−1(V n) = S has Lebesgue measure zero.
Theorem 2.26 (Transversality theorem) For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ N∗, let a k1-dimensional
Cr manifold X1, a Cr manifold X2, a k2-dimensional Cr manifold Y , a k3-dimensional Cr
manifold Z, being a subset of Y , and a function f ∈ Cr(X1 × X2, Y ) be given, with r ≥
max{1, k1 − k2 + k3}. For every x2 ∈ X2, define a function fx2 ∈ Cr(X1, Y ) by fx2(x1) =
f(x1, x2), for all x1 ∈ X1. Then f t>Z implies fx2 t>Z, except for a subset of X2 having
Lebesgue measure zero in X2.
See Mas-Colell (1985), I.2.2, page 45.
Part I
Normal Form Games
Chapter 3
Computation of Equilibria
The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simpli-
cial methods. This chapter is based on Herings and Peeters (2001a), the first paper to introduce
a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem.
It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the computations. The homotopy path
can therefore be followed by several numerical techniques. Moreover, instead of computing
some Nash equilibrium, the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash
equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten. As a consequence of the
proofs it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasible path.
The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of several examples.
3.1 Introduction
During the past few years, many research fields in which conflicts between agents arise have
benefited from the introduction of game theoretic tools. A further use of game theory may
stagnate for several reasons. One is that there may be a great number of solutions to a given
game. Recent work of McLennan (1999) shows that the number of Nash equilibria in normal
form games of modest size is huge on average. For instance, the mean number of Nash equilibria
in a game with 4 agents, each having 6 strategies, is estimated to be 2.037, with a standard error
of the estimation of 66. Nevertheless, computation of just a single Nash equilibrium may prove
to be hard in many games of interest. This point is expressed as follows in van Damme (1995):
“In the last two decades, game theoretic methods have become more and more im-
portant in economics and the other social sciences. Many scientific papers in these
areas have the following basic structure: A problem is modeled as a game, the game
is analyzed by computing its equilibria, and the properties of the latter are trans-
lated back into insights relevant to the original problem. . . . It has been found that
the tools may not be powerful enough . . . For example, many models admit a vast
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multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes so that the predictive power of game theoretic
analysis is limited. To increase understanding, it may, hence, be necessary to perfect
the tools.”.
A tool to increase understanding has been suggested in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), who intro-
duce the linear tracing procedure as a means for equilibrium selection in finite n-person games.
The linear tracing procedure is a mathematical construct that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into
equilibrium beliefs. First, the players optimize by playing best responses against identical prior
beliefs concerning the play of the other players. Next, they observe that their beliefs are not
met and they subsequently update their beliefs and react optimally there upon. This updating
of beliefs continues until equilibrium beliefs for the game have been found. Although the term
“procedure” suggests a numerical approach, the tracing procedure itself is a non-constructive
method.
From here a second problem for further progress in the applications of game theory to stag-
nate is found. Namely, the difficulties involved in solving games of interest. The view expressed
in Judd (1997) that in general computational methods will serve an important role in the further
development of economic theory, is also applicable in the progress of game theory.
The aim of this chapter is to present an algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium for an
arbitrary finite n-person game in normal form. Since there is a vast multiplicity of Nash equilibria
in many games, it is also essential to provide an algorithm that performs the task of equilibrium
selection (actually, each algorithm to compute for a sample equilibrium selects by definition, but
here is meant to select on equilibria satisfying certain refinement properties). In particular, the
algorithm has to compute the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure. Finally,
the algorithm should be fast in that it allows for the computation of a Nash equilibrium for non-
trivial games within reasonable time limits.
The first procedures for finding an equilibrium in n-person games were developed simul-
taneously and independently by Rosenmu¨ller (1971) and Wilson (1971). Both methods are
generalizations of the procedure of Lemke and Howson (1964) for bimatrix games. Although
these methods are not directly suitable for computational purposes, their common result, the
existence of a non-linear path leading to an equilibrium, was a very important step towards an
implementable algorithm as developed by Garcia, Lemke and Lu¨thi (1973). Later, more efficient
algorithms were proposed in van der Laan, Talman and Van der Heyden (1987) and Doup, van
der Laan and Talman (1987). A problem of these algorithms is that they calculate only an approx-
imation of a sample Nash equilibrium and do not bother about the game-theoretic underpinning
of the calculated equilibrium.
The case of 2-person games is special in that the exact calculation of a Nash equilibrium is
possible due to the linear structure of such a game. For this class of games, the algorithm of
van den Elzen and Talman (1999) computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing
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procedure. The generalization to n-person games is covered by the algorithm presented in He-
rings and van den Elzen (2002). That algorithm, as well as all the other algorithms discussed
above, is a simplicial method. Simplicial methods solve a non-linear equilibrium problem by
solving a piecewise linear approximation of the problem. All known algorithms that have been
shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium for a generic n-person game, are simplicial methods. A
drawback of these methods is that they do not exploit the differentiable structure that is present
in n-person games. For an excellent survey of methods to compute Nash equilibria in games, see
McKelvey and McLennan (1996).
In this chapter an algorithm is proposed that is shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium
for a generic n-person game. This algorithm is the first to exploit the differentiability present
in games to the full extent. The variables are transformed in the way as proposed in Garcia
and Zangwill (1981). This chapter contains the first rigorous proof that after the transformation
differentiability results. The algorithm also solves the equilibrium selection problem in that it
computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods. The formulation as a differentiable
homotopy makes it possible to apply standard path-following techniques that are available in
professionally programmed software. This makes implementation on a computer an easy exer-
cise.
As a by-product of the convergence proof, an elegant and clean proof of the theorem in
Harsanyi (1975) that for a generic game the linear tracing procedure yields a path leading
to a unique Nash equilibrium and of the theorem in Rosenmu¨ller (1971), Wilson (1971), and
Harsanyi (1973) that for a generic game the number of Nash equilibria is odd is obtained.
This chapter is organized as follows. Some notations and the definition of the linear tracing
procedure are given in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, the properties of the linear tracing procedure
are studied. It is shown that for almost every game, the linear tracing procedure is formed by
a finite union of arcs and loops. Using a well-chosen transformation of variables, the linear
tracing procedure is described by the zeros of an everywhere differentiable homotopy function in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the implementation of the homotopy algorithm and gives some
numerical results for randomly generated games. Section 3.6 summarizes. Section 3.7 contains
some proofs to theorems arising in the preceding sections.
3.2 The linear tracing procedure
A finite n-person game in normal form Γ is given by a tuple 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉, with Si and
ui : S → R the set of pure strategies and the payoff function of player i, respectively. The set of
players is denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. The set S = S1×· · ·×Sn denotes the set of pure strategy
combinations. Player i has mi pure strategies. The total number of pure strategies is given by
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m∗ =
∑
i∈N m
i; the total number of pure strategy combinations is given by m =
∏
i∈N m
i
.
The strategies of the players are numbered such that pure strategy j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} of player i is
denoted by sij . The union of the pure strategies over all players is given by S∗ =
⋃
i∈N S
i
.
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution on Si. The set of all probability
distributions on Si is identified with Σi. For σi ∈ Σi, the probability assigned to pure strategy
sij is given by σij . The strategy space of the game is therefore equal to Σ = i∈NΣi. Note that
the dimension of Σ equals m∗ − n. Given a mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ and a strategy
σ¯i ∈ Σi, the mixed strategy that results from replacing σi by σ¯i is denoted by (σ−i, σ¯i). If a
mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ is played, then the probability σ(s) that the pure strategy
combination s = (s1j1 , . . . , snjn) occurs, is given by σ(s) =
∏
i∈N σ
i
ji
and the expected payoff of
player i by ui(σ) =
∑
s∈S σ(s)u
i(s). The class of all noncooperative games is denoted by G.
A mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ is said to be a Nash equilibrium of game Γ if σi is a best
response against σ−i for all i ∈ N . The set of Nash equilibria of game Γ is denoted by NE(Γ)
and is nonempty (Nash (1951)).
The equilibrium selection theory as presented in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) has the nice
feature that it selects a unique Nash equilibrium for every game. The Harsanyi-Selten theory
is to a large extent based on the linear tracing procedure, a mathematical procedure introduced
in Harsanyi (1975) that yields, only dependent on initial beliefs, a unique Nash equilibrium for
almost every game. To select the unique Nash equilibrium for the remaining measure zero set of
games, Harsanyi and Selten use a construct called the logarithmic tracing procedure. The linear
tracing procedure is used repeatedly in their equilibrium selection theory to find a unique solution
of so-called basic games and to define risk-dominance relationships between Nash equilibria.
The linear tracing procedure models a process of convergent expectations by which rational
players will come to adopt, and expect each other to adopt, a particular Nash equilibrium as a so-
lution for a given game. Before applying the tracing procedure, every player is assumed to have
a subjective probability distribution expressing his expectation about the strategic choices of the
other players. Each player is assumed to use the same theory to determine his subjective probabil-
ity distributions. Therefore, all players have the same expectations about the other players. This
common subjective probability distribution is called the prior. In the naive Bayesian approach, all
players choose best responses to their priors and would in this way reach a strategy-combination
that does not constitute a Nash equilibrium in general. In the linear tracing procedure, the in-
formation on the best responses is only gradually fed back into the expectations of the players.
As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the priors and their best responses will gradually
change until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Each generically convergent algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted
as a procedure that selects an equilibrium, but will in fact be a completely arbitrary selection
procedure. Harsanyi-Selten’s procedure, on the other hand, is comprehensively studied and finds
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its origin in the search for an equilibrium selection method. Therefore, it is attractive to have an
algorithm which computes the equilibrium selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory.
Consider some n-person game Γ and some prior p ∈ Σ. For every t ∈ [0, 1], the linear tracing
procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of the game Γt = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {vi(t)}i∈N〉, where the
payoff function vi(t) : S → R of player i is defined by
vi(t; s) = tui(s) + (1− t)ui(p−i, si).
The game Γ0 corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that all their opponents
play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The game Γ1 coincides with the original
game Γ. A best response against a strategy combination σ ∈ Σ in the game Γt corresponds to a
best response against the probability distribution t[σ] + (1− t)[p] on S in the game Γ. The latter
probability distribution does in general not belong to Σ, since it may be correlated.
The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ0 to a Nash equilibrium
of Γ1. The set of all Nash equilibria related to the games Γt, t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L(Γ, p) =
{
(t, σ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ
∣∣∣ σ ∈ NE(Γt) }.
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in L(Γ, p) connecting a
best response against the prior to a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ, i.e. there exists a continuous
function γ : [0, 1]→ L(Γ, p) such that γ(0) ∈ L(Γ, p)∩({0}×Σ) and γ(1) ∈ L(Γ, p)∩({1}×Σ).
In general there may be many trajectories γ([0, 1]) that link a Nash equilibrium of Γ0 to a Nash
equilibrium of Γ1. If this trajectory is unique, then the linear tracing procedure is said to be well-
defined. If the linear tracing procedure is well-defined, then it selects a unique Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ.
Schanuel, Simon and Zame (1991) have shown that the logarithmic tracing procedure con-
nects the best responses to the prior beliefs to exactly one Nash equilibrium. From this result, the
feasibility of the linear tracing procedure follows by an easy limit argument. The proofs related
to the logarithmic tracing procedure use heavy mathematical machinery from the field of alge-
braic geometry. Herings (2000) gives two very short proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing
procedure that do not involve the logarithmic tracing procedure.
The linear tracing procedure is shown to be well-defined for a generic n-person game by
Harsanyi (1975). His result is that given any prior distribution almost all n-person noncooperative
games give rise to a well-defined linear tracing procedure. As a by-product of the convergence
proof of the algorithm presented, a clean and elegant proof of Harsanyi’s result is obtained.
3.3 A piecewise differentiable approach
From the previous section it is known that the linear tracing procedure contains a feasible path.
The strategy of the algorithm is to end up in a Nash equilibrium of the game by following that
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path. A simplicial method that needs very little structure of the path is implemented in Herings
and van den Elzen (2002). Here, path following methods that exploit the differentiability of the
path are used. Unfortunately, the feasible path displays serious non-differentiabilities for most
games, which makes the computation of Nash equilibria very difficult. This section analyzes
the differentiability properties of L(Γ, p) and reveals that, although not necessarily everywhere
differentiable, it has a lot of structure.
Let a subset B∗ of S∗ be given with the property that for every player i there is at least one
pure strategy sij in B∗, so B∗ ∩ Si 6= ∅ for every player i. Such a set B∗ is called admissible.
The sets B∗ are used to decompose L(Γ, p) in subsets L(Γ, p, B∗), each having a differentiable
manifold structure. The set L(Γ, p, B∗) contains those elements of L(Γ, p) where only strategies
in B∗ are played with positive probability. It is defined by
L(Γ, p, B∗) =
{
(t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p)
∣∣∣ sij 6∈ B∗ ⇒ σij = 0
sij ∈ B∗ ⇒ sij ∈ argmaxsi`∈Siv
i(t;σ−i, si`)
}
.
It follows that
L(Γ, p) = ⋃B∗L(Γ, p, B∗).
Two sets L(Γ, p, B∗) and L(Γ, p, B¯∗) with B∗ 6= B¯∗ can only have a point (t, σ) in common
if there is a player i and a strategy sij of player i such that σij = 0 and sij is an element of
argmaxsi
`
∈Siv
i(t;σ−i, si`), so strategy sij is a best response to σ−i that is played with probability
zero.
To analyze the structure of L(Γ, p) and the sets L(Γ, p, B∗), systems of equalities and in-
equalities whose solutions characterize these sets are designed. The Kuhn-Tucker first-order
conditions, which provide necessary and sufficient conditions for σi to be a best response against
σ¯−i in the game Γt¯, are given by
vi(t¯; σ¯−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, (sij ∈ Si),
λij ≥ 0, σij ≥ 0, λijσij = 0, (sij ∈ Si),∑
sij∈S
iσij − 1 = 0.
Here, λij is the shadowprice of playing strategy sij , i.e. the disutility of a marginal increase in the
probability σij by which pure strategy sij is played. If σij > 0, then sij is a best response to σ¯−i in
game Γt¯, which implies λij = 0. It follows that µi is equal to the payoff of player i in game Γt¯.
The last equality,
∑
sij∈S
i σij − 1 = 0, makes sure that σi is a member of Σi.
Given an admissible subset B∗, we define O(Γ, p, B∗) as the set of solutions (t, σ, λ, µ) to
the following system of equalities and inequalities:
(1) vi(t;σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N),
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(2) σij = 0, (s
i
j 6∈ Bi, i ∈ N),
(3) λij = 0, (s
i
j ∈ Bi, i ∈ N),
(4)
∑
sij∈S
i σij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N),
(5) σij ≥ 0, (sij ∈ Bi, i ∈ N),
(6) λij ≥ 0, (sij 6∈ Bi, i ∈ N),
(7) t ≥ 0,
(8) − t+ 1 ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.1 implies that (t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p, B∗) if and only if there exists λ ∈ Rm∗ and µ ∈ Rn
such that the equalities (1)-(4) and the inequalities (5)-(8) are satisfied.
Theorem 3.1 Let a game Γ ∈ G and a prior p ∈ Σ be given. For all admissible subsets B∗ of
S∗, the sets L(Γ, p, B∗) and O(Γ, p, B∗) are C∞ diffeomorphic.
Proof Let B∗ be an admissible subset of S∗. For every i ∈ N take an element sij ∈ B∗.
Define the function f : [0, 1] × Σ → R × Rm∗× Rm∗× Rn by f(t, σ) = (t, σ, λ, µ), where
λi` = v
i(t;σ−i, sij) − vi(t;σ−i, si`) and µi = vi(t;σ−i, sij). Then f(t, σ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗) if and
only if (t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p, B∗). Note that f defined in this way is a C∞ diffeomorphism. 2
In the proof of Theorem 3.1 it is shown that for all (t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p, B∗) there is a unique λ and
a unique µ such that (t, σ, λ, µ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗). Vice versa, for all (t, σ, λ, µ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗) it
holds that (t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p, B∗).
The analysis of the system of equalities and inequalities (1)-(8) provides the following result.
Theorem 3.2 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure1 such that for all admissible subsets B∗ of S∗, the set L(Γ, p, B∗) is a compact 1-
dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary. Moreover, (t, σ) is a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B∗) if
and only if either σij = 0 for exactly one sij ∈ B∗, or exactly one sij 6∈ B∗ is a best response to
σ−i, or t = 0, or t = 1.
Proof See Section 3.7. 2
This theorem implies that, for almost every Γ and p, for all admissible subsets B∗ of S∗ the
set L(Γ, p, B∗) consists of a finite number of smooth arcs and loops (see for instance Mas-
Colell (1985), H.1.(vi)). The structure of L(Γ, p, B∗) is therefore a simple one; all kinds of
complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solution sets, diverging behavior,
etc. are excluded. Theorem 3.2 does not claim that the set L(Γ, p, B∗) is non-empty. Since
the empty set qualifies as a k-dimensional manifold for any k by definition, a 1-dimensional
manifold may be empty.
1G is endowed with a measure in the standard way, for details see for instance van Damme (1987), page 25.
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To prove Theorem 3.2, it is first shown that, for generic Γ and p, O(Γ, p, B∗) is a com-
pact 1-dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary. By Theorem 3.1, this property carries over to
L(Γ, p, B∗). Notice that the set O(Γ, p, B∗) is described in (1)-(8) as a system of equalities and
inequalities with 2m∗ + n equations and 2m∗ + n + 1 unknowns. A 1-dimensional solution set
is therefore what one expects.
The set L(Γ, p, B∗) consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. If it contains some arcs,
it also has a boundary. The next result makes some very precise statements on the properties of
boundary points.
Theorem 3.3 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure such that a boundary point (t, σ) of L(Γ, p, B∗) is either
(i) not a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B¯∗) for all B¯∗ 6= B∗ and lies in {0, 1} × Σ,
(ii) or, is a boundary point of exactly one L(Γ, p, B¯∗) with B¯∗ 6= B∗ and belongs to (0, 1)×Σ.
Moreover, B∗ and B¯∗ differ in exactly one element, say sij , for which σij = 0 and sij is a
best response to σ−i in Γt.
Proof By Theorem 3.2 it follows that in a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B∗) exactly one of the
inequalities (5)-(8) is binding. If the binding inequality is (7) or (8) alternative (i) holds. If
one of the inequalities from (5) or (6) is binding, the second alternative holds. More precisely,
if an inequality from (5) is binding, it holds for exactly one sij ∈ B∗ that σij = 0 and the
boundary point of L(Γ, p, B∗) is also a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B¯∗), where B¯∗ = B∗\{sij}; if
an inequality from (6) is binding, it holds that λij = 0 for exactly one sij 6∈ B∗ and the boundary
point of L(Γ, p, B∗) is also a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B¯∗), where B¯∗ = B∗ ∪ {sij}. 2
If L(Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in (0, 1) × Σ, then there is a unique admissible subset B¯∗
such that L(Γ, p, B¯∗) has this boundary point in common with L(Γ, p, B∗). The cardinality of
B¯∗ is one less or one greater than the cardinality of B∗, depending on whether in the common
boundary point a strategy in B∗ is played with probability zero, or whether a strategy not in B∗
is a best response. The uniqueness of the set B¯∗ implies that the sets L(Γ, p, B∗) and L(Γ, p, B¯∗)
are nicely linked to each other. Generically, it does not happen that three sets have a common
boundary point, nor does it happen that a boundary point of one set intersects the interior of
another set. All this implies that L(Γ, p) does not display bifurcations.
If L(Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in {0, 1}×Σ, then this point does not belong to any other
set L(Γ, p, B¯∗). This implies that such a boundary point is also a boundary point of L(Γ, p).
Formally, the structure of L(Γ, p) is as follows.
Theorem 3.4 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure such that L(Γ, p) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise C∞ manifold with boundary.
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The boundary of L(Γ, p) is given by the intersection of L(Γ, p) and {0, 1}×Σ. There is a unique
boundary point in {0} × Σ.
Proof See Section 3.7. 2
For almost every Γ and p, the set L(Γ, p) consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. Al-
though it is not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are smooth, the number of non-
differentiabilities is finite at most. Theorem 3.3 implies that all arcs in L(Γ, p) start and end in
{0, 1} × Σ. Each such path consists of a finite sequence of smooth arcs of the sets L(Γ, p, B∗).
A loop in L(Γ, p) consists either of a finite sequence (at least two) of differentiable arcs in the
sets L(Γ, p, B∗) or is a loop of one set L(Γ, p, B∗).
Generically, each player i has a unique best response to the prior, so generically there is
exactly one point of L(Γ, p) that belongs to {0}×Σ. This point is both a corner point of {0}×Σ
and a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B∗), where B∗ consists of the following n strategies: for each
player the best response to the prior. By Theorem 3.4 this point is the starting point of a uniquely
defined arc of L(Γ, p). This arc is the unique feasible path of L(Γ, p) that transforms prior beliefs
into equilibrium beliefs.
Theorem 3.5 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure such that the linear tracing procedure is well-defined.
By following the feasible path starting in the unique point L(Γ, p)∩({0}∩Σ) a Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ is found. The set L(Γ, p) ∩ ({1} × Σ) consists of all equilibria of the game
Γ. Precisely one of these equilibria is an element of the feasible path of L(Γ, p). Any other
equilibrium is a boundary point of L(Γ, p) and is therefore part of some arc of L(Γ, p). A
moment of reflection makes clear that the remaining equilibria are pairwise connected by arcs
from L(Γ, p), and so the number of Nash equilibria is odd.
Theorem 3.6 There exists open set of games Γ ∈ G with full Lebesgue measure such that the
number of Nash equilibria is odd.
Next an example follows in order to illustrate the theorems. Consider the game Γ depicted in
Figure 3.1 coming from Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In this game, player 1 is the row player
having strategies s11 and s12. Player 2 is the column player having strategies s21 and s22. For
each cell, the payoff to player 1 is displayed in the upper-left corner. The payoff to player 2 is
displayed in the lower-right corner. So, when player 1 plays his first strategy s11 and player 2
plays his first strategy s21, player 1 obtains a payoff of 2 and player 2 obtains a payoff of 1.
Take for the prior p = (p1, p2) =
(
(1
2
, 1
2
), (2
3
, 1
3
)
)
. Expecting that player 2 plays his first
strategy with probability 2/3 and his second strategy with probability 1/3, by playing s11 player 1
expects a payoff of 2
3
· 2 + 1
3
· 0 = 4
3
. By playing s12, player 1 expects a payoff of 13 . Expecting
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Figure 3.1: Game Γ.
that player 1 plays according to the prior, player 2 expects 1
2
by playing s21 and 2 by playing s22.
Clearly, this prior yields the game Γ0 depicted in Figure 3.2 as our starting game.
s11
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s21 s
2
2
4
3
4
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
2
2
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2
4+2t
3
4−4t
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1−t
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3
1+t
2
1−t
2
2−2t
2+2t
Figure 3.2: Games Γ0 and Γt.
The game Γt of Figure 3.2 equals (1 − t) · Γ0 + t · Γ. In Table 3.1 the set L(Γ, p, B∗) is
described for all admissible sets B∗. Figure 3.3 shows the entire graph of the linear tracing
procedure L(Γ, p) = ⋃B∗ L(Γ, p, B∗).
B∗ L(Γ, p, B∗)
{s11, s21}
{
(t, (s11, s
2
1))
∣∣ t ∈ [3
5
, 1]
}
{s11, s22}
{
(t, (s11, s
2
2))
∣∣ t ∈ [0, 1
2
]
}
{s12, s21} ∅
{s12, s22}
{
(t, (s12, s
2
2))
∣∣ t ∈ [1
2
, 1]
}
{s11, s21, s22}
{
(3
5
, (s11, (r, 1− r)))
∣∣ r ∈ [1
9
, 1]
}
{s12, s21, s22} ∅
{s11, s12, s21} ∅
{s11, s12, s22}
{
(1
2
, ((r, 1− r), s22)) | r ∈ [0, 1]
}
{s11, s12, s21, s22}
{
(t, ((5t+3
10t
, 5t−3
10t
), (2t−1
3t
, t+1
3t
)))
∣∣ t ∈ [3
5
, 1]
}
Table 3.1: Description of the sets L(Γ, p, B∗).
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Figure 3.3: The linear tracing procedure.
The feasible path of the linear tracing procedure starts in the point (0, (s11, s22)) with B∗ =
{s11, s22}. As long as t < 12 , the equalities (1)-(4) determine the feasible path. At t = 12 inequality
(6) belonging to strategy s12 is binding, which implies that the second pure strategy of player 1 is
a best response to a belief of player 1 that puts probability 1/2 on the prior and probability 1/2
on strategy s22. A further continuation of the path determined by the equalities (1)-(4) without
changing the set B∗ would make the value of λ12 negative and thereby violates inequality (6). The
set B∗ has to be expanded by including strategy s12. Our new B∗ becomes {s11, s12, s22}. Continue
following the feasible path from
(
1
2
, (s11, s
2
2)
)
, leads to the point
(
1
2
, (s12, s
2
2)
)
. Continuing with
the current B∗ violates inequality (5), since σ11 becomes negative. Strategy s11 has to be removed
from B∗ and the new B∗ becomes {s12, s22}. The equalities (1)-(4) related to this B∗ determine
the remainder of the path leading to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The observations made so far suggest the following algorithm for the computation of the
Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in n-person games. Define the admissible
set B∗ that contains for each player i the best response to the prior and start with a point (0, σ)
in L(Γ, p, B∗) such that σi is a best response of player i to the prior. Theorem 3.4 implies that
B∗ and σ are uniquely determined. The equalities (1)-(4) belonging to this B∗ determine at least
a part of the feasible path. As long as the inequalities (5)-(8) hold with strict inequality the set
B∗ stays unchanged. As soon as one of the inequalities from (5) or (6) gets binding, the set B∗
needs to be changed. When the binding inequality belongs to (5), say σij = 0 while sij ∈ B∗,
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strategy sij has to be removed from B∗. Obviously, this cannot happen for the set B∗ obtained at
the start. If the binding inequality belongs to (6), say λij = 0 while sij 6∈ B∗, strategy sij has to
be added to B∗. In both situations there is a strategy sij for which σij = 0 and λij = 0. In general
this leads to a kink in the feasible path of the linear tracing procedure. This procedure is repeated
with our new B∗. Note that inequality (7) is only binding in the starting point. When inequality
(8) is binding, a Nash equilibrium is found.
In Figure 3.3 it can be seen that the linear tracing procedure determines a whole range of
equilibria at t = 1
2
. In general, it is even possible that the linear tracing procedure buckles and
moves backwards in t (see Section 4.19 of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for an explicit example).
3.4 A differentiable approach
The previous section presents a method that can be used for the computation of a Nash equi-
librium, in particular the Nash equilibrium selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory. A potential
drawback of that method is that one has to check continuously whether the system of equalities
used is still appropriate, and if not, one has to switch between different systems of equalities.
The idea of switching homotopies has only been used in the literature recently. In the context
of general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets switching homotopies are used by Brown,
DeMarzo and Eaves (1996). In the present set-up, switching homotopies can be a serious prob-
lem in terms of computing time. There are
∏
i∈N(2
mi − 1) different sets B∗, whereas each one
of them may be visited several times in the course of the algorithm.
In the remaining of this section it is shown that for the problem of computing Nash equilibria,
switching homotopies can be avoided. It is possible to formulate one, everywhere differentiable,
homotopy. To obtain differentiability a well-chosen transformation of variables is used, which
is also used in Garcia and Zangwill (1981), and Herings and Schmedders (2001). Define for all
α ∈ Rm∗
σij(α) = [max{0, αij}]2 and λij(α) = [max{0,−αij}]2.
After this transformation of variables, the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions that provide nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for σi to be a best response against σ¯−i in the game Γt¯ become
vi(t¯; σ¯−i(α), sij) + λ
i
j(α)− µi = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N),
λij(α) ≥ 0, σij(α) ≥ 0, λij(α)σij(α) = 0, (si ∈ Si, i ∈ N)∑
sij∈S
iσij(α)− 1 = 0, (i ∈ N).
Owing to the proposed transformation of variables, the conditions λij(α) ≥ 0, σij(α) ≥ 0 and
λij(α)σ
i
j(α) = 0 are trivially satisfied. The (in)equalities in (1)-(8) that characterize the set
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O(Γ, p, B∗) correspond to solutions (t, α, µ) ∈ R×Rm∗×Rn with αij ≥ 0 if sij ∈ B∗ and αij ≤ 0
if sij /∈ B∗ such that
(a) vi(t;σ−i(α), sij) + λ
i
j(α)− µi = 0, (si ∈ Si, i ∈ N),
(b)
∑
sij∈S
i σij(α)− 1 = 0, (i ∈ N),
(c) t ≥ 0,
(d) − t+ 1 ≥ 0.
Looking at the system of equalities and inequalities (a)-(d) it is striking that the set B∗ has
disappeared. The same system of equalities and inequalities can be used, irrespective of the set
B∗. The role of B∗ is taken over by the vector α; more precisely, by the sign-combinations
of the components of α. Actually, given a point (t, α, µ) satisfying the (in)equalities (a)-(d),
a set B∗ such that (t, σ(α), λ(α), µ) satisfies the (in)equalities (1)-(8) for this particular B∗ is
easily reconstructed. More precisely, such a set B∗ consists of all strategies sij for which αij is
positive and does not contain strategies sij for which αij is negative. Admissibility is trivially
satisfied since by (b) it follows that for each player i there is at least one strategy sij such that αij
is positive. Figure 3.4 illustrates the relation between the vector α and the set B∗.
sij 6∈ B∗ sij ∈ B∗
αij
σij
σij(α)
sij 6∈ B∗ sij ∈ B∗
αij
λij
λij(α)
Figure 3.4: Relation between σij and αij and between λij and αij .
Counting equations and unknowns in the system (a)-(d) shows that there is one degree of
freedom, and therefore one expects a 1-dimensional solution set. Consider any solution (t, α, µ)
to (a)-(d). When αij = 0, then both σij(α) and λij(α) are zero. This implies that there are exactly
two admissible subsets of S∗ for which the set of (in)equalities (1)-(8) are satisfied. If along a
solution curve αij is increasing while passing zero, then σij(α) gets positive and B∗new = B∗old ∪
{sij}. If αij is decreasing while passing zero, then λij(α) gets positive and B∗new = B∗old\{sij}.
Whenever αij passes zero, a kink occurs in L(Γ, p).
The left-hand sides of the equalities (a)-(b) specify the homotopy H : [0, 1] × Rm∗× Rn →
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R
m∗× Rn,
H(t, α, µ) =
(
vi(t;σ−i(α), sij) + λ
i
j(α)− µi (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N)∑
sij∈S
i σij(α)− 1 (i ∈ N)
)
.
The homotopy function H is continuously differentiable.2 The inequalities (c) and (d) are satis-
fied as the homotopy takes [0, 1] as the domain for the variable t. It has the salient feature that
its zeros describe the linear tracing procedure, (t, α, µ) ∈ H−1({0}) ⇔ (t, σ(α)) ∈ L(Γ, p).
Starting at the unique point (0, α0, µ0) ∈ H−1({0}) at t = 0 and following the path described
by the zeros of H, we end up in a point (1, α˜, µ˜) ∈ H−1({0}). This point generates the Nash
equilibrium σ(α˜) of Γ selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory.
Theorem 3.7 specifies the structure of the set of solutions to the homotopy, H−1({0}).
Theorem 3.7 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure such that H−1({0}) is a compact 1-dimensional C1 manifold with boundary. The
boundary of H−1({0}) equals the intersection of H−1({0}) and {0, 1} × Rm∗× Rn. There is
a unique boundary point in {0} × Rm∗× Rn.
Proof See Section 3.7. 2
The set H−1({0}) consists of finitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All arcs start and end
in {0, 1}×Rm∗×Rn. Loops have no points in common with {0, 1}×Rm∗×Rn. There is exactly
one arc that starts in {0} ×Rm∗×Rn and that ends in {1} ×Rm∗×Rn with a point (1, α˜, µ˜) that
generates the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure. This arc is a transformation of
the feasible path of the tracing procedure. All other arcs start and end in {1} × Rm∗× Rn and
connect two points inducing Nash equilibria of Γ.
The structure ofH−1({0}) is even simpler than the one of L(Γ, p). Not only, like for L(Γ, p),
are complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions sets, diverging behav-
ior, etc. excluded. The arcs and loops in H−1({0}) are differentiable everywhere. It is the
transformation of variables that smoothes out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible
to calculate the derivative at each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow
the path by means of differentiable as opposed to simplicial methods.
It is very convenient to describe the variables t, σ, λ, α and µ as functions of pathlength τ . By
doing so, the feasible path of the linear tracing procedure of Figure 3.3 is as shown in Figure 3.5.
The plot in panel (a) of Figure 3.5 shows t, σ and λ as a function of pathlength. To make the
picture more clear, only informative values of the variables are depicted. In particular this means
that for each pure strategy sij , either σij or −λij is plotted, depending on which one is non-zero.
2When for the transformation a power of 1 + ξ would have been used, the homotopy-function would be r times
continuously differentiable, where r = bξc, that is, the largest integer smaller than ξ.
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Figure 3.5: Homotopy-variables of the linear tracing procedure as a function of pathlength τ .
The plot in panel (b) of Figure 3.5 shows the values of t and α as a function of pathlength and
therefore corresponds to the feasible path of the tracing procedure after the transformation.
The first plot shows that kinks appear for all variables when s11 and s12 are passing zero. In
the second plot no kinks appear at all. In that plot, when s11 or s12 passes zero, the derivatives of
all variables with respect to pathlength are equal to zero, except the variable passing zero. This
is a general phenomenon and follows from the proofs in Section 3.7.
3.5 Implementation
This section is devoted to the implementation of the homotopy function. Because of differentia-
bility of the homotopy path, it is possible to apply standard numerical path-following techniques
that are available in professionally programmed software.
What is programmed are a number of FORTRAN-subroutines belonging to the software-
package HOMPACK, a FORTRAN77 program (see Watson, Billups and Morgan (1987)).3 HOM-
PACK provides three qualitatively different algorithms for tracking the zero curve of the homo-
topy: ordinary differential equation-based, normal flow, and augmented Jacobian matrix. Sepa-
rate routines are also provided for dense and sparse matrices. The algorithm used for the imple-
mentation is FIXPDF, which is an ordinary differential equation-based algorithm working with
dense Jacobian matrices. FIXPDF is chosen because it is more robust than the other algorithms
3http://www.netlib.org/hompack/index.html
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even though this may come at the cost of higher computing times.
The homotopy path is parameterized by pathlength τ . Thus t = t(τ), α = α(τ) and µ = µ(τ)
along the homotopy path, andH(t(τ), α(τ), µ(τ)) = 0 identically in τ . The differential equation
is characterized by
d
dτ
H(t(τ), α(τ), µ(τ)) = ∂H(t(τ), α(τ), µ(τ)) ·

 dt/dτdα/dτ
dµ/dτ

 = 0,
∥∥∥∥
(
dt
dτ
,
dα
dτ
,
dµ
dτ
)∥∥∥∥
2
= 1,
and initial conditions given by
(t(0), α(0), µ(0)) = H−1({0}) ∩ ({0} × Rm∗× Rn).
The homotopy path corresponds to the trajectory of the initial value problem. When t(τ¯) = 1,
(α(τ¯), µ(τ¯)) is a zeropoint of H and σ(α(τ¯)) is a Nash equilibrium of game Γ with equilibrium
payoff µ(τ¯). Details on how to solve the initial value problem can be found in Watson (1979)
and Watson and Fenner (1980).
The homotopy function that is implemented is the one as described in Section 3.4. It may be
possible to improve on computing times by using a transformation with a power less than 2, or
by rescaling utilities and probabilities. Moreover, HOMPACK provides the possibility to adjust a
number of parameters, mainly related to the accuracy by which the homotopy path is followed.
An extensive digress on the optimal numerical implementation of the homotopy is beyond the
scope of the current analysis.
Among others the algorithm is applied to the example of Harsanyi and Selten from the pre-
vious sections. Figure 3.6 shows five plots. The first plot corresponds to the homotopy-variable
t and is plotted with respect to pathlength τ . Each of the other four plots correspond to the
homotopy-variables α11, α12, α21, and α22. These variables are also plotted as a function of path-
length. For all five plots, the dotted lines show the analytical solution path and the solid lines
show the numerical solution paths.
For a number of pairs (n,m), where n is the number of players and m the common number
of pure strategies they have, five games are generated randomly. All payoffs are chosen inde-
pendently from one another out of the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The prior is chosen such
that the players play all their strategies with equal probability. Table 3.2 shows the mean time
in seconds (the upper number) and the mean number of function evaluations (the lower number)
needed to compute a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, between brackets, the standard deviations
are given.4
4The computations were performed on a PC operating under Windows 98 with an Intel Pentium II 350 MHz
processor and 64 Mb workspace.
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Figure 3.6: The behavior of the homotopy-variables along the zero curve as a function of path-
length τ .
The table shows that computation times were less than one minute for most cases analyzed.
The standard deviation of computation times is fairly large. This can be explained by the fact
that sometimes the best response to the prior is a Nash equilibrium, in which case the homotopy
path is a straight line from t = 0 to t = 1. In other cases, none of the strategies played with
positive probability against the prior is played with positive probability in a Nash equilibrium.
The resulting homotopy path is curly and takes a long time to be tracked.
The table clearly conveys the impression that the mean computation time and the mean num-
ber of function evaluations is greater when a large number of agents each have a small number of
pure strategies than when a small number of agents each have many pure strategies (in the table
horizontally the numbers increase faster than vertically).
The maximal inaccuracy of our calculation amounts to 10−4, which means that the 2-norm
of the value of the homotopy function is less than 10−4 in the computed equilibrium. From
the specification of the homotopy function, this implies that the gain in payoff from a unilateral
deviation by a player is at most 10−4.
For the same pairs (n,m), Table 3.3 shows an estimation of the mean number of Nash equilib-
ria with between brackets the standard error of the estimation (see Table 9 of McLennan (1999)).
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m\n 2 3 4 5
2 0.28 (0.13) 0.40 (0.05) 0.79 (0.19) 2.28 (1.15)
44.20 (23.79) 143.60 (20.94) 136.40 (40.92) 178.40 (111.69)
3 0.33 (0.09) 1.57 (0.56) 7.48 (4.29) 44.87 (12.10)
127.40 (33.70) 272.60 (156.79) 355.40 (227.83) 455.20 (122.19)
4 0.51 (0.32) 2.73 (0.61) 104.94 (108.22) 519.44 (332.60)
151.60 (152.50) 197.40 (54.04) 1036.80 (945.71) 824.40 (381.34)
5 0.98 (0.31) 16.89 (12.02) 360.16 (250.91)
233.20 (98.51) 589.20 (362.91) 1215.40 (730.73)
6 1.14 (0.35) 24.84 (25.97) 442.47 (147.78)
182.00 (64.39) 461.80 (481.87) 686.00 (201.86)
7 2.51 (1.39) 51.59 (43.43)
339.60 (207.47) 520.60 (396.45)
8 3.97 (1.74) 179.90 (162.42)
408.60 (183.76) 941.40 (788.42)
9 4.37 (3.27)
345.20 (276.51)
10 5.74 (1.75)
333.80 (78.00)
Table 3.2: Average computation times and average number of function evaluations.
The numbers in the table suggests that multiplicity of Nash equilibria is a serious problem in
game theory and that the specific method used for equilibrium selection is of crucial importance.
m\n 2 3 4 5
2 1.31 (0.13) 2.15 (0.20) 4.49 (0.40) 6.98 (0.43)
3 1.52 (0.12) 3.76 (0.33) 18.01 (1.22) 81.82 (3.32)
4 1.77 (0.18) 12.66 (1.13) 82.49 (3.87) 879.24 (32.94)
5 2.64 (0.44) 27.23 (2.78) 440.02 (18.86)
6 2.61 (0.52) 65.69 (4.19) 2036.54 (65.98)
7 4.62 (0.41) 151.80 (3.88)
8 5.52 (0.37) 355.63 (8.60)
9 6.74 (0.44)
10 8.55 (0.54)
Table 3.3: Average number of equilibria.
The algorithm also provides the possibility to investigate how sensitive the Nash equilibrium
selected by the linear tracing procedure is with respect to the choice of the prior. For the same
pairs as before, five such games are randomly generated and for each game a Nash equilibrium
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is computed for five randomly generated priors. Table 3.4 shows the average number of different
Nash equilibria found, with the standard deviation given between brackets.
m\n 2 3 4 5
2 1.00 (0.00) 1.20 (0.45) 1.40 (0.55) 1.40 (0.89)
3 1.00 (0.00) 2.20 (0.84) 2.60 (1.14) 3.80 (0.84)
4 1.20 (0.45) 2.40 (0.89) 4.00 (0.71) 4.60 (0.89)
5 1.40 (0.55) 2.20 (1.10) 4.00 (1.41)
6 1.20 (0.45) 2.40 (0.89) 4.80 (0.45)
7 1.80 (0.45) 3.40 (0.55)
8 1.60 (0.89) 2.80 (1.48)
9 1.40 (0.89)
10 2.00 (1.00)
Table 3.4: Multiplicity by variation of prior.
Since five different priors are tried, the maximal number of different Nash equilibria that can
be found in this set-up is five. Notice that for cases with 4 or 5 players, each having at least 4 pure
strategies, the average number found in our computations is above four, so close to the maximum
possible. When the number of players is 2, the average number of different Nash equilibria found
is less than two, so close to the minimum possible. This confirms again that games with many
players are far more difficult in all respects than games with few players. It also shows that
multiplicity of Nash equilibria is a serious problem, and that the equilibrium selection method
used is likely to be crucial.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter it is shown that generically the linear tracing procedure consists of a finite number
of piecewise smooth arcs and loops. From this structure it is concluded that the linear tracing
procedure is well-defined for almost all normal form games. An everywhere differentiable ho-
motopy function is defined, whose zeros correspond one-to-one to elements of the linear tracing
procedure. From this it is proved that the set of zeros of the homotopy function consists of a
finite number of smooth arcs and loops. Finally, this homotopy function is used to compute the
equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure numerically. The unique smooth feasible path is
followed using a mathematical software package, which is able to follow smooth homotopy-paths
numerically. In this way, the first globally convergent algorithm that exploits the differentiability
present in normal form games is constructed. The numerical performance of the algorithm is
analyzed extensively. Further, it is showed that multiple equilibria can be found by varying the
prior expectations.
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3.7 Proofs
Fix the number of players, the number of pure strategies for each player, and fix a prior p ∈ Σ.
For any tuple of utility functions u and any admissible subset B∗, define the functions gB∗,u :
R
1+2m∗+n → R2m∗+n and hB∗,u : R1+2m∗+n → Rm∗+2 in such a way that gB∗,u equals the left-
hand side of the equalities (1)-(4) and hB∗,u the left-hand side of the inequalities (5)-(8),
gB
∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ) =


vi(t;σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µi (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N)
σij (s
i
j 6∈ Bi, i ∈ N)
λij (s
i
j ∈ Bi, i ∈ N)∑
sij∈S
i σij − 1 (i ∈ N)


and
hB
∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ) =


σij (s
i
j ∈ Bi, i ∈ N)
λij (s
i
j 6∈ Bi, i ∈ N)
t
−t+ 1

 .
A point (t, σ, λ, µ) is a solution of the system of equations and inequalities (1)-(8) if and only if
gB
∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ) = 0 and hB∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ) ≥ 0.
Once the number of players and the number of pure strategies of each player are fixed, a
normal form game is completely determined by the tuple of utility functions u, which can be
represented by a vector in Rmn. The standard topology and measure on Rmn therefore induce a
topology and a measure on games. For every u ∈ Rmn, we define the functions gB∗ : R1+2m∗+n×
R
nm → R2m∗+n and hB∗ : R1+2m∗+n × Rnm → Rm∗+2 by gB∗(t, σ, λ, µ, u) = gB∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ)
and hB∗(t, σ, λ, µ, u) = hB∗,u(t, σ, λ, µ). Figure 3.7 presents the matrix of derivatives of the
functions gB∗ and hB∗ with respect to all variables, where
E(i, si
′
j′) =
{
1 if i = i′
0 otherwise
,
∂uk(s−k,sk
`
)v
i(t;σ−i, sij) = 0 if sij 6= sk` for all s−k ∈ S−k,
and
∑
s−i∈S−i∂ui(s−i,sij)v
i(t;σ−i, sij) = 1.
Each row in Figure 3.7 corresponds to one of the equalities and inequalities in (1)-(8). To
make the figure more clear, derivatives with respect to σ are first taken for sij ∈ B∗. The first
applies to the derivatives with respect to λ and the ordering of the equalities in (1). From the
properties of the matrix, it follows that the matrices ∂uv and E have full row rank.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
∂t ∂σ
B∗ S
∗\B∗
∂λ
B∗ S
∗\B∗
∂µ ∂u
B∗
S∗\B∗
∂tv(·) ∂σv(·)m∗
m∗
n
m∗
1
1
1 m∗ m∗ n mn
I 0
0 I
−E> ∂uv(·)
0 0 I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0
0 E 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0
Figure 3.7: The matrix of derivatives of gB∗ and hB∗ .
The structure of the proof of Theorem 3.2 is as follows. First, it is shown that for almost
all games u, M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u] is a regular constraint set, from which the manifold structure of
L(Γ, p, B∗) follows immediately (see Chapter 2.4 for some notations and definitions from the
theory of regular constraint sets and see also Herings (1997) for a first application of this theory
in economics). Next it is shown that there is an open set of full measure for which the manifold
structure holds. The proof of the first part is done when it is shown that for almost all games u,
for every x¯ ∈M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u],{
∂xg
B∗,u
j (x¯)
>
∣∣∣ j ∈ J1 } ∪ { ∂xhB∗,uj (x¯)> ∣∣∣ j ∈ J0(x¯) }
is a set of independent vectors, where J1 represents the set of rows from (1)-(4) and J0(x¯) the
set of rows from (5)-(8) for which hj(x¯) = 0. To show this we need three lemmas, Lemmas 3.8,
3.9 and 3.10. Lemma 3.8 is used to handle points x¯ for which J0(x¯) = ∅, Lemma 3.9 deals with
points x¯ such that the cardinality of J0(x¯) is one, and Lemma 3.10 implies that J0(x¯) contains
one element at most.
Lemma 3.8 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Then, for almost all
u, gB
∗,u t>{0}.
Proof Consider a point (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0. The matrix of partial
derivatives of gB∗ at (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is given by the rows (1)-(4) in Figure 3.7. We show first that
this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that gB∗ t>{0}.
Since ∂uv(·) has full row rank and the derivative with respect to u in (2)-(4) is zero, it is suf-
ficient to show that the part of the matrix given by (2)-(4) has full row rank. Since the derivative
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with respect to λ in (3) has full row rank, whereas the derivative with respect to λ in (2) and (4)
is zero, it is sufficient to show that the rows in (2) and (4) are independent. The admissibility of
B∗ implies that the derivative with respect to σB∗ in (4) has full row rank. Since, the derivative
with respect to σB∗ in (2) is zero, the only thing left to prove is that (2) has independent rows,
which is obvious from the derivative with respect to σS∗\B∗ . Consequently, gB
∗
t>{0}.
By the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.26, and since gB∗ is a C∞ function, it follows that
the complement of {u ∈ Rnm | gB∗,u t>{0} } has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Lemma 3.9 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Moreover, let an
inequality j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗ + 2} be given. Then, for almost all u, (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ )t>{0}.
Proof Take (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0 and hB∗j′ (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0. The matrix
of partial derivatives of (gB∗ , hB∗j′ ) at (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is given in Figure 3.7 by the rows (1)-(4) and
a single row related to hB∗j′ in (5)-(8). First it is shown that this matrix has full row rank, from
which it follows that (gB∗ , hB∗j′ )t>{0}.
If row j′ belongs to (6), (7) or (8), then it follows from the derivative with respect to λS∗\B∗
or from the derivative with respect to t that row j′ has rank 1. Since all other derivatives in row
j′ are zero, it follows as in the proof of Lemma 3.8 that the rows of (1)-(4) together with row j′
are independent. Consider the case where row j′ belongs to (5). Following the first part of the
proof of Lemma 3.8, it suffices to prove that (2) and (4) together with row j′ are independent.
Inequality hB∗j′ states that σij′ ≥ 0, sij′ ∈ B∗, and this inequality is now required to hold with
equality. Since
∑mi
j=1 σ
i
j − 1 = 0, it follows that |B∗ ∩ Si| > 1. Then the row related to sij′
together with (2) and (4) trivially form an independent set. Consequently, (gB∗ , hB∗j′ )t>{0}. By
the transversality theorem it follows that the complement of {u ∈ Rnm | (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ )t>{0}}
has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Lemma 3.10 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Moreover,
let inequalities j′, j′′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗ + 2} with j′ 6= j′′ be given. Then, for almost all u,
(gB
∗,u, hB
∗,u
j′ , h
B∗,u
j
′′ )t>{0}.
Proof Consider the point (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0, hB∗j′ (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0,
and hB∗j′′ (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0. The matrix of partial derivatives of (gB
∗
, hB
∗
j′ , h
B∗
j′′ ) at (t¯, σ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is
given in Figure 3.7 by the rows (1)-(4) and two rows related to hB∗j′ and hB
∗
j′′ in (5)-(8). First it is
shown that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that (gB∗ , hB∗j′ , hB
∗
j′′ )t>{0}.
The case where the two rows are not equal to (7) and (8) is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.9.
Rows (7) and (8) are not independent. However, they cannot be binding simultaneously, because
then it holds that t = 0 and t = 1. Consequently, (gB∗ , hB∗j′ , hB
∗
j′′ )t>{0}. It follows that the
complement of the set {u ∈ Rnm | (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ , hB
∗,u
j′′ )t>{0}} has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2 Fix n and mi, i ∈ N . Fix a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset
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B∗ of S∗. The set U consisting of u ∈ Rmn such that gB∗,u t>{0}, (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ )t>{0} for all
j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗+2}, and (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ , hB
∗,u
j′′ )t>{0} for all j′, j′′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗+2}with j′ 6= j′′,
has full measure by Lemmas 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.
Consider any u ∈ U . It has to be shown that M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u] is a regular constraint set.
Consider any x¯ ∈M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u]. Then, it has to be shown that{
∂xg
B∗,u
j (x¯)
>
∣∣∣ j ∈ J1 } ∪ { ∂xhB∗,uj (x¯)> ∣∣∣ j ∈ J0(x¯) }
is a set of independent vectors. When J0(x¯) = ∅, this is a consequence of Lemma 3.8. When
|J0(x¯)| = 1, this is a consequence of Lemma 3.9. Suppose |J0(x¯)| ≥ 2 and choose two elements,
say j′ and j′′ from J0(x¯). It follows from Lemma 3.10 that{
∂xg
B∗,u
j (x¯)
>
∣∣∣ j ∈ J1 } ∪ { ∂xhB∗,uj′ (x¯)>, ∂xhB∗,uj′′ (x¯)>}
is a set of independent vectors, which leads to a contradiction as the set contains 2m∗ + n + 2
vectors of dimension 2m∗ + n + 1. Consequently, |J0(x¯)| ≤ 1, and M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u] is a regular
constraint set. It follows that O(Γ, p, B∗) is a 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, and that
the boundary ofO(Γ, p, B∗) is given by the elements x¯ ∈M [gB∗,u, hB∗,u] for which |J0(x¯)| = 1.
Therefore, a point inO(Γ, p, B∗) is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the inequalities
in (5)-(8) holds with equality. These properties carry over to L(Γ, p, B∗) since it is diffeomorphic
to O(Γ, p, B∗) by Theorem 3.1.
Compactness of L(Γ, p, B∗) is obvious.
It remains to be shown that there is an open set of games and priors with full Lebesgue
measure for which the asserted properties hold. Let Ω be the set of all noncooperative games and
priors and let ΩB∗ be the subset of Ω consisting of all pairs (Γ, p) for which the transversality
statements in Lemma 3.8, Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 hold. It has already been shown that
Ω\ΩB∗ has Lebesgue measure zero. If (Γ, p) ∈ Ω\ΩB∗ , then there exist (t, σ, λ, µ) ∈ R2m∗+n+1
such that (t, σ, λ, µ,Γ, p) belongs to the set ΞB∗ defined by
ΞB
∗
=
{
(y,Γ, p) ∈ R2m∗+n+1 × Ω
∣∣∣
gB
∗,u,p(y) = 0 and rank
(
∂gB
∗,u,p(y)
) ≤ 2m∗ + n− 1,
∃j′, gB∗,u,p(y) = hB∗,u,pj′ (y) = 0 and rank
(
∂gB
∗,u,p(y)
∂h
B∗,u,p
j′
(y)
)
≤ 2m∗ + n,
∃j′, j′′, j′ 6= j′′, gB∗,u,p(y) = hB∗,u,pj′ (y) = hB
∗,u,p
j′′ (y) = 0
}
.
The notation gB∗,u,p and hB∗,u,p makes the dependence on the prior p explicit. The set ΞB∗ is
closed since it is obtained by finite unions and intersections of closed sets. Define the projection
pi : ΞB
∗ → Ω by
pi(t, σ, λ, µ,Γ, p) = (Γ, p) for all (t, σ, λ, µ,Γ, p) ∈ ΞB∗ .
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It holds that pi(ΞB∗) = Ω\ΩB∗ . Next it is shown that pi is proper, i.e. that pi−1(K) is compact if
K is a compact subset of Ω. Let K be a compact subset of Ω. Clearly, pi−1(K) is a closed subset
of the set ΞB∗ , which is easily seen to be compact, and therefore pi−1(K) is compact. Since the
image by a continuous proper mapping of a closed set is closed, it follows that pi(ΞB∗) = Ω\ΩB∗
is closed, so ΩB∗ is open. Since there is a finite number of admissible subsets B∗ of S∗, the
intersection of the sets ΩB∗ over all admissible subsetsB∗ is an open set of full Lebesgue measure
of games and priors with the properties as stated in the theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.4 Fix any game and any prior in the open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors
p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure of Theorem 3.2. For any B∗ it holds that L(Γ, p, B∗) is a
compact 1-dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary, so it consists of a finite number of arcs and
loops. Each arc in L(Γ, p, B∗) has two endpoints. If it has an endpoint as in alternative (i) of
Theorem 3.3, then it does not belong to any L(Γ, p, B¯∗) for B¯∗ 6= B∗ and lies in {0, 1} × Σ.
Therefore, it is a boundary point of L(Γ, p). If an arc has an endpoint as in alternative (ii) of
Theorem 3.3, then it belongs to (0, 1) × Σ and there exists exactly one B¯∗ 6= B∗ such that this
endpoint is also an endpoint of an arc inL(Γ, p, B¯∗). This arc inL(Γ, p, B¯∗) has another endpoint
that either satisfies alternative (i) of Theorem 3.3 or alternative (ii) of Theorem 3.3. In the former
case an endpoint of L(Γ, p) in {0, 1}×Σ has been found. In the latter case, the endpoint belongs
to (0, 1)× Σ and there is exists exactly one B˜∗ 6= B¯∗ such that this endpoint is also an endpoint
of an arc in L(Γ, p, B˜∗), and so on.
Since there is a finite number of admissible subsets B∗ ⊆ S∗, and each L(Γ, p, B∗) consists
of finitely many arcs and loops, it will either be the case that eventually an arc is generated with
an endpoint as in alternative (i) of Theorem 3.3, or an arc is generated that has been generated
before. In the latter case, a piecewise C∞ loop of L(Γ, p) is found. In the former case, the finite
chain of arcs constitutes a piecewise C∞ arc of L(Γ, p) with endpoints belonging to {0, 1} × Σ.
Indeed, starting from the endpoint already found in {0, 1} × Σ and generating the chain of arcs
in L(Γ, p, B∗) for various admissible subsets B∗, will either lead to another endpoint of L(Γ, p)
in {0, 1} ×Σ or to the generation of an endpoint of some L(Γ, p, B∗) in (0, 1)×Σ that has been
generated before. The latter case is excluded as this point would be an endpoint of three different
arcs, which violates Theorem 3.3. It follows that L(Γ, p) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise
C∞ manifold with boundary, where the boundary is given by the intersection of L(Γ, p) and
{0, 1} ×Σ. The argument to show this is nothing but a nonlinear version of the door-in door-out
principle of Lemke and Howson (1964).
It remains to be shown that there is a unique boundary point in {0}×Σ. Notice that (0, σ) ∈
L(Γ, p) if and only if for all i, σi is a best response against the prior p. If there would be more
than one best response for some player, then there would be at least two pure best responses for
some player when t = 0, which contradicts Lemma 3.10. 2
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Lemma 3.11 There exists an open set of games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G × Σ with full Lebesgue
measure such that ∂(t,α,µ)H(t¯, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all points (t¯, α¯, µ¯) with H(t¯, α¯, µ¯) = 0,
∂(α,µ)H(0, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all (α¯, µ¯) with H(0, α¯, µ¯) = 0, and ∂(α,µ)H(1, α¯, µ¯) has full
rank for all (α¯, µ¯) with H(1, α¯, µ¯) = 0.
Proof Fix any game and any prior in the open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure of Theorem 3.2. In Figure 3.8 the Jacobian of H is shown, where
E(i, si
′
j′) =
{
1 if i = i′
0 otherwise
and
Eα(i, s
i′
j′) =
{
2αi
′
j′ if i = i′
0 otherwise .
To simplify the exposition of this Jacobian, the strategies sij are first ordered according to whether
αij is positive or not.
∂t ∂α
α>0 α≤0
∂µ
α>0
α≤0
m∗
n
1 m∗ n
∂tv(·)
∂σv(·) ∂ασ(·)
0
0
∂αλ(·) −E
>
0 Eα 0 0
Figure 3.8: The Jacobian of the homotopy function H.
The Jacobian ofH can be decomposed as the product of the two matrices shown in Figure 3.9.
The first matrix equals the rows in (1) and (4) of Figure 3.7 when B∗ = {sij ∈ S∗ |αij > 0}.
Because gB∗,u t>{0}, this matrix has full rank. In the second matrix, the notation Λ(2α) is used
to represent a diagonal matrix with the components of the vector 2α on the diagonal. The second
matrix contains at least m∗ zero rows. Since it cannot be the case that two variables αij are zero
at the same time, the second matrix contains at most m∗ + 1 zero rows.
Delete the m∗ zero rows in the middle part of the second matrix and the corresponding
columns in the first matrix. The product of the resulting matrices remains equal to the Jaco-
bian of H. By deleting the zero rows in the second and the corresponding columns in the first
matrix both matrices do not drop rank. For the second matrix this is obvious. For the first matrix,
note that after deletion of the columns, it is equal to the submatrix of Figure 3.7 that results after
applying Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the rows in (2) and (3), and therefore
has full rank.
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∂t ∂σ ∂λ ∂µ
B∗ S
∗\B∗ B∗ S
∗\B∗
B∗
S∗\B∗
m∗
n
1 m∗ m∗ n
∂tv(·) ∂σv(·) I 0
0 I
−E>
0 E 0 0
α>0 α≤0
α>0
α≤0
α>0
α≤0
1
m∗
m∗
n
1 m∗ n
1 0 0
0
Λ(2α) 0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0 Λ(2α)
0
0 0 I
Figure 3.9: Decomposition of the Jacobian of H into two matrices.
If αij 6= 0 for all strategies sij , then the remaining second matrix is a diagonal matrix with non-
zero entries on the diagonal, so it has full rank. As a consequence, the product of the remaining
matrices and thereby the Jacobian of H has full rank.
If αk` = 0 for a certain strategy sk` , then the remaining second matrix has still one zero row.
After deletion of this row, the remaining second matrix still has full rank. After deletion of the
corresponding column, the remaining first matrix also has full rank, as it is equal to the submatrix
of Figure 3.7 that results after applying Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the
rows in (2) and (3), and the row in (6) corresponding to sk` . As the remaining first matrix is a
square matrix, it follows that the product of the remaining matrices, and thereby the Jacobian
of the homotopy function, has full rank. Consequently, ∂(t,α,µ)H(t¯, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all
(t¯, α¯, µ¯) with H(t¯, α¯, µ¯) = 0.
For proving that ∂(α,µ)H(0, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all (α¯, µ¯) with H(0, α¯, µ¯) = 0, and that
∂(α,µ)H(1, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all (α¯, µ¯) withH(1, α¯, µ¯) = 0, consider the matrix in Figure 3.8
without the first column. That matrix can be decomposed as the product of the matrices of
Figure 3.9 with the first column of the first matrix and both the first row and the first column of
the second matrix deleted. The resulting second matrix contains exactly m∗ zero rows, as none of
the variables αij equals zero when t = 0 or t = 1. Delete the m∗ zero rows of the second matrix
and the corresponding columns in the first matrix. The product of the resulting matrices remains
equal to the Jacobian of H. The resulting first matrix is equal to the submatrix of Figure 3.7 that
is obtained after applying Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the rows in (2) and
(3), and the row in (7) when t = 0 or the row in (8) when t = 1. Therefore, both the resulting
first matrix and the resulting second matrix are square matrices with full rank, and so is their
product. Consequently, ∂(α,µ)H(0, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all (α¯, µ¯) with H(0, α¯, µ¯) = 0, and
∂(α,µ)H(1, α¯, µ¯) has full rank for all (α¯, µ¯) with H(1, α¯, µ¯) = 0. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.7 Fix any game and any prior in the open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors
p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure of Theorem 3.2. Consider the following system of equalities
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and inequalities,
H(t, α, µ) = 0,
t ≥ 0,
−t+ 1 ≥ 0.
The set of solutions to this system equals H−1({0}). It is a regular constraint set by Lemma 3.11
and is therefore a 1-dimensional C1 manifold with boundary as described in the theorem. The
compactness ofH−1({0}) follows trivially. The uniqueness of the boundary point in {0}×Rm∗×
R
n carries over from Theorem 3.4. 2
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Chapter 4
Computation of All Equilibria
In this chapter an algorithm is presented to compute all Nash equilibria for games in normal
form on the only premises that the number of Nash equilibria is finite. The algorithm relies on
decomposing the game by means of support-sets. For each support-set, the set of totally mixed
equilibria of the subgame that results by restricting the players to strategies in the support-set,
can be characterized by a system of polynomial equations and inequalities. By solving those
systems for each support-set, all equilibria are found. The algorithm belongs to the class of
homotopy-methods and is implementable. Finally, several techniques to speed up computations
are proposed.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was argued that a further application of game theory to research fields
in which conflicts between agents arise may stagnate when the tools are found not to be powerful
enough. One such tool is an algorithm to compute equilibria and select among equilibria. For
many purposes, having an algorithm to compute a single sample equilibrium might be unsatisfac-
tory. Even if the algorithm is able to select within the complete set of equilibria on perfectness or
some other refinement criterion, it cannot be neglected that there might exist another equilibrium
that is more salient. For some refinements, for example risk dominance, a candidate equilibrium
has to be compared with the other equilibria of the game. Even when an equilibrium for a game
is found, there might exist multiple equilibria with different implications with regard to the orig-
inal problem under consideration. All are motivations for having an algorithm to compute all
equilibria.
For bimatrix games, efficient and implementable algorithms to compute all equilibria ex-
ist. For bimatrix games in which one player has exactly two strategies at its disposal, an al-
gorithm to compute the complete set of Nash equilibria is developed by Borm, Gijsberts, and
Tijs (1987). For the general class of bimatrix games, algorithms are developed by Dickhaut and
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Kaplan (1993) and Kostreva and Kinard (1991).
The algorithm which is implemented in Gambit1 allows for finding all Nash equilibria of an
n-person normal form game via the Liapunov function method described in McKelvey (1996).
This is a continuously differentiable nonnegative function whose zeros coincide with the set
of Nash equilibria of the game. A standard descent algorithm is used to find a constrained
local minimum of the function from any given starting location. All global minima, the local
minima with function value zero, are Nash equilibria of the game under inspection. But, these
functions for computing ‘all’ equilibria will only find all equilibria (for generic games) in a weak
probabilistic sense: Given any number less than one, there is an amount of time such that if the
algorithm is run for at least that amount of time it will find all solutions with probability higher
than that given number. For a general survey on the computation of equilibria, see McKelvey
and McLennan (1996).
The approach enhanced in the present chapter is again the homotopy approach. The set of
Nash equilibria can be represented as the set of solutions to a system of polynomial equations
and inequalities. When the system is decomposed by means of all possible carrier structures
only equations remain for which the solutions have to be computed and subsequently have to be
checked whether they really are equilibria. For the computation of the solutions to the systems of
polynomial equations, the homotopy approach is chosen. For homotopy continuation algorithms
to solve systems of equations and inequalities of multivariate polynomials a large library of
literature is present.
As is well-known, see for instance McLennan (1999), the number of Nash equilibria increases
exponentially in the size of the game. Therefore, the algorithm that is proposed is by definition
exponentially. Exponential algorithms are sometimes loosely described as impractical. If all
problems of interest were large in scale, then indeed such algorithms are not very worthwhile.
The algorithm proposed in this chapter has the property that it generates more and more Nash
equilibria during its execution, so there is no need to wait until it finally terminates. There is also
the flexibility to start searching for particular equilibria, like Nash equilibria in pure strategies,
or Nash equilibria in completely mixed strategies, before turning to others. It is also possible to
efficiently apply parallel computers to speed up computations.
An alternative approach that is addressed in this chapter is one for which no decomposition
is needed. It directly computes the solutions to a set of polynomial equations which again have
to be checked for satisfying some inequalities.
This chapter is organized as follows. Some notations, definitions and general results are given
in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 a method to compute all equilibria is proposed. Section 4.4 deals
in detail with the implementation of the proposed algorithm. In Section 4.5 the algorithm we
1Gambit is a library of game theory software and tools for the construction and analysis of finite extensive and
normal form games. See http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼gambit/Gambit.html.
4.2 Number of equilibria 51
propose is described explicitly. In Section 4.6 an alternative method is mentioned. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Number of equilibria
Consider an n-person noncooperative game in normal form Γ = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉 as de-
fined in Chapter 3. All notations used are similar to that of the previous chapter except when
mentioned otherwise.
From the existence of a Nash equilibrium, it is clear that for any game the number of equi-
libria is larger than or equal to one. It can also be shown that the number of Nash equilibria is
generically odd, see for instance Harsanyi (1973). The exact number of equilibria is not known
and may vary among games. However, some results are known on the number of equilibria of a
normal form game with given size. For generic games, McKelvey and McLennan (1997) have
determined the maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria and in McLennan (1997) the
maximal number of pure Nash equilibria is determined. McLennan (1999) presents a formula
for the expected number of Nash equilibria for a random normal form game for given (finite and
nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies. In Table 4.1, for some numbers of players (n) and
some common number of strategies (m), an estimation of the mean number of Nash equilibria is
displayed with between brackets the standard error of the estimation.2
n\m 2 3 4 5 6
2 1.31 (0.13) 1.52 (0.12) 1.77 (0.18) 2.64 (0.44) 2.61 (0.52)
3 2.15 (0.20) 3.76 (0.33) 12.66 (1.13) 27.23 (2.78) 65.69 (4.19)
4 4.49 (0.40) 18.01 (1.22) 82.49 (3.87) 440.02 (18.86)
5 6.98 (0.43) 81.82 (3.32) 879.24 (32.94)
6 15.75 (0.96) 401.61 (10.77)
Table 4.1: Mean number of equilibria.
McLennan (1999) concludes from these numbers that the average number of Nash equilibria
grows more rapidly than the size of the game, if the size of the game is measured by the number
of pure strategy tuples times the number of players (which equals the number of payoffs in the
game) and that the table clearly conveys the impression that the mean number of equilibria is
greater when a large number of players each have a small number of pure strategies than the
other way around.
2Although Table 4.1 looks quite similar to Table 3.3 of the previous chapter, the presentation is transposed and
other pairs (n,m) are chosen.
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4.3 Equilibria as solutions to systems of equations
In this section a method is presented to reformulate the problem of finding all Nash equilibria
of a normal form game to finding all (finite nonnegative real) zeros of systems of multivariate
polynomials. First a normal form game is decomposed by means of all possible carriers and
secondly all totally mixed equilibria of the games that result by restricting the players to choose
strategies within the predescribed carriers are computed. The ‘subgames’ resulting from carriers
where only two players have more than one strategy are equivalent to bimatrix games. For these
subgames existing algorithms developed for bimatrix games, such as for instance the algorithms
proposed in Dickhaut and Kaplan (1993) and in Kostreva and Kinard (1991), can be applied and
might improve (decrease) computation time.
Let a subset D∗ of S∗ be given with the property that for every player i there is at least
one pure strategy sij in D∗, i.e. Di = D∗ ∩ Si 6= ∅ for every player i.3 Such a set D∗ is
called admissible. Admissible subsets D∗ are used to decompose NE(Γ) in subsets NE(Γ, D∗),
where NE(Γ, D∗) contains those elements of NE(Γ) where only strategies in D∗ are played with
positive probability and all strategies in D∗ are best responses, i.e.
NE(Γ, D∗) =
{
σ ∈ NE(Γ)
∣∣∣ sij 6∈ D∗ ⇒ σij = 0
sij ∈ D∗ ⇒ sij ∈ argmaxsi`∈Siu
i(σ−i, si`)
}
.
The situation where a Nash equilibrium σ is an element of two different sets NE(Γ, D∗) is a
knife-edge case. It can only occur if there is for some player i an optimal strategy which is
played with zero probability. It is easily seen that
NE(Γ) =
⋃
D∗NE(Γ, D
∗).
An admissible subset D∗ of S∗ determines a subgame Γ|D∗ = 〈N, {Di}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉 with Di =
{di1, . . . , di|Di|} the set of pure strategies of player i and the payoff functions restricted to the
set D = i∈ND
i
. A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution on Di. The set
of mixed strategies for player i will be denoted by ∆i, with generic element δi, and we define
∆ = i∈N∆
i
.
Given an admissible subset D∗, define
E(Γ|D∗) =
{
δ ∈ ∆
∣∣∣Di = argmaxdi
`
∈Diu
i(δ−i, di`) for all i ∈ N
}
as the set of all Nash equilibria δ of subgame Γ|D∗ with the property that for all players i ∈ N
it holds that all strategies from Di are best responses to δ−i. Note that for all δ ∈ NE(Γ, D∗) it
3Note that this chapter uses the ‘D’ to denote admissible subsets rather than the ‘B’ which was used in the
previous chapter.
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holds that δ ∈ E(Γ|D∗), i.e. NE(Γ, D∗) ⊆ E(Γ|D∗).4 Elements of E(Γ|D∗) are not necessarily
elements of NE(Γ, D∗), since there may exist an si ∈ S∗\D∗ with ui(δ−i, si) > ui(δ). Therefore
it holds that NE(Γ, D∗) = E(Γ|D∗) ∩ NE(Γ).
If δ ∈ E(Γ|D∗), then
ui(δ−i, dij)− ui(δ−i, di`) = 0, (dij, di` ∈ Di, i ∈ N),∑
dij∈D
iδij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N).
Fix one element d˜i ∈ Di for each player i. This is possible because of the admissibility of the
set D∗. Then the set of solutions to the set of equations above is equivalent to the set of solutions
of the following system of multilinear equations:
(1) ui(δ−i, d˜i)− ui(δ−i, di) = 0, (di ∈ Di \ {d˜i}, i ∈ N),
(2)
∑
dij∈D
iδij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N).
In total, this system has
∑
i∈N(|Di| − 1) + n = |D∗| equations and |D∗| unknows. What one
expects is a zero-dimensional solution set. To state this differently, one expects that the set of
solutions to the system (1)-(2) consists only of a finite number of isolated points.
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, a normal form game can be parameterized by
its payoffs; any game Γ is determined by the set of players, number of actions per player, and
some vector u containing the payoffs of the game. When it is said that a property holds for
(almost) every game Γ, it means that for any specification of the set of players, and the number
of pure strategies per player, the property holds for (almost) every vector u that parameterizes
this game Γ.
For every vector u ∈ Rn|S| and admissible subset D∗, define the function FD∗,u : R|D∗| →
R
|D∗| by the left-hand side of (1)-(2), i.e.
FD
∗,u(δ) =
(
ui(δ−i, d˜i)− ui(δ−i, di) (di ∈ Di \ {d˜i}, i ∈ N)∑
dij∈D
iδij − 1 (i ∈ N)
)
.
The set of solutions E(Γ|D∗) to the system (1)-(2) is a subset of the set of solutions to FD∗,u(δ) =
0. In fact, if δ ∈ E(Γ|D∗), then δ is a nonnegative real solution of FD∗,u(δ) = 0. An element
δ ∈ C|D∗| is an element of E(Γ|D∗) if it solves (1)-(2), and
(a) δij ∈ R+, (dij ∈ Di, i ∈ N).
It follows that δ ∈ C|D∗| is an element of NE(Γ, D∗), and therefore a Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ, if and only if it solves (1)-(2), (a), and
(b) ui(δ)− ui(δ−i, si) ≥ 0, (si ∈ Si \Di, i ∈ N).
4In fact, δ is not an element of Σ, but from ∆. When we use a δ from Σ we actually mean σ(δ) from Σ where
σ(δ) is the trivial extension of δ in ∆: σij(δ) = δij if sij ∈ D∗ and σij(δ) = 0 otherwise.
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Since (1) consists of |D∗| − n polynomials of degree n − 1 and (2) consists of n polynomials
of degree 1, the total degree of the system (1)-(2) is (n − 1)|D∗|−n as being the product of the
degrees of the individual equations. The theorem of Bezout says that the number of solutions
and solutions at infinity, counting multiplicities, is equal to the total degree of the system (see
Subsection 4.4.1).
Theorem 4.1 When the number of solutions inC|D∗| to FD∗,u = 0 is finite, it equals (n−1)|D∗|−n
if solutions are counted by multiplicity and infinite solutions are counted.
The reason that the analysis is done in the complex space is because the number of complex
solutions to FD∗,u(δ) = 0 is known when the solution set consists only of a finite number of
isolated points, and so it is easily checked if all solutions have been found. While in practice the
interest goes out to finding all solutions to the system (1)-(2) that satisfy conditions (a)-(b), by
finding all solutions with their multiplicities, one can be sure that all solutions to FD∗,u(δ) = 0,
or to (1)-(2), with the desired properties (Nash equilibria) have been found.
The number of zeros we calculate in total is the sum of the zeros to FD∗,u over all admissible
subsets D∗ and is equal to∑|S∗|
k=nA(k)(n− 1)(k−n).
Here A(k) is the number of admissible subsets with cardinality k, i.e.5
A(k) =
∑µ¯1
k1=µ1
∑µ¯2
k2=µ2 · · ·
∑µ¯n−1
kn−1=µn−1
∏n
i=1
( |Si|
ki
)
,
where
µi = µi(k1, . . . , ki−1) = max
{
1 ; k −∑i−1j=1kj −∑nj=i+1|Sj|},
µ¯i = µ¯i(k1, . . . , ki−1) = min
{
|Si| ; k −∑i−1j=1kj − (n− i)}, and
kn = kn(k1, . . . , kn−1) = k −∑n−1j=1kj.
Table 4.2 shows how the number of zeros increases when games become larger. For the same
sizes, Table 4.1 showed an estimation of the mean number of Nash equilibria (see Table 9 of
McLennan (1999)). Comparison of the two tables reveals that only a small fraction of the com-
puted points are Nash equilibria.
Although it is known that for an open set of games with full Lebesgue measure the number
of Nash equilibria is finite (see Harsanyi (1973)), it cannot be guaranteed that for the same set of
games the set of (complex) solutions to FD∗,u(δ) = 0 is finite for all admissible subsets D∗. In
fact, up to now, there is no proof present that such a property holds. However, when the vector u
is allowed to be chosen from the complex space, the following holds true.
5Suppose we have n vases where vase i contains |Si| balls. The number A(k) equals the number of possible
outcomes when we pick k balls with the condition that from each vase at least one ball must be picked.
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n\m 2 3 4 5 6
2 9 49 225 961 3969
3 64 2197 64000 1771561 48228544
4 625 194481 52200625 1.3521e+10
5 7776 28629151 9.2390e+10
6 117649 6.3214e+09
Table 4.2: Total number of solutions.
Theorem 4.2 For all admissible subsets D∗, there is an open set of vectors u ∈ Cn|D| with full
Lebesgue measure such that the set of solutions to FD∗,u(δ) = 0 is a compact zero-dimensional
manifold.
Proof See Section 4.8. 2
The set of vectors u for which the property of the theorem above holds for all admissible subsets
equals the intersection of the separate sets over the admissible subsets. Since the number of ad-
missible subsets is finite, it concerns a finite intersection. More precisely, it is a finite intersection
of open sets with full Lebesgue measure.
Theorem 4.3 There is an open set of vectors u ∈ Cn|S| with full Lebesgue measure such that
for all admissible subsets D∗ the set of solutions to FD∗,u(δ) = 0 is a compact zero-dimensional
manifold.
Proof For an admissible subset D∗, let U(D∗) denote the open set of full Lebesgue measure
from Theorem 4.2. Define U = ⋂D∗ U(D∗), where U(D∗) is the class of vectors u ∈ Cn|S|
for which the natural restriction to Cn|D|, u|D∗ , is in U(D∗). That the set U is an open set with
full Lebesgue measure is obvious, as being a finite intersection of open sets with full Lebesgue
measure. 2
This latter result seems rather weak since payoffs are commonly in real numbers, and the set
R
n|S| is a set of measure zero in Cn|S|. However, when a game with payoff-vector u in real
numbers is considered which is not in the generic set of the theorem, a small perturbation of
the payoff-vector (if necessary, complex) suffices to obtain a payoff-vector which is. For this
newly obtained payoff-vector it is possible to compute all candidate equilibria. Since the equi-
librium correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, the candidate equilibria found are close to
– and therefore good approximations of – the equilibria for the original game defined by the
payoff-vector u. Because games are considered for which the number of equilibria is finite and
for which the transversality conditions hold, locally (in the area of interest) the correspondence is
56 Computation of All Equilibria
also lower hemi-continuous, such that each equilibrium can be approximated by using complex
perturbations.
4.4 Implementation
This section presents an algorithm to solve the systems of the previous section. The algorithm
belongs to the class of homotopy-based algorithms. First, a general treatment of homotopy con-
tinuation methods to locate the zeros of a polynomial mapping is given. Next, one specific algo-
rithm is discussed in detail, i.e. the algorithm used in the HOMPACK-routine POLSYS. Finally,
the Gro¨bner basis is introduced as a method to transform the problem of solving a system of
multivariate polynomials to the problem of (subsequently) solving single polynomial equations
with one unknown.
4.4.1 Homotopy continuation
Many papers have been devoted on finding all solutions to a system P of n polynomial equations
in n unknowns using homotopy continuation6 methods on the only premises that the set of zeros
is finite; see Chow, Mallet-Paret and Yorke (1979), Drexler (1977, 1978), Garcia and Li (1980),
Garcia and Zangwill (1979a, 1979b, 1980), Kojima and Mizuno (1983), Mizuno (1981), Morgan
(1983), Morgan and Sommese (1987), Morgan, Sommese and Watson (1989), Wright (1985),
and Zulehner (1988).
A map P : Cn → Cn is polynomial if the maps Pk : Cn → C are polynomials for all
k = 1, . . . , n, i.e. Pk(z) is a sum of terms each of which has the form azb11 zb22 · · · zbnn for some
a ∈ C and some nonnegative integers bj (j = 1, . . . , n). The sum of all bjs is the degree of
the term, and the maximum of the degrees of the terms, dk, is the degree of the polynomial Pk.
The degree of P is given by d =
∏n
k=1 dk. Consider the system P (z) = 0 of n equations in
n unknowns. By Bezout’s Theorem it follows that there are at most d isolated solutions (if the
number of solutions is finite).
Homotopy continuation methods can be used to find all the geometrically isolated solutions
of P (z) = 0. This works as follows. The system P is embedded in a system of n polynomial
equations in n + 1 unknowns where this new system includes the variables of P and a new
variable, the homotopy parameter. For one value of the homotopy parameter, the new system
can be satisfactorily solved, and for another it is identical to P . The continuation process solves
P (z) = 0 by evolving or ‘continuing’ the full set of known solutions resulting for one value of
the homotopy parameter into the full set of solutions to P (z) = 0.
6Homotopy continuation is also called imbedding, continuation or incremental loading.
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The homotopy system is denoted by H(t, z) = 0, where H(1, z) = P (z) for all z and the
solutions to H(0, z) = 0 are known. The homotopy parameter t varies between 0 and 1. The
task is to continue the solutions of H(0, z) = 0 into those of H(1, z) = 0. Assuming sufficient
conditions so that H−1({0}) consists of smooth paths, the continuation towards the solutions
becomes a process of path tracking.
Many issues arise in attempting to implement this concept into a reliable and fast algorithm
for computing all solutions to polynomial systems. Basically, there are two steps:
(1) Define the homotopy H(t, z).
(2) Choose a numerical method for tracking the paths defined by H(t, z) = 0.
The definition chosen in step (1) has to result in smooth paths in H−1({0}) which link the known
solutions of H(0, z) = 0 to the solutions of P (z) = 0. More precisely, it has to be chosen such
that the components of H−1({0}) topologically have the following properties:
1. A component may be a closed arc which intersects each slice {t} × Cn, t ∈ [0, 1], once.
These components correspond to single roots of the system P (z) = 0.
2. A component may consist of m arcs which meet in a single point of {1} × Cn. This point
is a root of the system P (z) = 0 with multiplicity m. Each slice {t} × Cn, t ∈ [0, 1), will
intersect such a component in m points.
3. A component may be a half-open arc which intersects each slice {t} × Cn, t ∈ [0, 1), in a
single point which tends to infinity as t→ 1. Such a component corresponds to an infinite
root.
For the treatment of infinite roots there are two basic solutions: to define the homotopy such that
for t ∈ [0, 1) the equations Hk(t, z) = 0 are one degree higher than the equations Pk(z) = 0,
or to carry out the continuation in the complex projective space, a compactification of Cn which
allows an explicit representation of infinite roots.
For step (2) there are two fundamental methods of numerically tracing those paths: predictor-
corrector methods, and simplicial methods. Predictor-corrector methods approximately follow
exact solution curves, whereas simplicial methods exactly follow approximate solution curves.
For more theory on path-tracking methods the reader is referred to Allgower and Georg (1980,
1983, 1990, 1993) and Garcia and Zangwill (1981).
4.4.2 Hompack
HOMPACK (see Watson, Billups and Morgan (1987)) is a suite of codes that is programmed in
FORTRAN and developed for following homotopy-paths numerically in order to compute fixed
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points or zeros. HOMPACK contains an algorithm, the so-called POLSYS-routine, which allows
to solve completely for systems of polynomial equations on the only premises that the solution
set is finite. Separate routines are provided for dense and sparse matrices. In Morgan, Sommese
and Watson (1989) it is described how the POLSYS routine of the software package HOMPACK
computes all isolated solutions of a polynomial system.
Consider a polynomial map P : Cn → Cn. Define Q : Cn → Cn by
Qk(z) = βkz
dk
k − αk, k = 1, . . . , n,
where αk and βk are nonzero complex numbers, for k = 1, . . . , n. Define the homotopy map
Hα,β : [0, 1]× Cn → Cn by
Hα,β(t, z) = (1− t)Q(z) + tP (z),
where α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Cn and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Cn. The following result of Morgan
(1987, p.124) applies.
Theorem 4.4 Given P , there are sets of measure zero, A and B in Cn such that, if α 6∈ A and
β 6∈ B, then the following holds
1. The solution set {(t, z) ∈ [0, 1)×Cn |Hα,β(t, z) = 0} is a collection of d non-overlapping
(smooth) paths;
2. The paths move from t = 0 to t = 1 without backtracking in t;
3. Each geometrically isolated solution of P (z) = 0 of multiplicity m has exactly m contin-
uation paths converging to it;
4. A continuation path can diverge to infinity only as t→ 1;
5. If P (z) = 0 has no solutions at infinity, all the paths remain bounded. If P (z) = 0 has a
solution at infinity, at least one path will diverge to infinity as t → 1. Each geometrically
isolated solution at infinity of P (z) = 0 of multiplicity m will generate exactly m diverging
continuation paths.
For almost all choices of α and β in Cn, H−1α,β({0}) consists of d smooth paths emanating from
{0}×Cn, which either diverge to infinity as t approaches 1 or converge to a solution to P (z) = 0
as t approaches 1. And, each geometrically isolated solution of P (z) = 0 has a path converging
to it.
In HOMPACK, the algebraic context for generating the full solution list of a polynomial sys-
tem is complex projective space rather than real or complex Euclidean space, thereby immedi-
ately providing a treatment for the infinite roots. For HOMPACK therefore the classical approach
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from algebraic geometry of homogenizing P and establishing the continuation process in pro-
jective space is followed.
The complex projective space, CPn, consists of the lines through the origin in Cn+1, denoted
[(z0, . . . , zn)], where (z0, . . . , zn) ∈ Cn+1 \ {0}; that is, [(z0, . . . , zn)] is the line through the
origin that contains (z0, . . . , zn). CPn can be seen as the disjoint union of points [(z0, . . . , zn)]
with z0 6= 0 identified with the Euclidean space via [(z0, . . . , zn)] → (z1/z0, . . . , zn/z0) and the
‘points at infinity,’ the elements [(z0, . . . , zn)] with z0 = 0.
Given Pk(z1, . . . , zn), let P⊥k (z0, . . . , zn) be defined as follows. Each term of P⊥k is obtained
from the corresponding term of Pk by multiplying it by the power of z0 to bring the degree of
the term up to dk. Thus, a term of Pk of degree δ is multiplied by zdk−δ0 , and consequently each
term of P⊥k has degree dk. Thus, P⊥k (λz) = λdkP⊥k (z), and P⊥k takes all points of [(z0, . . . , zn)]
to the same point. The map P⊥k : CPn → C is the homogenization of the map Pk. Then, P⊥
– all n components P⊥k taken together – is a map form CPn to Cn. Note that if P⊥(z) = 0,
then P⊥(λz) = 0, for any non-zero complex scalar λ. Therefore, ‘solutions’ of P⊥(z) = 0 are
(complex) lines through the origin.
The system P⊥(z0, . . . , zn) = 0 reduces to the system P (z) = 0 under the substitution
z0 = 1. Thus, the two systems can be considered to have the same set of roots in Cn.
Theorem 4.5 There are no more than d isolated solutions to P⊥(y) = 0 in CPn. If P⊥(y) = 0
has only a finite number of solutions in CPn, it has exactly d solutions, counting multiplicities.
To avoid dealing with CPn, a unique point is determined for each solution line. This point is
z ∈ Cn such that either (1, z) is on the solution line, or (0, z) is and the first nonzero component
of z is 1.
4.4.3 Applying the Gro¨bner basis
Let C[z1, . . . , zn] denote the set of all polynomials in n variables with coefficients in C. For
p1, . . . , ps ∈ C[z1, . . . , zn], the variety V (p1, . . . , ps) is defined to be the set of solutions of the
system
p1=0, . . . , ps=0.
That is,
V (p1, . . . , ps) =
{
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Cn | pi(a1, . . . , an) = 0, i = 1, . . . , s
}
.
The set I = 〈p1, . . . , ps〉 = {
∑s
i=1 uipi | ui ∈ C[z1, . . . , zn], i = 1, . . . , s } is an ideal in
C[z1, . . . , zn]; that is, if p, q ∈ I , then so is p + q and if p ∈ I and r is any polynomial in
C[z1, . . . , zn], then rp ∈ I . The set {p1, . . . , ps} is called a generating set of the ideal I . Accord-
ing to Adams and Loustaunau (1994, p.3) the following holds.
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Theorem 4.6 The variety V (I) := {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Cn | p(a1, . . . , an) = 0, p ∈ I} is equal to
the variety V (p1, . . . , ps). Or, stated differently, p=0 (p ∈ I) is equivalent to p1=0, . . . , ps=0.
Now, if we have I = 〈p1, . . . , ps〉 = 〈p′1, . . . , p′t〉, then V (p1, . . . , ps) = V (I) = V (p′1, . . . , p′t).
This means that the system p1 = 0, . . . , ps = 0 has the same solutions as the system p′1 =
0, . . . , p′t = 0, and hence a variety is determined by an ideal, not by a particular set of equa-
tions. If we have a ‘better’ generating set for the ideal I = 〈p1, . . . , ps〉, we will have a ‘better’
representation for the variety V (p1, . . . , ps). By ‘better’ is meant a set of generators that al-
lows us to understand the algebraic structure of I = 〈p1, . . . , ps〉 and the geometric structure
of V (p1, . . . , ps) better. This ‘better’ generating set for I is called a Gro¨bner basis for I (see
Gro¨bner (1949, 1970)). In the case of linear polynomials this ‘better’ generating set is the one
obtained from the row echelon form of the matrix in the system.
Applying Buchberger’s algorithm, see Buchberger (1965), to a zero-dimensional ideal I ,7 a
typical Gro¨bner basis can be found, namely one in ‘triangular’ form (this is similar to the row
echelon form in the linear case). Thus, in order to solve the system of equations determined by
a zero-dimensional ideal I , it suffices to have an algorithm to find the roots of polynomials in
one variable. That is, first the equation in one variable, q1(z1) = 0, is solved. Subsequently, for
each solution α of q1(z1) = 0, the equation q2(α, z2) = 0 is solved. The computation process
continues in this manner all the way until qn(α1, . . . , αn−1, zn) = 0 is solved. The solutions
obtained in this way are the only possible solutions. Finally the solutions are tested by equations
qn+1 = 0, . . . , qt = 0 (in the case when t > n) in order to obtain the set of solutions of the full
system of equations. For a thorough introduction into Gro¨bner bases the reader is referred to
Adams and Loustaunau (1994) and Cox, Little, and O’Shea (1996).
An important advantage of having the triangular structure is that the problem of finding all
zeros of a system of polynomials can be reduced to repeatedly finding all zeros of a single
polynomial. Each step the zeros that are not finite, nonnegative and real can be filtered out,
which increases performance of the algorithm in terms of computation time. A disadvantage
of the application of the Gro¨bner basis is that the degree of the ‘new’ system may increase
enormously, since the number of polynomials as well as the degree of each polynomial separately
may increase.
4.5 Description of algorithm
In this section the proposed algorithm to compute all equilibria is comprehensively described in
a step-wise manner.
7Since the field of concern is the complex space and given the fact that this space is algebraically closed, saying
that the ideal I is zero-dimensional is equivalent to saying that the variety V (I) is finite.
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Step 1. In the first step of the algorithm, the game is decomposed by means of support-sets.
Each decomposition can be seen as a game for which the strategy set of each player is restricted
as only to use strategies that belong to the support-set.
Step 2. When the support-restricted game has a special structure – for instance, when only
two players have more than one strategy such that the support-restricted game is equivalent to
a bimatrix game – it is possible to use existing algorithms especially developed for the class of
games having that structure. In this case we can forward the found candidate equilibria to the
final step of the algorithm. Otherwise a set of polynomial equations is formulated for which the
set of solutions contain all completely mixed equilibria of the support-restricted game.
Step 3. The third step of the algorithm is optional. Here Buchberger’s algorithm can be
applied to deform the system of polynomial equations into one with a special structure, i.e. in
‘triangular form’.
Step 4. In this step the bulk of the computations are done by using a numerical method to
compute all solutions of the system of polynomial equations. The POLSYS-routine of HOMPACK
is used to do these computations. When Buchberger’s algorithm is applied it suffices to use a
numerical algorithm to find all solutions to a single polynomial equation subsequently. In both
cases the found candidate equilibria are forwarded to the next step.
Step 5. The candidate equilibria found are checked whether they really are equilibria of the
original game. The solutions that are not nonnegative and real are removed as are the solutions
for which there is a player that can obtain a better payoff by using a strategy that is outside the
support to which it is temporarily restricted (for computational purposes).
4.6 An alternative method
In this section an alternative method is presented, one for which no decomposition by means of
carriers is needed. Here, the set of Nash equilibria is computed by computing all zeros of only
one system of polynomials. From Herings and Peeters (2001a) or from Chapter 3 it follows that a
strategy-tuple σ is an equilibrium with equilibrium payoffs µ if and only if it is part of a solution
to
ui(σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N),∑
sij∈S
iσij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N),
σij ≥ 0, λij ≥ 0, σijλij = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N).
If the set of equations
ui(σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N),∑
sij∈S
iσij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N),
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σijλ
i
j = 0, (s
i
j ∈ Si, i ∈ N),
is solved, and solutions for which some component of λ or σ is not a finite nonnegative real
are filtered out, the set of Nash equilibria is what remains. The previous system of equations is
equivalent to
σiju
i(σ−i, sij)− σijµi = 0, (sij ∈ Si, i ∈ N),∑
sij∈S
iσij − 1 = 0, (i ∈ N).
Now, filtering for σij and µi − ui(σ−i, sij) to be finite nonnegative reals for all sij ∈ Si and all
i ∈ N is required. All remaining solutions together form the complete set of Nash equilibria.
Like in the original method, it is necessary to go to the complex space for being sure of having
found all solutions to the system of polynomial (multilinear) equations. Here, in contrast to the
original method, the problem is not decomposed by means of carriers (admissible subsets). So,
when using this method, only one system of equations needs to be solved. Although this seems to
be an advantage, the system has also the µs as variables and therefore the system is one of higher
dimension. It is not clear, therefore, which system is more efficient in terms of computation time.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter a method is described to find all Nash equilibria of an n-person normal form game.
Several techniques are mentioned to speed up the computation times.
First, for bimatrix games existing algorithms can be applied which might be faster. These
algorithms can also be applied for certain carrier decompositions. Decomposition allows also
for parallel computation, since the problem can be divided into a finite number of small(er)
problems.
Secondly, it is possible to apply Buchberger’s algorithm in order to transform the problem of
finding all solutions to a system of polynomial equations in subsequently finding all solutions to
single polynomial equations. When for one polynomial a zero is found, it is substituted in the
next polynomial to solve. Therefore, again it is possible to apply parallel computers.
Finally, there is no need to wait until the algorithm has finally converged. It finds more and
more Nash equilibria while running, and can therefore also be useful where the sheer size of the
problem makes it practically impossible to really find all equilibria.
4.8 Proofs
To prove Theorem 4.2, the following lemma is needed.
4.8 Proofs 63
Lemma 4.7 For all admissible subsets D∗, there is an open set of vectors u ∈ Cn|S| with full
Lebesgue measure such that the Jacobian of FD∗,u has full rank in its zero points.
Proof Let an admissible subset D∗ of S∗ and a vector u ∈ Cn|S| be given and let the function
FD
∗
: C|D
∗| × Cn|D| → C|D∗| be defined such that FD∗(δ, u) = FD∗,u(δ). If ∂(δ,u)FD∗(δ¯, u¯), the
Jacobian of FD∗ in (δ¯, u¯), has full rank for all (δ¯, u¯) such that FD∗(δ¯, u¯) = 0, then it follows by
the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.26, that ∂δFD
∗,u(δ¯), the Jacobian of FD∗,u in δ¯, has full
rank for all δ¯ such that FD∗,u(δ¯) = 0 except for a set of vectors u with zero Lebesgue measure.
So, we have to prove that ∂(δ,u)FD
∗ has full rank in points (δ¯, u¯) such that FD∗(δ¯, u¯) = 0.
It is easily seen that
∂δk
`
(∑
dij∈D
iδij − 1
)
= 1 i=k,
∂uk(d−k,dk
`
)
(∑
dij∈D
iδij − 1
)
= 0,
where 1 represents the identity function that assigns value one if the condition in the subscript is
satisfied and zero otherwise, and that
∂δk
`
(
ui(δ−i, d˜i)− ui(δ−i, dij)
)
=
(
ui(δ−i,k, dk` , d˜
i)− ui(δ−i,k, dk` , dij)
)
· 1 i6=k,
∂uk(d−k,dk
`
)
(
ui(δ−i, d˜i)− ui(δ−i, dij)
)
= δ(d−i) ·
(
1 dk
`
=d˜i − 1 dk`=dij
)
.
Further we know that
∑
d−i∈D−iδ(d
−i) = 1,
∂δ ∂u
(1)
(2)
|D∗|−n
n
|D∗| n|D|
?
1 · · · 1
.
.
.
1 · · · 1
0
0
∑
=1
.
.
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.
.
. ∑
=−10
0
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Figure 4.1: Jacobian of FD∗ .
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and therefore
∑
d−i∈D−i∂uk(d−k,dk` )
(
ui(δ−i, d˜i)− ui(δ−i, dij)
)
= 1 dk
`
=d˜i − 1 dk`=dij .
So, the Jacobian of FD∗ in points (δ¯, u¯) for which it holds that FD∗(δ¯, u¯) = 0 has the form as
depicted in Figure 4.1 (for certain ordering of variables and equations). In this figure the box
containing the star is not specified because it is not necessary to know that part of the matrix to
see that the matrix has full rank. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2 From Lemma 4.7, it follows that for any admissible subset D∗ and for al-
most every vector u, the set {δ ∈ C|D∗||FD∗,u(δ) = 0} is a regular constraint set (see Section 2.4).
By counting the number of equations and variables it follows that {δ ∈ C|D∗| | FD∗,u(δ) = 0} is
a zero-dimensional manifold. Compactness is obvious. 2
Part II
Stochastic Games
Chapter 5
Equilibrium Selection
In this chapter, which is based on Herings and Peeters (2001b), a selection theory for stochastic
games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select
equilibria for games in standard form. First several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing
procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, are
introduced. Then the properties of these alternative definitions are analyzed. Finally, it is shown
that exactly one of the proposed extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi-Selten
for games in standard form and captures stationarity.
5.1 Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered both finite and infinite hori-
zon two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action spaces. Shap-
ley proved that such games have a value and that both players have optimal stationary strategies
with respect to the discounted payoff criterion. Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971)
extended Shapley’s model to n-person non-zero-sum stochastic games. For the model with finite
state space and finite action spaces they showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
A stochastic game is played in stages. At each stage, the game is in one of finitely many
states and every player observes the current state. In each stage the players have to make a
choice (simultaneously and independently) out of the action sets which depend on the state.
These choices result not only in a payoff (each state is coupled with a normal form game), but
also in an action dependent probability measure on the set of states. Next, according to this
probability measure, a chance experiment is carried out to determine the state of the next stage.
For many normal form games there is a vast multiplicity of equilibria, see McLennan (1999).
There is no reason to expect that the situation is different for the multiplicity of equilibria in
stochastic games. Even though such a game may possess many non-stationary equilibria, there
are good reasons to focus on stationary equilibria. But, concerning the multiplicity of stationary
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equilibria there is no reason to expect that this number is small. After all, when the dynamics
does not allow to jump to states other than the initial one, for instance, the stochastic game is
equivalent to a finite number of repeated games, and the set of stationary equilibria equals the
Cartesian product of the Nash equilibria of the separate stage games. It follows that there are
many stationary equilibria. Therefore, it is essential to provide a selection theory that selects a
particular stationary equilibrium.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988) the tracing procedure is defined for normal form games and for
extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure (in these games at every point
every player remembers whatever he knew in the past). For extensive form games, Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) first transform the game into one in standard form and subsequently define the
tracing procedure for that class of games. Since the expected utility property does not hold in
stochastic games, it is not possible to transform a stochastic game into one in standard form. The
way to extend the tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games is neither straightforward
nor unique.
In this chapter a variant of the tracing procedure which allows selection within the class
of stationary equilibria of stochastic games is introduced. Thereto, four ways to extend the
linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to the setting of stochastic games in a
natural way are presented. The four alternatives originate from two choices of modeling beliefs
in stochastic games. First, there is the assumption about beliefs within states. Second, there
is the assumption about beliefs across time (stages). Both belief-types might be assumed to be
correlated or not. After properly defining the four alternatives, they are analyzed. It is found that
the four alternatives are essentially different, in the sense that they may select different equilibria.
Only one of the extensions turns out to be consistent with the linear tracing procedure while
capturing stationarity. This extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic
games is labeled as the stochastic tracing procedure.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 the finite discounted stochastic game
model in described. Further, the restriction to stationary strategies is made, and the concept of
stationary equilibrium is defined. Section 5.3 comprehensively defines the linear tracing proce-
dure and exposes some of its properties. In Section 5.4, the four extensions of the linear tracing
procedure to the class of stochastic games are proposed and defined. Section 5.5 analyzes the
four alternatives. The last section, Section 5.6, summarizes comprehensively.
5.2 Finite discounted stochastic games
In this chapter finite discounted stochastic games are studied. A finite discounted stochastic game
is an ordered sextuple
Γ =
〈
N,Ω, {Siω}(i,ω)∈N×Ω, {ui}i∈N , pi, δ
〉
,
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where N , Ω and Siω are finite non-empty sets, Sω = i∈NSiω, ui is a real-valued function on
the set H = {(ω, sω) |ω ∈ Ω, sω ∈ Sω}, pi is a map pi : H → ∆(Ω) with ∆(Ω) the family of
probability distributions on the space Ω, and δ is a real number. The game parameters have the
following meaning.
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the player set.
• Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωz} is the state space.
• Siω = {siω1, . . . , siωmiω} is the action set of player i ∈ N in state ω ∈ Ω.
• ui : H → R is the payoff function of player i ∈ N ; if in state ω ∈ Ω the players
action choices are sω = (s1ω, . . . , snω) ∈ Sω, then player i gets an instantaneous payoff of
ui(ω, sω).
• pi : H → ∆(Ω) is the transition map. For each (ω, sω) ∈ H , pi(ω, sω) is identified
with the vector (pi(ω1 |ω, sω), . . . , pi(ωz |ω, sω)). Here pi(ω¯ |ω, sω) represents the proba-
bility that the system jumps to state ω¯ if in state ω the strategy-tuple sω is played. Hence,
pi(ω¯ |ω, sω) ≥ 0 and
∑
ω¯∈Ω pi(ω¯ |ω, sω) = 1.
• δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and is used to discount future payoffs.
Such a stochastic game corresponds to a dynamic system which can be in different states and
where at certain stages the players can influence the course of the play. Here, the infinite horizon
model is considered and the set of stages is represented by the set Z+ = {0, 1, . . .}. Players know
the game itself and this knowledge is common knowledge among all the players. Moreover, the
initial state ω0 ∈ Ω at stage k = 0 is common knowledge to the players.
The game proceeds as follows. All players i select at the initial state ω0, simultaneously and
independently of each other (possibly by a chance experiment), an action siω0 ∈ Siω0 . Now two
things happen, both depending on the current state ω0 and the action choices s1ω0 , . . . , snω0 .
(a) Player i earns ui(ω0, sω0).
(b) The system jumps to the next state ω1 according to the outcome of a chance experiment.
The probability that the next state will be ω¯ equals pi(ω¯ |ω0, sω0).
Subsequently, prior to the next stage k = 1, all players are informed about the previous actions
chosen by the players, and of the new state ω1. At stage k = 1, the above procedure is repeated,
starting from the state ω1. This procedure goes on and on ad infinitum.
The game is assumed to be of perfect recall, i.e. at each stage each player remembers all past
actions chosen by all players and all past states that have occurred. Note that for finite stochastic
games, each stage game resembles a normal form game. However, contrary to the situation
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with normal form games, the game does not consist of a single play, but jumps according to
the probability measure pi(· |ω, sω) to the next state and continues dynamically. In choosing an
action in a certain state, a player not only takes into account the immediate payoff, but also his
opportunities in future states.
Like in normal form games, the players are allowed to randomize their pure actions. A
mixed strategy of player i in state ω is a probability distribution on Siω. The set of all probability
distributions on Siω is identified with Σiω. For σiω ∈ Σiω, the probability assigned to pure strategy
siωj is given by σiωj . The strategy space of the normal form game in state ω is therefore equal to
Σω = i∈NΣ
i
ω. Given a mixed strategy combination σω ∈ Σω and a strategy σ¯iω ∈ Σiω, (σ−iω , σ¯iω)
denotes the mixed strategy that results from replacing σiω by σ¯iω. If a mixed strategy combination
σω ∈ Σω is played, then the instantaneous expected payoff of player i is denoted by ui(ω, σω)
and the expected transition to state ω¯ by pi(ω¯ |ω, σω).
At the different stages this randomization may depend on the history of the game up to that
stage. A history up to a stage k is a sequence hk = (ω0, sω0 , ω1, sω1 , . . . , ωk−1, sωk−1) that could
have occurred up to time k, k ≥ 1. Here, ωκ represents the state and sωκ the actions of the players
at stage κ, κ = 0, . . . , k − 1. Obviously, the set of histories up to time k equals Hk = k−1κ=0H ,
i.e. the k-fold Cartesian product of H .
A behavior strategy σik of player i specifies for each stage k, each state ωk at time k, and each
history hk a probability distribution σik(hk, ωk) on the action space Si
ωk
of player i in state ωk.
Then σik(si
ωk
|hk, ωk) is the probability with which player i chooses action si
ωk
∈ Si
ωk
at time
k if state ωk and history hk have occurred. So, a behavior strategy σi for player i is a sequence
(σi0, σi1, . . .) where σi0 ∈ Σi := ω∈ΩΣiω and σik : Hk → Σi for all k ≥ 1.
Given initial state ω ∈ Ω and strategy-tuple σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), player i evaluates the stream
of expected payoffs by
U i(ω, σ) :=
∑∞
k=0δ
k · U ik(ω, σ),
where U ik(ω, σ) denotes the expected instantaneous utility at stage k. Here, U i(ω, σ) equals the
total discounted expected payoff of player i when the discount factor equals δ, the starting state
is ω and the strategy-tuple σ is played. Since the state and action spaces are assumed to be finite,
U i(ω, σ) exists.
A strategy-tuple σ is an equilibrium if and only if σi is a best response to σ−i for all i ∈ N .
If n = 2 and the payoffs are zero-sum, then the definition of an equilibrium characterizes a
minimax solution (see Shapley (1953)).
A stationary strategy for player i is a behavior strategy for which σik(hk, ωk) is of the form
σi(ωk), i.e. a stationary strategy is a history and time independent strategy which depends on
the state only. In the sequel, a stationary strategy for player i will be denoted by the symbol ρi.
Define ρi = (ρiω)ω∈Ω, where ρiω is a probability measure on the action space Siω for each ω ∈ Ω.
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So ρiω ∈ Σiω. If player i decides to play the stationary strategy ρi, then every time that the system
is in state ω, player i selects his pure action according to ρiω. So, a stationary strategy ρi for
player i is an element of Σi.
In the sequel of this chapter the analysis is restricted to stationary strategies.1 Several moti-
vations for analyzing stationary equilibria can be found in Maskin and Tirole (2001). Stationary
strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality, stationar-
ity captures the notion that ‘bygones are bygones’ more completely than does the concept of
subgame-perfect equilibrium, and it embodies the principle that ‘minor causes should have mi-
nor effects’, that is, only those aspects of the past that are ‘significant’ should have an appreciable
influence on behavior. The pragmatic motivations they give are that in applied theory, the focus
on stationary strategies allows for clean, unobstructed analysis of the influence of the state vari-
ables, that stationary strategies substantially reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in
dynamic (econometric) models, and that stationary models can be simulated.
Suppose that ω is the initial state and the players decide to play a stationary strategy-tuple
ρ. The total discounted expected payoff of player i is denoted by U i(ω, ρ). The instantaneous
payoff player i obtains in stage k = 0 equals ui(ω, ρω). The probability that at the next stage the
state will be ω¯ equals pi(ω¯ |ω, ρω).
When ρ is a stationary strategy-tuple and ω is the initial state, the expected payoffs are given
by the following recursive formula (see e.g. Fink (1964))
U i(ω, ρ) = ui(ω, ρω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)U i(ω¯, ρ).
A stationary strategy-combination ρ ∈ Σ is a stationary equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium
in stationary strategies. It is a very well-known result that there exists a stationary best response
to stationary strategies ρ−i. Therefore, a stationary strategy-combination ρ¯ ∈ Σ is a stationary
equilibrium if for all i and all ω
U i(ω, ρ¯) ≥ U i(ω, ρ¯−i, ρi), (ρi ∈ Σi).
Another famous result, see Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), or Sobel (1971), is that for every
finite discounted stochastic game a stationary equilibrium exists. In Haller and Lagonoff (2000)
it is shown that the number of stationary equilibria is generically finite. In Herings and Peeters
(2000) this result is sharpened to generic oddness (see also Chapter 6). For δ = 0, the number of
stationary equilibria is the product of the number of Nash equilibria of the separate stage games.
It is shown in McLennan (1999) that the number of Nash equilibria of each stage game might be
enormous. So, for δ = 0 the number of stationary equilibria is enormous. There is no reason to
expect that the number of stationary equilibria will not be huge when δ is positive.
1In fact, restrict is made to a class which is even tighter. Namely, the one of perfect stationary strategies, where
the strategy chosen is as if each state is reached or might be the initial state.
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5.3 Linear tracing procedure
In this section, a state ω is fixed and the linear tracing procedure for the corresponding normal
form game Γω = 〈N, {Siω}i∈N , {ui(ω)}i∈N〉 is briefly explained. A more extensive introduction
to the linear tracing procedure is provided in Chapter 3.
The linear tracing procedure is a mathematical construct to model a process of convergent ex-
pectations, by which rational players come to adopt, and expect each other to adopt, one particu-
lar equilibrium point as the outcome for a given game. At the beginning of this outcome-selection
process, the players will as yet lack any specific theory predicting the strategies to be used by the
other players. Accordingly, each player will express his expectations about the strategy choice of
any other player in the form of a subjective probability distribution over the other players’ pure
strategies. These subjective distributions are called prior probability distributions, or simply pri-
ors. An important assumption of this model is that all players other than i will associate the same
prior probability distribution piω with any given player i. Part of the Harsanyi-Selten theory is the
determination of a prior.
The linear tracing procedure is based on a one-parameter family of auxiliary games Γtω with
t ∈ [0, 1]. In any game Γtω, every player i has the same strategy set Σiω as he has in the original
game Γω. But his payoff function vi(t;ω) in Γtω is
vi(t;ω, ρω) = (1− t)ui(ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tui(ω, ρω),
where ui(ω) is his payoff in the original game Γω. Clearly, vi(1;ω, ρω) = ui(ω, ρω) so that
Γ1ω = Γω. On the other hand, vi(0;ω, ρω) = ui(ω, p−iω , ρiω).
Thus Γ0ω is a game of a rather special structure in which the payoff vi(0;ω) of each player i
will depend only on his own strategy ρiω and will be independent of the other players’ strategy-
combination ρ−iω . Consequently, the game Γ0ω naturally decomposes into several mutually in-
dependent and separate maximization problems, one for each player. For almost all games Γω,
for almost all choices of the prior vector pω, the game Γ0ω has exactly one equilibrium point ρ0ω,
which is in pure strategies.
For any auxiliary game Γtω, the set of all equilibrium points in Γtω is denoted by E(Γtω). By
Nash’s (1951) existence theorem for equilibrium points, all of these sets are nonempty. Let
Lω = L(Γω, pω) be the graph of the correspondence t → E(Γtω) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Lω is typically a
collection of pieces of one-dimensional algebraic curves, though in degenerate cases it may also
contain isolated points and/or subsets of more than one dimension, see Chapter 3.
Suppose the graph Lω contains a path γω connecting a point x0ω = (0, ρ0ω), corresponding
to an equilibrium point ρ0ω of the game Γ0ω, with a point x1ω = (1, ρ∗ω), corresponding to an
equilibrium point ρ∗ω of the original game Γ1ω = Γω. Then γω is called a feasible path, whereas
x0ω and x1ω are called the starting point and the end point of this path γω, respectively. Moreover,
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the strategy part ρ∗ω of this end point x1ω is called the outcome selected by the path γω. This
strategy combination ρ∗ω can be rationally selected as the outcome of the game because it always
is an equilibrium point of the original game Γω.
The linear tracing procedure consists of selecting an outcome ρ∗ω for any game Γω by tracing
a feasible path γω from its starting point x0ω = (0, ρ0ω) to its end point x1ω = (1, ρ∗ω). For any given
pair (Γω, pω), the linear tracing procedure is called feasible if the graph Lω = L(Γω, pω) contains
at least one feasible path γω, and is called well-defined if Lω contains exactly one feasible path
γω.
For any possible pair (Γω, pω), the linear tracing procedure is always feasible but is not always
well-defined (see Harsanyi (1975)). For any specific vector pω of prior probability distributions,
almost all games Γω will give rise to a well-defined linear tracing procedure (see Chapter 3).
5.4 Stochastic tracing procedure
For the remainder of this chapter, let a stochastic game Γ and a prior p ∈ Σ be given. Because the
prior p is an element from Σ and there exists a stationary best response to stationary strategies,
each player i has a stationary best response to p−i.
For every t ∈ [0, 1], the stochastic tracing procedure generates a stationary equilibrium of
the stochastic game Γt = 〈N,Ω, {Σiω}ω∈Ω,i∈N , {V i(t)}i∈N〉, where the total expected discounted
payoff function V i(t) of player i is defined such that
V i(0;ω, ρ) = U i(ω, p−i, ρi) and V i(1;ω, ρ) = U i(ω, ρ).
The stochastic game Γ0 corresponds to a trivial stochastic game, where all players believe that
all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The stochastic game Γ1
coincides with the original stochastic game Γ. Alternative definitions of V i(t) for t ∈ (0, 1) will
give rise to alternative stochastic tracing procedures.
Given a proper definition of V i(t), i ∈ N , for t ∈ (0, 1), the stochastic tracing procedure
S(Γ, p) is defined as the set of pairs (t, ρ) for which it holds that ρ is a stationary equilibrium of
the stochastic game Γt, i.e.
S(Γ, p) =
{
(t, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ
∣∣∣ ρi is a best response to ρ−i in Γt for all i ∈ N }.
The stochastic tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in S(Γ, p) connecting
a best response against the prior to a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game Γ, i.e. there
exists a continuous function γ : [0, 1] → S(Γ, p) such that γ(0) ∈ S(Γ, p) ∩ ({0} × Σ) and
γ(1) ∈ S(Γ, p) ∩ ({1} × Σ). In general there may be many trajectories γ([0, 1]) that link a
stationary equilibrium of Γ0 to a stationary equilibrium of Γ1. If this trajectory is unique, then
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S(Γ, p) is said to be well-defined. If the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined, then it
selects a unique stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game Γ.
The concepts stochastic tracing procedure, feasibility and well-definedness are all based on
the definition of V i(t), i ∈ N , for t ∈ (0, 1). There are at least four a priori reasonable ways in
which V i(t) can be defined to extend the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten to the
setting of stochastic games. Choices have to be made whether a player holds correlated beliefs
within a state or not, and whether a player holds correlated beliefs across time or not.
Correlation within states, C(S), means that when a player knows that some opponent plays
according to the prior (which he expects with probability 1 − t), he expects all opponents to
play according to the prior. Alternatively, absence of correlation within states, I(S), implies that
even when a player knows that some opponent is playing according to the prior he may not
infer that other opponents are playing according to the prior; all opponents are expected to play
(1− t)pi + tρi, independent from one another.
Correlation across time, C(T), means that when a player knows that some opponent plays
according to the prior today, he expects that opponent to play according to the prior in all future
stages. Absence of correlation across time, I(T), implies that even when a player knows that some
opponent is playing according to the prior today, this opponent might not play according to the
prior in future stages. In all future events he faces independent lotteries which assign probability
1− t to play against the prior strategies of his opponents.
In the rationalizability literature the issue of “correlated beliefs” versus “uncorrelated beliefs”
is often discussed. The second requires players to believe that the opponent players choose their
strategies independently, while the first does not. Rationalizability with uncorrelated beliefs has
been studied extensively by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). The correlated rationalizability
concept is defined by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and is related to the correlated equilibrium
concept of Aumann (1974, 1987).
To analyze the four possible extensions, the four alternatives have to be defined properly by
specifying the corresponding functions V i(t). Therefore, this section contains four subsections,
with each subsection devoted to one of the alternatives.
5.4.1 Alternative 1: C(S), I(T)
Suppose beliefs are correlated within states, but not across time. Because here correlation within
states is assumed, each player expects that in stochastic game Γt all opponents are playing ac-
cording to the prior with probability 1 − t and that all opponents are playing strategically with
probability t. So, in the case of three or more players it is excluded that one opponent plays
according to the prior whereas simultaneously another opponent plays strategically. The addi-
tional assumption of absence of correlation across time causes that each player faces this lottery
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at every stage. Therefore, the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when the
initial state is ω and ρ is played, equals
V iC(S),I(T)(t;ω, ρ) = (1− t)ui(ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tui(ω, ρω)
+ δ ·∑ω¯∈Ω[(1− t)pi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)]V iC(S),I(T)(t; ω¯, ρ).
Stationarity implies that this payoff can be written by means of a recurrent relation. This station-
arity results from the assumption that the beliefs of the players depend only on the state and not
at the stage in which the state is reached.
5.4.2 Alternative 2: C(S), C(T)
When correlation as well within states as across time is assumed, again each player expects
that in a stochastic game Γt all opponents are playing according to the prior with probability
1 − t and that all opponents are playing strategically with probability t. But now, unlike in the
previous case, correlation across time is assumed. This means that when a player knows that
some opponent plays according to the prior today, he expects that opponent to play according
to the prior in all future stages. Apparently, unlike in the previous case each player faces this
lottery only once and this will be at k = 0. Therefore, the total discounted payoff to player i in
stochastic game Γt when the initial state is ω and ρ is played, is
V iC(S),C(T)(t;ω, ρ) = (1− t)U i(ω, p−i, ρi) + tU i(ω, ρ).
A solution (t, ρ) for t ∈ (0, 1) in S(Γ, p) is not necessarily a stationary equilibrium of the game
Γt. A player i might have a non-stationary strategy that is better than ρi against ρ−i in Γt.
Namely, at k = 0 all players make their stationary decisions believing that with probability 1− t
all opponents play according to the prior and with probability t they play strategically. In fact,
in k = 0 all players are facing a lottery. Once the players are in k = 1, they know the outcome
of the lottery, i.e. in k = 1 they have information on the strategies played in k = 0 (p−i or
ρ−i). It might be better, and most of the time it will be better, to revise their strategy having this
knowledge, which would lead to a non-stationary strategy.
5.4.3 Alternative 3: I(S), I(T)
In this subsection the situation in which absence of correlation both within states and across
time is assumed is considered. Absence of correlation within states means that in the stochastic
game Γt a player expects that each opponent is playing independently according to the prior
with probability 1− t and playing strategically with probability t. The additional assumption of
absence of correlation across time causes every player to face this lottery at every stage. Clearly,
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these assumptions imply the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when the
initial state is ω and the strategy ρ is played to be equal to
V iI(S),I(T)(t;ω, ρ) = U
i(ω, (1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi).
Just like in Subsection 5.4.1 it is possible, because of absence of correlation across time, to
rewrite the total discounted payoffs in recurrent form:
V iI(S),I(T)(t;ω, ρ) = u
i(ω, (1− t)p−iω + tρ−iω , ρiω)
+ δ ·∑ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, (1− t)p−iω + tρ−iω , ρiω)V iI(S),I(T)(t; ω¯, ρ).
Since the decision problem a player faces depends on the state only, his problem is stationary no
matter at which stage of the game the state is realized. Assuming that beliefs are not correlated
across time captures, therefore, the presence of stationarity. Stationarity means that a recurrent
relation can be given. A direct result is that best stationary responses are best responses in the
broader class of behavior strategies as well.
5.4.4 Alternative 4: I(S), C(T)
When absence of correlation within states, but correlation across time is assumed, again each
player expects that in stochastic game Γt each opponent is playing according to the prior with
probability 1− t and playing strategically with probability t. But this time, in contrast to Subsec-
tion 5.4.3, correlation across time is assumed. This means that when a player knows that some
opponent plays according to the prior today, he expects that opponent to play according to the
prior in all future stages. Therefore, the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt
when the initial state is ω and ρ is played, equals
V iI(S),C(T)(t;ω, ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1U i(ω, pS, ρN\S).
In the formula, (1 − t)|S|t|N\S|−1 is the probability that the opponents from S ⊆ N \ {i} are
playing according to the prior, whereas the other opponents are playing strategically. When
player i’s opponents from S are playing according to p and the others according to ρ, his total
discounted payoff is U i(ω, pS, ρN\S). Player i’s payoff in the game Γt is therefore the sum over
all subsets S of N \{i} of the probability that only the players from S play according to p (given
t) times the total expected discounted payoff in that case.
Like in Subsection 5.4.2, a solution (t, ρ) for t ∈ (0, 1) in S(Γ, p) is not necessarily a station-
ary equilibrium of the game Γt. A player i might have a non-stationary strategy that performs
better than ρi against ρ−i in Γt. Apparently, a best stationary response is not necessarily a best
response in the broader class of behavior strategies.
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5.4.5 Properties
In order to be useful as a selection theory, it is important that for almost all stochastic games the
stochastic tracing procedure determines a unique stationary equilibrium. When well-definedness
holds, one can be sure of selecting a unique stationary equilibrium. The following result is shown
in the next chapter, see the proof of Theorem 6.6.
Theorem 5.1 Assume C(S) and I(T). There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors
(Γ, p) with full Lebesgue measure such that the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined.
Repeating and modifying the proof of the former theorem it is possible to prove the following
result.
Theorem 5.2 Assume I(S) and I(T). There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors
(Γ, p) with full Lebesgue measure such that the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined.
For the alternatives where C(T) is assumed, it is not possible to rewrite the payoffs into a re-
current relation. Therefore, to prove similar theorems with C(T) assumed, calls for different
techniques of proof. Nevertheless, it should be expected that generic well-definedness holds as
well when C(T) is assumed. Since the number of variables is one less than the number of con-
straints imposed by the concept of stationary equilibrium, there is one degree of freedom left.
Under suitable transversality conditions, this should be sufficient to show well-definedness.
5.5 Analysis of alternatives
The analysis proceeds by analyzing the four alternatives defined so far. The first part of this
section is devoted to lay bare that the choice about beliefs within states matter. This is done by a
well-chosen example. In the second part of this section the same is done for the assumption with
respect to beliefs across time.
5.5.1 Beliefs within states
In this subsection an example is created for which it matters whether correlation or absence
of correlation within states is assumed, in the sense that different stationary equilibria will be
selected starting from the same prior. Before doing so, it is important to know the minimal size
of such an example. In case there are two players, assuming absence or presence of correlation
within states does not matter since the number of opponents is one.
Proposition 5.3 For n = 2, the stochastic tracing procedure based on I(S) is identical to the one
based on C(S).
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So, in order to construct an example with the desired properties the number of players must be
larger than or equal to 3.
Consider the normal form game Γ with three players each having two strategies of Figure 5.1.
This is a special case of a stochastic game, namely one with only one state and discount factor
δ equal to 0. The left element in the first upper-left box is the payoff to player 1 if all players
play their first strategy. The advantage of considering a normal form game, is that it disconnects
s1
s1
′
s2 s2
′
s3 s3
′
2, 2, 2
0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
1, 1, 1
Figure 5.1: Normal form game Γ.
assumptions on beliefs within states and assumptions on beliefs across time. Note that this game
possesses three stationary equilibria: the pure stationary equilibria (s1; s2; s3) and (s1′; s2′; s3′),
and a mixed stationary equilibrium at which all players play their first strategy with probability√
2− 1 and their second with probability 2−√2. Because the discount factor is taken equal to
0, it does not matter whether I(T) or C(T) is assumed.
Take the following prior:
p =
(
(1
6
, 5
6
); (1
2
, 1
2
); (2
3
, 1
3
)
)
.
Note that for the best response against the prior it does not matter whether C(S) or I(S) is as-
sumed. Both alternatives lead to the same best response to all possible priors.
Here, the prior is chosen such that the starting point is (0, (s1; s2′; s3′)). Player 1 starts play-
ing the equilibrium strategy of the first pure stationary equilibrium and players 2 and 3 start
playing the equilibrium strategy of the second pure stationary equilibrium. To obtain a stationary
equilibrium, at least one player has to switch to another pure strategy. It turns out that in the case
of I(S), player 2 or 3 is switching his strategy before player 1, whereas in the other case, C(S),
player 1 is the first player willing to switch his strategy.
When I(S) is assumed
When absence of correlation within states is assumed, Γt has the form as depicted in Figure 5.2.
The upper-left element of the most upper-left box, 1
3
(1 + t)(2 + t), is the payoff to player 1 if
he plays s1 and he expects player 2 to play according to the prior with probability 1 − t and s2
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s1
s1
′
s2 s2
′
s3 s3
′
1
3
(1+t)(2+t)
1
9
(1+5t)(2+t)
1
6
(1+t)(1+5t)
1
6
(1−t)(1−t)
1
9
(1−t)(2+t)
1
6
(1−t)(1+t)
1
3
(1−t)(2+t)
5
18
(1−t)(1−t)
1
6
(1−t)(1+t)
1
6
(1−t)(1+t)
1
18
(1−t)(5+t)
1
6
(1−t)(1−t)
2
3
(1+t)(1−t)
2
9
(1−t)(1+5t)
5
12
(1−t)(1−t)
1
6
(1−t)(1+2t)
2
9
(1−t)(1−t)
1
12
(1−t)(5+t)
2
3
(1−t)(1−t)
5
18
(1−t)(1+2t)
1
12
(1+t)(5+t)
1
6
(1+t)(1+2t)
1
18
(1+2t)(5+t)
1
12
(1+t)(5+t)
Figure 5.2: Game Γt when I(S) is assumed.
with probability t and expects player 3 to play according to the prior with probability 1 − t and
s3 with probability t. So, player 1 expects player 2 to play (1
2
(1− t) + t, 1
2
(1− t)) and player 3
to play (2
3
(1 − t) + t, 1
3
(1 − t)) and the expected payoff when playing s1 is therefore equal to
(1
2
(1− t) + t)(2
3
(1− t) + t)2 = 1
3
(1 + t)(2 + t), and so on for the other entries.
For all t ∈ [0, 1] it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt. Since the only matter
of interest is the stationary equilibrium selected, only the path starting at t = 0 and terminating
in t = 1 is determined. Obviously, by the way the prior is constructed, the path starts in the
point (s1; s2′; s3′). This point is a stationary equilibrium of Γt as long as t ≤ 1/10. When
t = 1/10, player 2 is indifferent between his two pure strategies. So, at t = 1/10 the path
jumps from (s1; s2′; s3′) to (s1; s2; s3′). Next, the point (s1; s2; s3′) is a stationary equilibrium
of Γt until t = 1/5(29 − 2√189) ≈ 0.3009, when player 3 is indifferent between his two pure
strategies. Here, in t = 1/5(29−2√189), the path jumps from (s1; s2; s3′) to (s1; s2; s3) which is
a stationary equilibrium of Γt for all t ∈ [1/5(29− 2√189), 1]. The point (s1; s2; s3) is therefore
the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure when I(S) is assumed.
The path is displayed graphically in Figure 5.3.
This figure shows a cube moving from t = 0 to t = 1. The cube itself displays the set of
stationary strategy-combinations. The strategic possibilities of player 1, player 2 and player 3
are displayed in the horizontal, diagonal, respectively vertical direction. The point marked with
a circle (◦) is the point where all players play their first pure strategy. The two bullets (•) which
are not endpoints of the feasible path of the stochastic tracing procedure display the remaining
two equilibria. In the figure it looks like if the feasible path moves backwards in the homotopy-
parameter t. This is actually not the case as the path moves along the edge of the cube in t = 0.1.
When C(S) is assumed
When correlation within states is assumed, Γt has the form as depicted in Figure 5.4. The first
element in the first box is the payoff to player 1 if he plays s1 and he expects players 2 and 3
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◦
•
•
•
ﬀ t = 0
ﬀ t = 0.1
ﬀ t = 0.3009
ﬀ t = 1
Figure 5.3: Feasible path when I(S) is assumed.
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s2 s2
′
s3 s3
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(1−t)
5
18
(1−t)
1
6
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(1−t)
1
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(1−t)
2
9
(1−t)
5
12
(1−t)
2
3
(1−t)
5
18
(1−t)
5
12
(1−t)
1
6
(1−t)+t
5
18
(1−t)+t
5
12
(1−t)+t
Figure 5.4: Game Γt when C(S) is assumed.
to play according to the prior with probability 1− t and their first pure strategy with probability
t. So, player 1 expects with probability 1 − t that players 2 and 3 are playing (1
2
, 1
2
) and (2
3
, 1
3
),
respectively, and with probability t that players 2 and 3 are playing s2 and s3, respectively. The
expected payoff to player 1 when playing s1 will therefore be equal to ((1 − t)1
2
2
3
+ t)2 =
2
3
(1− t) + 2t.
Again, it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt, for t ∈ [0, 1]. And, again,
restriction to determine the path starting at t = 0 and terminating in t = 1 is made. Just as
before, the path starts in the point (s1; s2′; s3′). This point is a stationary equilibrium point as
long as t ≤ 1/3. When t = 1/3, player 1 is indifferent between both his pure strategies and will
be the first player to switch to another pure strategy unlike in the previous case. At t = 1/3, the
path jumps from (s1; s2′; s3′) to (s1′; s2′; s3′). The point (s1′; s2′; s3′) is a stationary equilibrium
of Γt up to t = 1 and this point is therefore the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic
tracing procedure when C(S) is assumed. The path is displayed graphically in Figure 5.5.
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◦
•
•
•
ﬀ t = 0
ﬀ t = 1/3
ﬀ t = 1
Figure 5.5: Feasible path when C(S) is assumed.
5.5.2 Beliefs across time
Again, it is important to know the minimal size of an example for which it matters whether
correlation or absence of correlation across time is assumed. In the next proposition it is claimed
that C(T) and I(T) select the same stationary equilibrium for stochastic games with one state
(repeated game), when the process never leaves a state (finite number of independent repeated
games), or when future payoffs are ignored (finite number of normal games).
Proposition 5.4 When pi =1 Ω or δ = 0, the stochastic tracing procedure based on I(T) is
identical to the one based on C(T).
Proof Consider a repeated game, i.e. |Ω| = 1 and therefore trivially pi = 1 Ω. In this case, the
total discounted payoffs for the four alternatives are:
V iC(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ V iC(S),I(T)(t; ρ),
V iC(S),C(T)(t; ρ) = (1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ),
V iI(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = u
i((1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi) + δ V iI(S),I(T)(t; ρ),
and
V iI(S),C(T)(t; ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1U i(pS, ρN\S).
First, note that
V iC(S),C(T)(t; ρ) = (1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ)
= (1− t) [ui(p−i, ρi) + δ U i(p−i, ρi)]+ t [ui(ρ) + δ U i(ρi)]
= (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ · [(1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ)]
= (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ V iC(S),C(T)(t; ρ).
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And secondly, note that
V iI(S),C(T)(t; ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1U i(pS, ρN\S)
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1
[
ui(pS, ρN\S) + δ U i(pS, ρN\S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1ui(pS, ρN\S)
+ δ ·∑S⊆N\{i}(1− t)|S|t|N\S|−1U i(pS, ρN\S)
= ui((1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi) + δ V iI(S),C(T)(t; ρ).
Finally, observe that
V iC(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = V
i
C(S),C(T)(t; ρ),
and that
V iI(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = V
i
I(S),C(T)(t; ρ)
for all (t; ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ. So, for repeated games C(T) and I(T) are equivalent.
From this, the equivalence between C(T) and I(T) follows trivially when pi = 1 Ω as being a
finite number of independent repeated games.
When δ = 0, the stochastic game is equivalent to a one shot game in which time plays no
role when stationary strategies are assumed. 2
Consider the stochastic game Γ of Figure 5.6. The stochastic game displayed in that figure is a
s1ω
s1ω
′
s2ω s
2
ω
′
ω
1, 1
1, 0
0, 0
1, 0
0, 0
1, 0
0, 0
0, 1
ω′
4, 4
1, 0 δ = 1/3
Figure 5.6: Stochastic game Γ.
stochastic game with two players, two states and discount factor δ equal to 1/3. In the first state
both players have two pure strategies, whereas in the second state both players have one strategy.
The upper-left corner of each box contains the payoffs. The transition probabilities are displayed
in the lower-right corner, where the first element is the probability that in the next stage the game
will be in the first state, the second element is the probability that the game will be in the second
state at the next stage.
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When both players play their second strategy in state ω, they both expect to earn 0 at the
current stage, go to state ω′, earn 4 at the next stage and then return to state ω. Notice that the
game at ω′ is completely degenerate. There is no need for players to make a choice. They simply
collect a payoff of 4. When ω is the initial state, both players expect to earn 4
3
(1+ 1
9
+ 1
81
+. . .) = 3
2
in total when both always play their second pure strategy. Suppose the box that belongs to
strategy-combination (s1ω
′
; s2ω
′
) had 1,1 in the upper-left corner and 1,0 in the lower-right corner.
Then the game is always in state ω when ω is the initial state, so coincides with a repeated
game. When again both players play their second pure strategy at all times, they both expect
again to earn 1 + 1
3
+ 1
9
+ . . . = 3
2
. Nevertheless, the two resulting stochastic games are not
strategically equivalent when mixed strategies are played. It turns out that ((1
2
, 1
2
); (1
2
, 1
2
)) is not a
stationary equilibrium in the stochastic game of Figure 5.6 unlike in the adapted stochastic game
(the repeated game). Although the stochastic game of Figure 5.6 is close to a repeated game, for
which C(T) and I(T) are equivalent, it is certainly not.
The stochastic game of Figure 5.6 possesses three stationary equilibria: the pure stationary
equilibria (s1ω; s2ω) and (s1ω
′
; s2ω
′
), and the symmetric mixed stationary equilibrium where both
players play their first strategy with probability 4 − 2√3 ≈ 0.5359 and the other strategy with
the rest of the probability mass.
Just like in the previous example, the prior is chosen such that the starting point of the stochas-
tic tracing procedure is not a stationary equilibrium strategy-combination of the original game.
This can be arranged by taking for one player the prior play of the first strategy smaller than
4 − 2√3 and the reverse for the other. Without loss of generality, let the first player mentioned
be player 1. Given such a prior, player 1 will prefer strategy s1ω and player 2 will prefer strategy
s2ω
′
. Consider the prior
p =
(
(1
2
, 1
2
); (2
3
, 1
3
)
)
,
which satisfies this property. Note that the starting point, in this case (s1ω; s2ω
′
), is independent
of the choice made between the two assumptions I(T) and C(T). Because the stochastic game
depicted is a game with two players, it does not matter whether C(S) or I(S) is assumed.
When I(T) is assumed
In Figure 5.7 the stage game for t = 0 is given. The figure is almost similar to Figure 5.6. The
difference is found in the lower-right corner of the boxes, which is divided into two sectors. The
lower-left sector displays the transition probabilities as player 1 thinks they are, the upper-right
sector the transition probabilities as player 2 thinks they are. For example, when player 1 plays
s1ω
′ he expects to receive 0 and expects that in the next stage the state will be ω with probability
2/3 and ω′ with probability 1/3.
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1, 0 δ = 1/3
Figure 5.7: Game Γ0 when I(T) is assumed.
The stage games Γtω can now be defined as Γtω = (1 − t)Γ0ω + tΓ1ω for all t ∈ (0, 1). For all
t ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt, but since only the stationary
equilibrium selected is of interest, only the path starting at t = 0 and terminating in t = 1 is
determined. As mentioned before, the path starts in the point (s1ω; s2ω
′
). This point is a stationary
equilibrium point as long as t ≤ 1
2
(23 − √513) ≈ 0.1752, the moment player 1 is indifferent
between both his pure strategies. Player 2 is not willing to switch his strategy as long as t ≤
1
6
(11−√97) ≈ 0.1919. So, player 1 is the first to change his strategy and at t = 1
2
(23−√513)
the path jumps from (s1ω; s2ω ′) to (s1ω ′; s2ω ′). This point is a stationary equilibrium point for all
t ∈ [1
2
(23 − √513), 1]. The point (s1ω ′; s2ω ′) is therefore the stationary equilibrium selected by
the stochastic tracing procedure when I(T) is assumed. The path is displayed graphically in
Figure 5.8.
◦
•
•
•
ﬀ t = 0
ﬀ t = 0.1752
ﬀ t = 1
Figure 5.8: Feasible path when I(T) is assumed.
This figure shows the Cartesian product of the strategy space (a square) and the interval [0, 1].
The strategic possibilities of player 1 and player 2 are displayed in the horizontal and vertical
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direction, respectively. The point marked with a circle corresponds to both players playing their
first pure strategy.
When C(T) is assumed
When C(T), correlation across time, is assumed, Γt cannot be represented easily in a figure.
Again, the path starts in the point (s1ω; s2ω
′
). Given that player 2 plays s2ω
′ during the whole play
with probability t and according to the prior during the whole play with probability 1 − t, the
best stationary response of player 1 is playing s1ω as long as t is less than 4/19. When t is larger
than 4/19 his other pure stationary strategy, that is s1ω
′
, will be his best stationary response. Vice
versa, when player 2 expects player 1 to play according to the prior the whole stochastic game
with probability 1 − t and s1ω the whole play with probability t, his best stationary response is
playing strategy s2ω
′
when t ≤ 1/15 and s2ω otherwise. So, player 2 will be the first player to
switch strategy, since 1/15 < 4/19. Therefore, at t = 1/15, the path will jump from (s1ω; s2ω ′) to
(s1ω; s
2
ω). From t = 1/15 up to t = 1 the point (s1ω; s2ω) is the stationary equilibrium and is also
the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure when C(T) is assumed.
The path is plotted in Figure 5.9 and is displayed in the same style as Figure 5.8.
◦
•
•
•
ﬀ t = 0
ﬀ t = 1/15
ﬀ t = 1
Figure 5.9: Feasible path when C(T) is assumed.
5.5.3 Extending the linear tracing procedure
The first subsection showed that the choice between assuming absence of correlation or assum-
ing presence of correlation within states can cause different stationary equilibria to be selected.
Although this was shown by means of a normal form game, the same result would have been
found if it was made a repeated game by taking a positive discount factor, i.e. δ ∈ (0, 1).
In the selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi
(1975) is used to select a Nash equilibrium of a normal form game. The structure of the linear
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tracing procedure there assumed beliefs to be correlated. The most natural extension of the
linear tracing procedure is therefore the one that assumes correlation within states. For instance,
this choice implies that for repeated games, the stationary equilibrium which is selected is the
repeated Nash equilibrium that is selected by the linear tracing procedure for the stage game
using the same prior.
The second subsection showed that the choice between assuming absence of correlation or
assuming presence of correlation across time can cause different stationary equilibria to be se-
lected. When C(T) is assumed, a point (t, ρ) on the feasible path is not necessarily a stationary
equilibrium of Γt. For some player i there might be a better behavior strategy than ρi against ρ−i
in Γt which is non-stationary, i.e. a best stationary response is not necessarily a best response
in the broader class of behavior strategies. However, assuming that beliefs are not correlated
across time, that is assuming I(T), captures the assumption of stationarity. The beliefs of a player
will depend only on the state reached and not on the stage at which it is reached. Therefore
the assumption of C(S) and I(T) leads to a stochastic tracing procedure that is the most natural
extension of the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten to the environment of stochastic
games.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi (1975) is extended in order to select on
an equilibrium for stochastic games, more precisely, to select on a stationary equilibrium for
stochastic games. There are four reasonable extensions. After having defined all four properly,
it is shown by examples that these extensions are independent. The most natural extension as-
sumes that players hold correlated beliefs within states, but do not hold correlated beliefs across
time, since this is the only possible extension consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi for
normal form games that captures stationarity. This extension is defined as the stochastic tracing
procedure. In the next chapter it is proved that the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined
for almost all stochastic games.
Chapter 6
Computation of Stationary Equilibria
This chapter is based on Herings and Peeters (2000) which is the first paper to introduce an
algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games, and shows convergence of the al-
gorithm for almost all such games. Moreover, since in general the number of stationary equilibria
is overwhelming, attention is paid to the issue of equilibrium selection. The stationary equilib-
rium computed is the one selected by the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear
tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games that has been defined in the previous chapter.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods and is easily and robustly implemented
on a computer using existing software routines to follow paths numerically. As a by-product, a
recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games is extended to
oddness of equilibria.
6.1 Introduction
Many economic situations of interest can be modeled as a stochastic game. Recent work of for
instance Olley and Pakes (1996), Pakes and Ericson (1998), Pakes and McGuire (1996), and
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) is devoted to the application of stochastic games to problems
emerging in the industrial organization literature. Another application within this stream of lit-
erature is presented in Chapter 7. Further progress in this research program can be made by
developing methods to solve stochastic games numerically. Numerical solution methods allow
researchers to go back and forth between the implications of economic theory and the char-
acteristics of alternative datasets. See also Judd (1997) and McKelvey and McLennan (1996)
for an expression of the important role of computational methods in the further development of
economic theory.
In Breton, Filar, Haurie, and Schultz (1986), Schultz (1986), Filar, Schultz, Thuijsman, and
Vrieze (1991), and Breton (1991), the problem of finding discounted stationary equilibria in the
general n-person stochastic game is reduced to that of finding a global minimum in a nonlinear
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program with linear constraints. Solving this nonlinear program is equivalent to solving a certain
nonlinear system for which it is known that the objective value in the global minimum is zero.
But, as is noted in Breton (1991), the convergence of an optimization algorithm to the global
optimum is not guaranteed.
In this chapter, an algorithm is proposed that is shown to converge to a stationary equilibrium
for a generic n-person stochastic game. This algorithm is the first globally convergent algorithm
to solve for an equilibrium in an arbitrary n-person stochastic game. The algorithm also deals
with the problem of equilibrium selection in that it computes the stationary equilibrium selected
by the extension of the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) – the stochastic
tracing procedure – as defined in the previous chapter.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988) the tracing procedure is defined for normal form games and
for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. Algorithms to compute
the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in normal form games are proposed in
van den Elzen and Talman (1999), Herings and van den Elzen (2002), and in Chapter 3. For
extensive form games, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) first transform the game into one in standard
form and subsequently define the tracing procedure for that class of games. Computation of the
Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in extensive form games is the topic of von
Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2001), who invoke the sequence form to calculate such
equilibria efficiently.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods. The formulation as a differentiable
homotopy makes it possible to apply standard path-following techniques that are available in
professionally programmed software. This makes implementation on a computer an easy exer-
cise. As a by-product of the proof that the algorithm converges for a generic stochastic game, the
result that for a generic stochastic game the stochastic tracing procedure yields a path leading to
a unique stationary equilibrium is obtained.
As another by-product of our convergence proof, an extension of a recent result of Haller
and Lagunoff (2000) is obtained. Their main result is that the set of stationary equilibria in a
stochastic game is generically finite. Here it is found that this number is generically odd.
In Section 6.2 the set of stationary equilibrium strategies is characterized. The definition of
the stochastic tracing procedure as proposed in Chapter 5 is given in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4,
the properties of the stochastic tracing procedure are studied. It is shown that for almost every
stochastic game, the stochastic tracing procedure is formed by a finite union of arcs and loops.
Using a well-chosen transformation of variables, the stochastic tracing procedure is described
by the zeros of an everywhere differentiable homotopy function in Section 6.5. Section 6.6
discusses the implementation of the homotopy algorithm and provides some numerical results.
Section 6.7 summarizes. Section 6.8 contains some lemmas used in the proof to a theorem arising
in Section 6.4.
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6.2 Characterization of stationary equilibria
Consider a finite discounted stochastic game
Γ =
〈
N,Ω, {Siω}(i,ω)∈N×Ω, {ui}i∈N , pi, δ
〉
,
as defined in Chapter 5. Here, N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of players, Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωz}
is the state space containing a finite number of states, and the set Siω = {siω1, . . . , siωmiω} is the
finite action set of player i ∈ N in state ω ∈ Ω. Further, ui : H → R is the payoff function of
player i and pi is the transition map pi : H → ∆(Ω), where H = {(ω, sω) |ω ∈ Ω, sω ∈ Sω}
and Sω = i∈NSiω. If in state ω ∈ Ω the players action choices are sω ∈ Sω, then player i
gets an instantaneous payoff of ui(ω, sω) and the probability that the system jumps to state ω¯ is
pi(ω¯ |ω, sω). Finally, δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor that is used to discount future payoffs.
Players are allowed to randomize their strategy in each stage of the game. Therefore, let
Σiω = ∆(S
i
ω), i.e. the set of all probability distributions over the set Siω, for all states ω ∈ Ω
and all players i ∈ N . The utilities and transition probabilities are extended in the natural
von Neumann-Morgenstern way. For further analysis the following notations are introduced:
S∗ =
⋃
(i,ω)∈N×Ω S
i
ω, S = (i,ω)∈N×ΩS
i
ω, m
∗ = |S∗| = ∑(i,ω)∈N×Ωmiω, and m = |S| =∏
(i,ω)∈N×Ωm
i
ω.
Like in the previous chapter, the analysis is focused to stationary strategies, in particular
stationary equilibria. Given that the other players play ρ−i and the initial state is ω¯, player i faces
the Markov decision problem of maximizing
U i(ω¯, ρ−i, ρi)
over ρi,1 subject to
ρiωj ≥ 0 (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0 (ω ∈ Ω),
for all possible initial states ω¯ ∈ Ω. If the present value of the total expected payoff for a system in
state ω with k transitions remaining is denoted by µiω(k), the following basic recurrence relation
is obtained:
µiω(k + 1) = u
i(ω, ρω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)µiω¯(k)
or in vector form
µi(k + 1) = ui(ρ) + δΠ(ρ)µi(k).
1Here, the player maximizes over his stationary strategies rather than over his behavioral strategies. But, as
already mentioned in Section 5.2 there always exists a best response in stationary strategies when the opponents are
playing stationary strategies. Therefore, the maximizing stationary strategy is also a maximizing behavioral strategy.
So, it is not the case that non-stationary strategies are not allowed, they only are not subject of selection.
90 Computation of Stationary Equilibria
Note that2
µi = lim
k→∞
µi(k) = lim
k→∞
(
∑k−1
`=0 (δΠ(ρ))
`ui(ρ) + (δΠ(ρ))kµi(0))
=
∑∞
`=0(δΠ(ρ))
`ui(ρ) = [I − δΠ(ρ)]−1ui(ρ).
The vector µi may be called the vector of present values of player i, because each of its ele-
ments µiω is the present value of an infinite number of future expected payoffs discounted by the
discount factor δ with ω the initial state.
Because interest goes out to the sequential decision process for large k (in fact for k equal to
infinity), the present values µiω = limk→∞ µiω(k) are substituted for the quantities µiω(k) to obtain
the recursive relation
µiω = u
i(ω, ρω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)µiω¯.
Given that the other players play ρ−i, player i maximizes µiω subject to ρiω ∈ Σiω for all ω ∈ Ω.
Because player i maximizes each µiω for ω ∈ Ω, he also maximizes
∑
ω∈Ω µ
i
ω. Given that the
other players play ρ−i, player i maximizes
∑
ω∈Ωµ
i
ω
subject to
ui(ω, ρ−iω , ρ
i
ω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , ρiω)µiω¯ − µiω = 0, (ω ∈ Ω),
ρiωj ≥ 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω).
The necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for this maximization problem are
αiω
{
ui(ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯
}
+ βiωj − γiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),
βiωj ≥ 0, ρiωj ≥ 0, βiωjρiωj = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω),
ui(ω, ρ−iω , ρ
i
ω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , ρiω)µiω¯ − µiω = 0, (ω ∈ Ω),
αi[I − δΠ(ρ−i, ρi)] = 1 .
2By Hadamard’s theorem all eigenvalues of the matrix between the squared brackets have absolute value larger
than 0. Thus zero is not an eigenvalue of that matrix and the inverse exists. Furthermore, the spectral radius of
δΠ(ρ) is less than one. Therefore it holds that [I − δΠ(ρ)]−1 =∑∞k=0 δkΠ(ρ)k. From this it is easily seen that the
value of element (i, j) of the matrix [I − δΠ(ρ)]−1 gives the discounted expected number of times that the state is
j when i is the initial state and ρ is played.
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Here, α, β and γ are the Lagrange multipliers of the first, second and third set of constraints, and
1 denotes the vector containing ones only. Then, by multiplying by ρiωj and summing over j, for
ρi a best response to ρ−i,
0 = αiω
{
ui(ω, ρ−iω , ρ
i
ω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , ρiω)µiω¯
}
+
∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
βiωjρ
i
ωj −
∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
γiωρ
i
ωj
= αiωµ
i
ω − γiω,
for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, since αi = [I − δΠ(ρ−i, ρi)]−11 = 1
1−δ
1  0,3
γiω
αiω
= µiω.
After division by αiω, the following necessary and sufficient conditions remain, where λiωj is
defined as the ratio of βiωj and αiω
ui(ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),
λiωj ≥ 0, ρiωj ≥ 0, λiωjρiωj = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω).
Here, λiωj is the shadowprice of playing strategy siωj , i.e. the disutility from a one-shot deviation
at t = 0 of a marginal increase in the probability ρiωj by which pure strategy siωj is played, and
µiω is the expected payoff of player i when the initial state is ω, ρ−i is played by his opponents,
and player i chooses a best response. The last equality,
∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, makes sure that ρiω
is a member of Σiω for all ω ∈ Ω.
Since for a stationary equilibrium it holds that a strategy-tuple constitutes mutually best re-
sponses, it is found that the set of stationary equilibria can be fully characterized by the system
of equalities and inequalities in Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1 A strategy ρ ∈ Σ is a stationary equilibrium if and only if it is part of a solution to
ui(ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
λiωj ≥ 0, ρiωj ≥ 0, λiωjρiωj = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N).
3Since the value of element (i, j) of the matrix [I − δΠ(ρ)]−1 gives the discounted expected number of times
that the state is j when i is the initial state and ρ is played, the rows sum up to 1/(1 − δ), which is larger than 0
(even larger than 1).
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The system above suggests that only one-shot deviations have to be considered. In the next the
reason of this surprising phenomenon is intuitively explained.
Suppose the other players play stationary strategies ρ−i and suppose that ρi is the best station-
ary response of player i. If player i is not able to improve his utility by a deviation to his strategy
ρi in one stage only, then it follows by a backward induction argument that neither finitely many
deviations to his strategy will make player i better off. Suppose now that player i can improve his
utility by infinitely many changes. Then, by a profit-to-go argument, player i can also increase
his payoff by finitely many changes, which is not possible.4
This section ends with an example in which it is shown that expected utility in stationary
strategies does not hold for the class of stochastic games. This causes a number of technical
difficulties for the convergence proof of the algorithm presented later on in the chapter.
Example 6.2 The stochastic game of Figure 6.1 is a game in which there are two states pH and
pL and one player. In each state the player can choose between actions qH and qL. In the upper-
left corner of each square the immediate payoff of the player is displayed. In the lower-right
corner the transition probabilities are given. So, if the player chooses qH when the state is pH ,
then he earns 1 today and the next state will be pL with probability 1. If the player chooses qL
when the state is pL, then he earns 0 today and the next state will be pH for sure. Future payoffs
are discounted by a factor 1/2.
pH
qH
qL
1
(0, 1)
1
2
(1
2
, 1
2
)
pL
qH
qL
1
2
(1
2
, 1
2
)
0
(1, 0)
δ = 1
2
Figure 6.1: Example.
Consider the stationary strategies ρ− = (qL, qH) and ρ+ = (qH , qL).5 Then U(pL, ρ−) =
U(pH , ρ
−) = 1, U(pL, ρ
+) = 2/3 and U(pH , ρ+) = 4/3. However,
U(pH ,
1
2
ρ− + 1
2
ρ+) = 6
5
6= 7
6
= 1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 4
3
= 1
2
U(pH , ρ
−) + 1
2
U(pH , ρ
+),
U(pL,
1
2
ρ− + 1
2
ρ+) = 4
5
6= 5
6
= 1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 2
3
= 1
2
U(pL, ρ
−) + 1
2
U(pL, ρ
+).
4Define M = max(i,ω,sω) |ui(ω, sω)|. Then the maximum payoff a player can earn from time k on is bounded
from above by δk(1+δ+δ2+. . .)M = δk/(1−δ)M , the so-called maximum ‘profit-to-go’ value. Suppose player i
is able to improve his utility by ε by means of infinitely many changes. When k grows large the profit-to-go value is
at a certain point less then ε (this is when k > log(ε(1− δ)/M)/ log(δ)). This means that the utility improvement
by changes until time k (finitely many changes) was positive.
5The first argument is the strategy when the state is pH and the second when the state is pL.
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So, expected utility does not hold. 
In the literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in normal form games, a distinction is
made between two-player games on the one hand and three or more players on the other hand.
For the class of two-player games exact algorithms are possible, because of the bilinear structure
of such games (see, for instance the algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964)). For stochastic
games this distinction disappears. The system of equations of Theorem 6.1 is not bilinear, even
for two-player games. The paper of Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1981) presents an example of
a two-player stochastic game with only rational numbers of payoffs and transition probabilities.
The unique Nash equilibrium involves strategies with irrational probabilities. This means that
the ordered field property does not hold. A straightforward application of a Lemke-Howson type
algorithm to two-player stochastic games is therefore not possible. This shows one more time
that the class of stochastic games is considerably more difficult than the class of normal form
games.
6.3 The stochastic tracing procedure
The linear tracing procedure as presented in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) models a process of
convergent expectations by which rational players will come to adopt, and expect each other to
adopt, a particular equilibrium as the solution for a given game. Before applying the tracing
procedure, every player is assumed to have a subjective probability distribution expressing his
expectation about the strategic choices of the other players. Each player is assumed to use the
same theory to determine his subjective probability distributions, which makes that all players
have the same expectations about the other players. This common subjective probability distri-
bution is called the prior. In the naive Bayesian approach, all players choose best responses to
their prior beliefs and would in this way reach a strategy-combination that does not constitute
an equilibrium in general. In the linear tracing procedure, the information on the best responses
is only gradually fed back into the expectations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure
proceeds, both the priors and their best responses will gradually change until both converge to
some equilibrium of the game.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988) the linear tracing procedure is defined for normal form games
and for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. For a normal form game
Γ = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉 and a prior p ∈ Σ, the linear tracing procedure is defined by tracing
a curve in the set of Nash equilibria of the games Γt = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {vi(t)}i∈N〉 for t ∈ [0, 1],
where vi(t, s) = (1 − t)ui(p−i, si) + tui(s). For extensive form games, they first transform the
game into one in standard form and subsequently define the tracing procedure for that class of
games. They did not define the tracing procedure for stochastic games, which are games with
instantaneous payoffs and infinite time horizon. Since expected utility in stationary strategies
94 Computation of Stationary Equilibria
does not hold in stochastic games (see Example 6.2) it is not possible to transform this game into
one in standard form. The extension of the tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games is
far from obvious.
In Chapter 5 four ways to extend the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten to the setting
of stochastic games were mentioned. Choices had to be made whether a player holds correlated
beliefs within a state or not, and whether a player holds correlated beliefs across time or not. The
conclusion in that chapter was that the most natural extension of the linear tracing procedure to
stochastic games assumes that beliefs are correlated within states and that they are not correlated
across time.
Consider some stochastic game Γ = 〈N,Ω, {Siω}ω∈Ω,i∈N , {ui}i∈N , pi, δ〉 and some prior p ∈
Σ. For every t ∈ [0, 1], the stochastic tracing procedure generates a stationary equilibrium of the
stochastic game Γt = 〈N,Ω, {Siω}ω∈Ω,i∈N , {vi(t)}i∈N , {p˜ii(t)}i∈N , δ〉, where the instantaneous
payoff function vi(t) : Ω× S → R of player i is defined by
vi(t;ω, sω) = (1− t)ui(ω, p−iω , siω) + tui(ω, sω)
and where the transition mapping p˜ii(t) is defined by
p˜ii(t; ω¯ |ω, sω) = (1− t)pi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , siω) + tpi(ω¯ |ω, sω).
Note that p˜ii(t) is equal for all players when t = 1. This is consistent with the fact that the tracing
procedure should be thought of as a reasoning process. The mapping p˜ii(t) should be thought
of as what the players think that the transition probabilities are in the stochastic game Γt. The
expected payoff of player i is easily shown to satisfy the recursive relation
V i(t;ω, ρ) = vi(t;ω, ρω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρω)V i(t; ω¯, ρ).
The stochastic game Γ0 corresponds to a trivial stochastic game, where all players believe that
all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The stochastic game
Γ1 coincides with the original stochastic game Γ. A best response against a strategy combina-
tion ρ−i ∈ Σ−i in the stochastic game Γt corresponds to a best response against the stationary
probability distribution (1− t)[p−i] + t[ρ−i] on S−i in the stochastic game Γ.
The stochastic tracing procedure S(Γ, p) is defined as the set of pairs (t, ρ) for which it holds
that ρ is a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game Γt, i.e.
S(Γ, p) =
{
(t, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ
∣∣∣ ρ is a stationary equilibrium of Γt }.
For a simple proof of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure for normal form games see
Herings (2000) and for the generic well-definedness see Chapter 3. The derivation of such prop-
erties for the stochastic tracing procedure is part of present chapter.
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6.4 Structure of the stochastic tracing procedure
The size of any stochastic game Γ can be characterized by a vector η = (n, z, (miω)
i=1,...,n
ω=1,...,z),
specifying the number of players, the number of states, and the number of pure strategies avail-
able to a player in a state. The vector η is called the size vector of a stochastic game Γ. For any
possible size vector η, transition map pi consistent with η and discount factor δ, the set G(η, pi, δ)
of all stochastic games Γ possessing η as their size vector, having pi as their transition map, and
δ as discount factor, is called the size class generated by (η, pi, δ).
Every stochastic game Γ in the size class G(η, pi, δ) is characterized by a vector u(Γ) that
contains exactly nm payoffs. A stochastic game Γ is identified with the vector u(Γ), and the size
class G(η, pi, δ) is identified with the set of all possible real vectors of size nm, that is, with an
nm-dimensional Euclidean space. It is now possible to define the distance %(Γ,Γ′) between two
stochastic games and the Lebesgue measure of a set of stochastic games.
A given mathematical statement Z is said to be true for an open set of (almost all, set of
generic) stochastic games if, for every possible size class G(η, pi, δ), the set G˜(Z) of all stochastic
games Γ in G(η, pi, δ) for which the statement Z is true is open (has full Lebesgue measure, is
open and of full Lebesgue measure) with respect to G(η, pi, δ).
Fix η, pi and δ.6 Let a subset B∗ of S∗ be given with the property that for every player i
and for every state ω there is at least one pure strategy siωj in B∗, so Biω = B∗ ∩ Siω 6= ∅, for
every player i, for every state ω. Such a set B∗ is called admissible. The sets B∗ are used to
decompose S(Γ, p) in subsets S(Γ, p, B∗), each having a differentiable manifold structure. The
set S(Γ, p, B∗) contains those elements of S(Γ, p) where only strategies in B∗ are played with
positive probability. It is defined by
S(Γ, p, B∗) =
{
(t, ρ) ∈ S(Γ, p)
∣∣∣
siωj 6∈ B∗ ⇒ ρiωj = 0
siωj ∈ B∗ ⇒ siωj ∈ argmaxsiω`∈SiωV
i(t;ω, ρ−i, ρi−ω, s
i
ω`)
}
.
It follows that
S(Γ, p) = ⋃B∗S(Γ, p, B∗).
Two sets S(Γ, p, B∗) and S(Γ, p, B¯∗) can only have a point (t, ρ) in common if there is a player i
and a strategy siωj such that ρiωj = 0 and siωj ∈ argmaxsiω`∈SiωV i(t;ω, ρ−i, ρi−ω, siω`), so siωj is a
best response to (ρ−i, ρi−ω) that is played with probability zero.
6It is possible to fix only η, and to define open sets of (almost all, generic sets of) games if these properties hold
for every possible size class G(η). All forthcoming proofs can be readily adapted to get results corresponding to
these definitions.
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To analyze the structure of S(Γ, p) and the sets S(Γ, p, B∗), systems of equalities and in-
equalities are designed whose solutions characterize these sets. By Theorem 6.1, an element
(t, ρ) belongs to S(Γ, p) if and only if it is part of a solution to
vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
λiωj ≥ 0, ρiωj ≥ 0, λiωjρiωj = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N).
Given an admissible subset B∗, define the setO(Γ, p, B∗) as the set of solutions (t, ρ, λ, µ) to the
following system of equalities and inequalities:
(1) vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(2) ρiωj = 0, (s
i
ωj 6∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(3) λiωj = 0, (s
i
ωj ∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(4)
∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(5) ρiωj ≥ 0, (siωj ∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(6) λiωj ≥ 0, (siωj 6∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(7) t ≥ 0,
(8) 1− t ≥ 0.
The fact that for stochastic games the system of equalities and inequalities differs from the case
of normal form games, is not the only difficulty. Since expected utility does not hold, properties
that are derived from it cannot be used. In particular, it is not even obvious that there is a unique
best response to the prior in pure stationary strategies.
Theorem 6.3 implies that (t, ρ) ∈ S(Γ, p, B∗) if and only if there exists λ ∈ Rm∗ and µ ∈ Rnz
such that the equalities (1)-(4) and the inequalities (5)-(8) are satisfied.
Theorem 6.3 Let a stochastic game Γ ∈ G(η, pi, δ) and a prior p ∈ Σ be given. For all admissi-
ble subsets B∗ of S∗, the sets S(Γ, p, B∗) and O(Γ, p, B∗) are C∞ diffeomorphic.
Proof Let B∗ be an admissible subset of S∗. For every i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω take an element
s¯iω ∈ B∗. Define the function f : [0, 1] × Σ → R × Rm∗× Rm∗× Rnz by f(t, ρ) = (t, ρ, λ, µ),
where (in vector form with a slight abuse of notation) µi = [I − δ · Π˜i(t; ρ−i, s¯i)]−1vi(t; ρ−i, s¯i)
and λiω` = µiω − vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , siω`)− δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ω p˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siω`)µiω¯. Then f(t, ρ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗)
if and only if (t, ρ) ∈ S(Γ, p, B∗). Note that f defined in this way is a C∞ diffeomorphism. 2
From Theorem 6.3 it follows that for all (t, ρ) ∈ S(Γ, p, B∗) there is a unique λ and a unique
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µ such that (t, ρ, λ, µ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗). Vice versa, for all (t, ρ, λ, µ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗) it holds that
(t, ρ) ∈ S(Γ, p, B∗).
The analysis of the system of equalities and inequalities (1)-(8) provides the following result.
Theorem 6.4 There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G(η, pi, δ)×Σwith
full Lebesgue measure such that for all admissible subsets B∗ of S∗, S(Γ, p, B∗) is a compact
1-dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary. Moreover, a boundary point (t, ρ) of S(Γ, p, B∗) is
either
(i) not a boundary point of S(Γ, p, B¯∗) for all B¯∗ 6= B∗ and lies in {0, 1} × Σ,
(ii) or, is a boundary point of exactly one S(Γ, p, B¯∗) with B¯∗ 6= B∗ and belongs to (0, 1)×Σ.
Moreover, B∗ and B¯∗ differ in exactly one element, say siωj , for which ρiωj = 0 and siωj is
a best response to ρ in Γt.
Proof The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proofs to Theorem 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3
and involves three lemmas. The only thing left to do is to prove those lemmas for the stochastic
game situation, which is done in Section 6.8. The inference is then analogously to the proofs of
Chapter 3, since it only uses the structural manifold properties of the lemmas.
Lemma 6.8 claims that the set of solutions to (1)-(8) is one-dimensional if the inequalities are
strict. Then in Lemma 6.9, it is claimed that the set of solutions to (1)-(8) is zero-dimensional
if exactly one of the inequalities is binding. Finally, it is proved in Lemma 6.10 that there is no
solution to (1)-(8) with more than one binding inequality.
It follows that O(Γ, p, B∗) is a one-dimensional manifold with boundary, and a point in
O(Γ, p, B∗) is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the inequalities in (5)-(8) holds with
equality. By Theorem 6.3 these properties carry over to S(Γ, p, B∗).
It is easily seen that for a boundary point alternative (i) holds when the binding inequality
comes from (7) or (8) and that alternative (ii) holds when the binding inequality comes from (5)
or (6). 2
This theorem implies that, for almost every Γ and p, for all admissible sets B∗ of S∗ the set
S(Γ, p, B∗) consists of a finite number of smooth arcs and loops. Each arc has two boundary
points. The structure of S(Γ, p, B∗) is therefore a simple one; all kinds of complications like
bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solution sets, diverging behavior, etc. are excluded.
If S(Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in (0, 1) × Σ, then there is a unique admissible subset
B¯∗ 6= B∗ such that S(Γ, p, B¯∗) has this boundary point in common with S(Γ, p, B∗). The
cardinality of B¯∗ is one less or one greater than the cardinality of B∗, depending on whether in
the common boundary point a strategy inB∗ is played with probability zero, or whether a strategy
not in B∗ is a best response. The uniqueness of the set B¯∗ implies that the sets S(Γ, p, B∗) and
S(Γ, p, B¯∗) are nicely linked to each other.
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If S(Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in {0, 1}×Σ, then this point does not belong to any other
set S(Γ, p, B¯∗). This implies that such a boundary point is also a boundary point of S(Γ, p).
Formally, the structure of S(Γ, p) is as follows.
Theorem 6.5 There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G(η, pi, δ) × Σ
with full Lebesgue measure such that S(Γ, p) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewiseC∞ manifold
with boundary. The boundary of S(Γ, p) is given by the intersection of S(Γ, p) and {0, 1} × Σ.
There is a unique boundary point in {0} × Σ which corresponds to a strategy-combination in
pure strategies.
Proof The intuition of the proof of the first part of this theorem is given in the text above
the theorem. A rigorous proof can be given using the Lemke-Howson argument. A rigorous
development of this argument can be found in Chapter 3.
The second part of the theorem, that there is generically a unique boundary point in {0} ×Σ
and that this boundary point is in pure strategies, remains to be shown. Suppose for some player
i there is a best response ρ¯i to the prior in mixed strategies. Then for some state ω player i plays
under ρ¯i at least two pure strategies with positive probability mass, say siω1 and siω2. Since ρ¯i
is an optimal strategy it is part of a solution to the necessary and sufficient conditions above
Theorem 6.1. So,
λiω1 = λ
i
ω2 = 0
and
ui(ω, p−iω , s
i
ω1) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , siω1)µiω¯ = µiω =
= ui(ω, p−iω , s
i
ω2) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , siω2)µiω¯.
It follows that every strategy ρi with ρiω1 ≥ 0, ρiω2 ≥ 0 and ρi−{ω1,ω2} = ρ¯i−{ω1,ω2} is a best
response to the prior. This contradicts the local finiteness of the number of solutions at t = 0.
Therefore, generically, all best responses are in pure strategies.
Suppose there are two pure best responses ρ¯i and ρˆi against the prior. Then µ¯iω = µˆiω for all
ω ∈ Ω. Take ρi = 1
2
ρ¯i + 1
2
ρˆi, µi = µ¯i, λiωj = 0 if ρiωj > 0 and λiωj = λ¯iωj otherwise. Now indeed
the complementarity conditions are satisfied and ρi is a member of Σi.
Suppose ρiωj > 0. Then it holds that ρ¯iωj > 0 or ρˆiωj > 0; without loss of generality, let
ρ¯iωj > 0. Then
0 = ui(ω, p−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , siωj)µ¯iω¯ − µ¯iω =
= ui(ω, p−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω.
Suppose ρiωj = 0. Then it holds that ρ¯iωj = 0 and therefore λiωj = λ¯iωj . The equalities above
hold again.
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It follows that ρi is a best response to the prior. This contradicts that, generically, best re-
sponses are pure. 2
For almost every Γ and p, the set S(Γ, p) consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. Al-
though it is not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are smooth, the number of non-
differentiabilities is finite at most. Theorem 6.4 implies that all arcs in S(Γ, p) start and end in
{0, 1}×Σ. Each such path consists of a finite sequence of smooth arcs of the sets S(Γ, p, B∗). A
loop in S(Γ, p) consists either of a finite sequence (at least two) of differentiable arcs of the sets
S(Γ, p, B∗) or is a loop of a set S(Γ, p, B∗). See Figure 6.2 for an impression of the structure of
S(Γ, p).
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Figure 6.2: The structure of S(Γ, p).
Generically, each player i has a unique best response to the prior for all possible initial states,
so generically there is exactly one point of S(Γ, p) that belongs to {0} × Σ. This point is both
a corner point of {0} × Σ and a boundary point of S(Γ, p, B∗), where B∗ consists of the fol-
lowing nz strategies: for each possible initial state and for each player the best response to the
prior. Given some initial state ω, the determination of the best response against the prior in
state ω involves the determination of the behavior in all other states ω¯ as well. So the nz inde-
pendent strategies are found by solving n optimization problems, as opposed to nz independent
optimization problems. By Theorem 6.5 this point is the starting point of a uniquely defined
arc of S(Γ, p). This arc is the unique feasible path of S(Γ, p) that transforms prior beliefs into
(stationary) equilibrium beliefs.
Theorem 6.6 There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors (Γ, p) ∈ G(η, pi, δ) × Σ
with full Lebesgue measure such that the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined.
By following the feasible path starting in the unique point S(Γ, p) ∩ ({0} ∩ Σ) a stationary
equilibrium of the stochastic game Γ is found. The set S(Γ, p) ∩ ({1} × Σ) consists of all
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stationary equilibria of the stochastic game Γ. Precisely one of these stationary equilibria is an
element of the feasible path of S(Γ, p). Any other stationary equilibrium is a boundary point of
S(Γ, p) and is therefore part of some arc of S(Γ, p). A moment of reflection makes clear that the
remaining stationary equilibria are pairwise connected by arcs from S(Γ, p), and so the number
of stationary equilibria is odd.
Theorem 6.7 There exists an open set of stochastic games Γ ∈ G(η, pi, δ) with full Lebesgue
measure such that the number of stationary equilibria is odd.
The generic oddness of the number of Nash equilibria in normal form games is a well-known
result of Rosenmu¨ller (1971), Wilson (1971), and Harsanyi (1973), an alternative proof of which
can be found in Chapter 3. The generic finiteness of the number of stationary equilibria in
stochastic games is a recent result of Haller and Lagunoff (2000). Theorem 6.7 shows that Haller
and Lagunoff’s result can be sharpened to oddness.
The observations made so far suggest the following algorithm for the computation of the
stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure in n-person stochastic games.
Define the admissible set B∗ that contains for each player i the best response to the prior for all
possible initial states, and start with a point (0, ρ) in S(Γ, p, B∗) such that ρiω is a best response
of player i to the prior when ω is the initial state. Theorem 6.5 implies that B∗ and ρ are uniquely
determined. The equalities (1)-(4) belonging to this B∗ determine at least a part of the feasible
path. As long as the inequalities (5)-(8) hold with strict inequality, the set B∗ remains unchanged.
As soon as one of the inequalities from (5) or (6) gets binding, B∗ has to be changed. When the
binding inequality belongs to (5), say ρiωj = 0 while siωj ∈ B∗, strategy siωj has to be removed
from B∗. Obviously, this cannot happen for the starting B∗. If the binding inequality belongs to
(6), say λiωj = 0 while siωj 6∈ B∗, strategy siωj has to be added to B∗. In both situations there
is a strategy siωj for which ρiωj = 0 and λiωj = 0. In general this leads to a kink in the feasible
path of the stochastic tracing procedure. This procedure is repeated over and over again, until the
inequality (8) is binding and a stationary equilibrium is found. Note that inequality (7) is only
binding in the starting point.
6.5 Smoothing the stochastic tracing procedure
The previous section presents a method that can be used for the computation of a stationary
equilibrium. A potential drawback of that method is that one has to check all the time whether
the system of equations used is still appropriate by consulting the inequalities, and if not, one has
to switch to a different system of equations. This switching can be a serious problem in terms
of computing time. There are
∏
(i,ω)∈N×Ω(2
miω − 1) different sets B∗, whereas each one of them
may be generated several times in the course of the algorithm.
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The suggestion in Garcia and Zangwill (1981), that is followed in Chapter 3, to formulate
one, everywhere differentiable, homotopy by using a well-chosen transformation of variables is
followed again. Define, for α ∈ Rm∗ ,
ρiωj(α) = [max{0, αiωj}]2 and λiωj(α) = [max{0,−αiωj}]2.
After this transformation of variables, the system of equalities and inequalities of Theorem 6.1
becomes
vi(t;ω, ρ−iω (α), s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω (α), siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj(α)− µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
λiωj(α) ≥ 0, ρiωj(α) ≥ 0, λiωj(α)ρiωj(α) = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj(α)− 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N).
Owing to the proposed transformation of variables, the conditions λiωj(α) ≥ 0, ρiωj(α) ≥ 0 and
λiωj(α)ρ
i
ωj(α) = 0 are trivially satisfied. The set of solutions to (1)-(8) that characterizes the set
O(Γ, p, B∗) is up to the transformation of variable equivalent to the set of solutions (t, α, µ) ∈
R× Rm∗× Rnz, with αiωj ≥ 0 if siωj ∈ B∗ and αiωj ≤ 0 if siωj 6∈ B∗, to
(a) vi(t;ω, ρ−iω (α), siωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω (α), siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj(α)− µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(b) ∑siωj∈Siωρiωj(α)− 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
(c) t ≥ 0,
(d) − t+ 1 ≥ 0.
Notice that the same system of equalities and inequalities can be used, irrespective of the set B∗.
The role of B∗ is taken over by the sign-combinations of the components of the vector α.
Counting equations and unknowns in the system (a)-(d) shows that there is one degree of
freedom, and therefore one expects a 1-dimensional solution set. Consider any solution (t, α, µ)
to (a)-(d). When αiωj = 0, then both ρiωj(α) and λiωj(α) are zero. This implies that there are
exactly two admissible subsets of S∗ for which the set of (in)equalities (1)-(8) are satisfied. If
along a solution curve αiωj is increasing while passing zero, then ρiωj(α) gets positive and B∗new =
B∗old ∪ {siωj}. If αiωj is decreasing while passing zero, then λiωj(α) gets positive and B∗new =
B∗old\{siωj}. When αiωj passes zero, a kink appears in the method proposed in Section 6.4.
The left-hand sides of the equalities (a)-(b) specify the homotopy H : [0, 1] × Rm∗× Rnz →
R
m∗× Rnz,
H(t, α, µ) =

vi(t;ω, ρ−iω (α), s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω (α), siωj)µiω¯ + λiωj(α)− µiω = 0
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj(α)− 1 = 0 (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)

 .
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The homotopy functionH is continuously differentiable. The inequalities (c) and (d) are satisfied
as the homotopy takes [0, 1] as the domain for the variable t. Further, H has the salient feature
that its zeros describe the stochastic tracing procedure, (t, α, µ) ∈ H−1({0}) if and only if
(t, ρ(α)) ∈ S(Γ, p).
The set H−1({0}) consists of finitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All arcs start and
end in {0, 1} × Rm∗× Rnz. Loops have no points in common with {0, 1} × Rm∗× Rnz. There is
exactly one arc that starts in {0} × Rm∗× Rnz and that ends in {1} × Rm∗× Rnz. All other arcs
start and end in {1} × Rm∗× Rnz and connect two points inducing stationary equilibria of the
stochastic game Γ. Starting at the unique point (0, α0, µ0) ∈ H−1({0}) at t = 0 and following
the path described by the zeros of H, a point (1, α˜, µ˜) ∈ H−1({0}) is where the path ends. This
point generates the stationary equilibrium ρ(α˜) of Γ selected by the stochastic tracing procedure.
See Figure 6.3 for an impression of the structure of H−1({0}).
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Figure 6.3: The structure of H−1({0}).
The structure of H−1({0}) is even simpler than the one of S(Γ, p). Not only are complica-
tions like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions sets, diverging behavior, etc., ex-
cluded. The arcs and loops in H−1({0}) are differentiable everywhere. It is the transformation
of variables that smoothes out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible to calculate
the derivative at each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow the path by
means of many easily implementable numerical methods, including methods to solve ordinary
differential equations.
6.6 Implementation
The stochastic game Γ0 naturally decomposes into n mutually independent and separate Markov
decision problems, one for each player. As is shown, generically a Markov decision problem
yields a unique optimal pure stationary strategy. The combination of all optimal strategies (for
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each player one) induces the starting point of the algorithm. This point can be determined an-
alytically since there are finitely many pure stationary strategies in each decision problem. For
each player only the total discounted payoffs for each of his pure stationary strategies have to be
computed and it has to be checked which strategy generates the highest payoff.
Once the starting point is determined, the numerical process starts to follow the homotopy-
path from that point on. Like in Chapter 3 a number of FORTRAN-subroutines belonging to
the software-package HOMPACK are programmed. Again, some subroutines are added to the
FIXPDF-subroutines, among which the homotopy function itself as well its Jacobian.
The homotopy function that is implemented is the one as described in Section 6.5 for stochas-
tic games with 2 states, 3 players, with in each state 2 strategies for each player. It may be
possible to improve on computing times by rescaling utilities and probabilities, or by using an
α-transformation with a power different from 2 (but larger than 1, to keep differentiability) or
multiplied by a positive scalar different from 1. An extensive digress on the optimal numerical
implementation is beyond the aim of the current analysis.
Within the class of stochastic games with 2 states, 3 players and for each player 2 strategies
in each state, five stochastic games and five priors have been generated randomly. All payoffs,
transition probabilities, and priors are chosen independently from one another out of the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. The transition probabilities and the priors are of course normalized to sum
up to 1. The discount factor is fixed at 0.95. The maximal inaccuracy of our calculation amounts
to 10−8, which means that the 2-norm of the value of the homotopy function is less than 10−8 in
the computed equilibrium.
prior 1 prior 2 prior 3 prior 4 prior 5
game 1 1.31 1.09 1.21 1.38 1.32
game 2 0.82 1.37 1.27 1.43 1.10
game 3 1.59 1.21 1.43 1.31 1.42
game 4 1.27 1.15 1.27 1.65 0.93
game 5 1.54 0.77 0.88 1.26 1.48
Table 6.1: Average computation times in seconds.
In Table 6.1 the computation times to compute a stationary equilibrium for each game-prior
pair are displayed.7 The mean time to compute a stationary equilibrium is 1.26 seconds with a
standard deviation of 0.23 seconds. For the games we found on average 1.60 different equilibria
with a standard deviation of 0.89 when 5 different priors where used. So, the algorithm is quite
fast and multiple equilibria can be found.
7The computations were performed on a PC operating under Windows 98 with an Intel Pentium II 350 MHz
processor and 64 Mb workspace.
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6.7 Summary
In this chapter it is shown that generically the stochastic tracing procedure consists of a finite
number of piecewise smooth arcs and loops, and that the stochastic tracing procedure is well-
defined for almost all stochastic games. An everywhere differentiable homotopy function is
defined, whose zeros correspond one-to-one to elements of the stochastic tracing procedure, but
this set of zeros consists of a finite number of smooth arcs and loops. The unique smooth feasible
path from the set of zeros of this homotopy function is followed numerically in order to end up in
the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure. The resulting algorithm
is globally convergent. The numerical performance of the algorithm is presented.
6.8 Proofs
For the proofs in this section some notations and definitions from the theory of regular constraint
sets are needed (see Chapter 2.4). The notations and definitions used here are similar to those of
Section 3.7.
Let a size vector η, a transition mapping pi, a discount factor δ, and a prior p ∈ Σ be fixed.
For any tuple of utility functions u and any admissible subset B∗, define the functions gB∗,u :
R
1+2m∗+nz → R2m∗+nz and hB∗,u : R1+2m∗+nz → Rm∗+2 in such a way that gB∗,u equals the
left-hand side of the equalities (1)-(4) and hB∗,u the left-hand side of the inequalities (5)-(8),
gB
∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ) =


vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωp˜i
i(t; ω¯ |ω, ρ−iω , siωj)µiω¯
+λiωj − µiω (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)
ρiωj (s
i
ωj 6∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)
λiωj (s
i
ωj ∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)


and
hB
∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ) =


ρiωj (s
i
ωj ∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)
λiωj (s
i
ωj 6∈ Biω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N)
t
−t+ 1

 .
A point (t, ρ, λ, µ) ∈ O(Γ, p, B∗) is a solution of (1)-(8) if and only if gB∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ) = 0 and
hB
∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ) ≥ 0.
Let the functions gB∗ : R1+2m∗+nz×Rmn → R2m∗+nz and hB∗ : R1+2m∗+nz×Rmn → Rm∗+2
be defined such that gB∗(t, ρ, λ, µ, u) = gB∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ) and hB∗(t, ρ, λ, µ, u) = hB∗,u(t, ρ, λ, µ)
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for all u ∈ Rmn. Figure 6.4 presents the matrix of derivatives of the functions gB∗ and hB∗ with
respect to all variables, where
E((i′, ω′), siωj) =
{
1 if (i′, ω′) = (i, ω)
0 otherwise ,
∂
ui
′
(ω′,s−i
′
ω′
,si
′
ω′j′
)
vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) = 0 if siωj 6= si
′
ω′j′ for all s−i
′
ω′ ∈ S−i
′
ω′ ,
and
∑
s−iω ∈S
−i
ω
∂ui(ω,s−iω ,siωj)
vi(t;ω, ρ−iω , s
i
ωj) = 1.
The stars (?) in the matrix need not to be specified for our analysis.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
∂t ∂ρ
B∗ S
∗\B∗
∂λ
B∗ S
∗\B∗
∂µ ∂u
B∗
S∗\B∗
? ?m∗
m∗
nz
m∗
1
1
1 m∗ m∗ nz mn
I 0
0 I
? ∂uv(·)
0 0 I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0
0 E 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0
Figure 6.4: The matrix of partial derivatives of gB∗ and hB∗ .
Each row in Figure 6.4 corresponds to one of the equalities and inequalities in (1)-(8). To
make the figure more clear, derivatives with respect to ρ are first taken for siωj ∈ B∗. The same
applies to the derivatives with respect to λ and the ordering of the equalities in (1). From the
properties of the matrix, it follows immediately that the matrices ∂uv and E have full row rank.
Lemma 6.8 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Then, for almost all
u, gB
∗,u t>{0}.
Proof Consider a point (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0. The matrix of partial
derivatives of gB∗ at (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is given by the rows (1)-(4) in Figure 6.4. First it is shown that
this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that gB∗ t>{0}.
Since ∂uv(·) has full row rank and the derivative with respect to u in (2)-(4) is zero, it is suf-
ficient to show that the part of the matrix given by (2)-(4) has full row rank. Since the derivative
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with respect to λ in (3) has full row rank, whereas the derivative with respect to λ in (2) and (4)
is zero, it is sufficient to show that the rows in (2) and (4) are independent. The admissibility of
B∗ implies that the derivative with respect to ρB∗ in (4) has full row rank. Since, the derivative
with respect to ρB∗ in (2) is zero, the only thing left to prove is that (2) has independent rows,
which is obvious from the derivative with respect to ρS∗\B∗ . Consequently, gB
∗
t>{0}.
By the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.26, and since gB∗ is a C∞ function, it follows that
the complement of the set
{
u ∈ Rmn | gB∗,u t>{0}} has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Lemma 6.9 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Moreover, let an
inequality j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗ + 2} be given. Then, for almost all u, (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ )t>{0}.
Proof Consider a point (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0 and hB∗j′ (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0.
The matrix of partial derivatives of (gB∗ , hB∗j′ ) at (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is given in Figure 6.4 by the rows
(1)-(4) and a single row related to hB∗j′ in (5)-(8). First it is shown that this matrix has full row
rank, from which it follows that (gB∗ , hB∗j′ )t>{0}.
If row j′ belongs to (6), (7) or (8), then it follows from the derivative with respect to λS∗\B∗
or from the derivative with respect to t that row j′ has rank 1. Since all other derivatives in row j′
are zero, it follows as in the proof of Lemma 6.8 that the rows of (1)-(4) together with row j′ are
independent. Consider the case where row j′ belongs to (5). Following the first part of the proof
of Lemma 6.8, it suffices to prove that (2) and (4) together with row j′ are independent. Inequality
hB
∗
j′ states that ρiωj′ ≥ 0, siωj′ ∈ B∗, and this inequality is now required to hold with equality.
Since
∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, it follows that |Biω| = |B∗ ∩ Siω| > 1. Then the row related to siωj′
together with (2) and (4) trivially form an independent set. Consequently, (gB∗ , hB∗j′ )t>{0}. By
the transversality theorem it follows that the complement of {u ∈ Rmn | (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ )t>{0}}
has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Lemma 6.10 Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ be given. Moreover,
let inequalities j′, j′′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m∗ + 2} with j′ 6= j′′ be given. Then, for almost all u,
(gB
∗,u, hB
∗,u
j′ , h
B∗,u
j′′ )t>{0}.
Proof Consider a point (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) such that gB∗(t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0, hB∗j′ (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0, and
hB
∗
j′′ (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) = 0. The matrix of partial derivatives of (gB
∗
, hB
∗
j′ , h
B∗
j′′ ) at (t¯, ρ¯, λ¯, µ¯, u¯) is
given in Figure 6.4 by the rows (1)-(4) and two rows related to hB∗j′ and hB
∗
j′′ in (5)-(8). First it is
shown that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that (gB∗ , hB∗j′ , hB
∗
j′′ )t>{0}.
The case where the two rows are not equal to (7) and (8) is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.9.
Rows (7) and (8) are not independent. However, they cannot be binding simultaneously, because
then it holds that t = 0 and t = 1. Consequently, (gB∗ , hB∗j′ , hB
∗
j′′ )t>{0}. It follows that the
complement of the set {u ∈ Rmn | (gB∗,u, hB∗,uj′ , hB
∗,u
j′′ )t>{0}} has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Part III
Application
Chapter 7
Dynamic Competition
In this chapter, which is partly based on Herings, Peeters and Schinkel (2001), the algorithm
developed in Chapter 6 is applied to a dynamic entry-and-exit model. For such models, common
understanding is that potential entrants will enter into the market up to the point where all excess
profits are eroded. Dominant incumbent positions are possible only under specific circumstances,
such as the presence of substantial barriers to entry, or when incumbents can credibly threaten to
punish rivals with losses upon entry. In this chapter, an equilibrium with market dominance that
exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor punishment strategies is
reported on. This equilibrium induces an alternating monopoly – despite the fact that the model
also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, an alter-
nating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, the alternating monopoly equilibrium
Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium.
7.1 Introduction
It is generally claimed that the possibility of rival firms entering into a market served by one or
a few large suppliers disciplines the behavior of the incumbent firm(s), provided that the threat
of such potential competition is serious enough. The logic is that should the incumbent firm (or
firms) make more than a normal profit through the exploitation of its (their) dominant position
in the market, entry will take place and intensify actual competition. Incumbent firms, therefore,
take into consideration when formulating their market strategy a trade-off between current and
future profits. Generally, the higher the former, the lower the latter, and vice versa.
Crucial in the analysis of potential competition and its influence on market performance is
the presence of sunk costs. Those are fixed costs that, once laid-out, cannot be recovered again.
Examples of sunk costs are costs of schooling of personnel, advertising costs, or the depreciation
of assets. To a firm that considers entering a market those entry costs are variable. That is,
potential entrants need not make them if they refrain from entry. To a firm in the market, however,
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these costs are truly foregone. This asymmetry creates a barrier to entry to the potential entrant.
The higher the sunk costs, the more a firm that considers entry will scratch its head again, since
the larger the profit on variable costs needs to be to make up for the lay-out. This, in turn, creates
a level of protection from entry to the incumbent firm, that can enjoy modest profits behind its
barrier, without triggering an entry process.
The benchmark model used in this type of reasoning is the so-called contestable market
model which developed in the 1970s – the condensed reference to which is Baumol, Panzar
and Willig (1982). When sunk costs are absent, the model predicts that even when only one firm
actually produces something, that firm will be forced to put a quantity on the market that clears at
minimum average (i.e. marginal) costs. By the ever present threat of ‘hit-and-run’ competition,
the market performance of a dominant firm is disciplined to the level of a market with perfect
competition, which is a situation known to be socially desirable.
The assumption that sunk costs are absent is both crucial to the model and hard to accept.
Generally, market entry will require a certain portion of fixed lay-out that is sunk. Consequently,
some barriers to entry do exist. This being the case, it may be expected that the contestability of
a market is related to the number of potential entrants. Just like the competitiveness of a market
increases in the number of actual suppliers, the discipline of the incumbent may well increase in
the number of potential competitors that threaten his position.
In the seminal Sherman and Willett (1967), that spawned the debate on the relationship be-
tween potential and actual competition, it was shown that this conjecture is not necessarily true.
When in a static limit price model potential entrants all behave identically, and simultaneously
decide whether to enter the market or not and how much to produce when they do enter, a larger
number of them may well convince all of them to stay out of the market. Quite surprisingly then,
it may well be that the larger the number of potential entrants, the stronger the position of the
incumbent firm. That is, the stronger potential competition, the weaker actual competition, and
consequently the lower welfare.
This striking result soon came under attack by adherents to the Chicago School. In Goldberg
and Moirao (1973), the Sherman-Willett result was shown to disappear when potential entrants,
instead of symmetrically playing a pure strategy ‘enter’ or ‘stay out’, would mix between the
two. This has the natural interpretation of some firms entering, while others stay out. The mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized by a constant number of expected entrants, simply
because an increase of potential entrants leads to a proportional decrease in the probability of
each one of them entering. With the expected number of actual entrants as the crucial determinant
of the strength of the incumbent’s position, no longer does that strength increase in the number
of potential entrants. Even though Stiglitz (1981) reproduced and fortified the Sherman-Willett
insight, the formalizations of the Chicago view in Grossmann (1981) and the before mentioned
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) got the idea stuck that potential competition can serve as a
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substitute for actual competition.
These early contributions to the contestability debate applied quite simple static entry mod-
els of the Bain-Sylos-Modigliani-type.1 To counter the Chicago consensus, Bernheim (1984)
and Dixit and Shapiro (1986) reproduced the argument that potential competition is not nec-
essarily a good for more dynamic models with sequential entry. Several ‘Harvardish’ surveys
of the debate in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Nti (1989, 2000) and Gilbert (1990) could not
compensate the common conception that indeed increased potential competition disciplines the
incumbent firms, further fortified by Vives (1988) and Waldman (1991). In Vives (1988), for
example, it is shown that in case of sequential entry and quantity setting the number of potential
entrants has an influence on the strategy of the incumbent firm to accommodate or not, but never
negatively influences social welfare. This common conception shows, for example, clearly from
Audretsch, Baumol and Bruke (2001), where the libertarian Austrian ideas on competition policy
is favorably revisited as early intuition on current understanding.
In this chapter a dynamic model of entry and exit is considered where a finite number of
incumbent firms are pressured by the threat of possible entrance by a finite number of poten-
tial entrants. Each period the incumbent firms are in Cournot competition. Additionally to the
decision on production quantity, they have to decide whether or not to continue production. Si-
multaneously and independently, the potential entrants have to make the choice whether or not
to enter the market. Since restriction to stationary behavior is made, there is no possibility to use
punishments strategies.
Among the questions of interest there are the following. How do the long-run industry dy-
namics look like? How many firms will be present in the long-run? Is it possible that more firms
are present in the long-run when the process starts with less firms? How are prices related to
marginal costs and what are the implications for welfare? In order to answer these questions,
the analysis is based on the numerical computation of equilibria, as analytical characterizations
cannot be obtained.
The dynamic entry-and-exit model is introduced formally in Section 7.2 and strategy and
equilibrium concepts are defined. Section 7.3 starts with observing that in each period, given
the current market structure, incumbent firms produce the static Cournot quantity. From this
observation it follows that the model belongs to the class of finite discounted stochastic games,
for which some known results are formulated briefly. In Section 7.4 the model is analyzed for
the case when there are two firms in total, there are no sunk costs, and no fixed costs. Where
common understanding is that this model will quickly display a long-run Cournot duopoly, a
1Bain (1949), Sylos-Labini (1962), and Modigliani (1958) formulated the classical theory of limit-pricing. They
all posit that the incumbent firm commits to a ‘limit quantity’, such that the residual demand is insufficient for the
entrant – which takes the incumbents quantity as given – to break even. The incumbent can charge the ‘limit price’
corresponding to the limit quantity and earn profits. In contrast to the classical limit-pricing model, in the model of
this chapter firms will act simultaneously and are allowed to play mixed strategies.
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different type of equilibrium is found, in which the market is intertemporally shared between
the two firms. This alternating monopoly equilibrium Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium
and is robust in the sense that it remains under positive entry costs and fixed costs. Section 7.5
concludes.
7.2 The dynamic entry-and-exit model
This section outlines the model of industry dynamics that is object of study. In each time period,
the firms in the model are either an incumbent or a potential entrant. Incumbents produce one
homogeneous good with identical cost structures. The market structure at a certain period is
given by the information about which of the firms is active in production at that particular period.
The instantaneous profits to an incumbent firm in any period depends on the current market
structure, the firm’s own production quantity and its competitors’ production quantities. For a
potential entrant the instantaneous profit depends on the entry decision only. Tomorrow’s market
structure depends on the number of active firms today and all firms’ entry and exit decisions
today.
There are n firms. The set of firms is denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of market
structures is given by Ω = {0, 1}n, the set of all possible binary arrays of length n. For a market
structure ω ∈ Ω, firm i is a potential entrant when ωi = 0 and an incumbent when ωi = 1.
In a period, an incumbent firm makes first a decision on production quantity, and second
the decision whether to stay active or to exit the industry. Of course, its decisions depend on
the market structure, since its instantaneous profit does not only depend on its own production
quantity, but also on its competitors’ production quantities. When in state ω a firm j produces
quantity qjω, where qjω = 0 when ωj = 0, the instantaneous profit to an incumbent firm i is
determined by ui(ω, qiω, q−iω ) = (a − b
∑
j∈N q
j
ω)q
i
ω − cqiω − cf , where it is assumed that the
(inverse) demand curve is linear, that marginal costs c are constant, and that fixed costs are cf .
The strategy space of an incumbent firm i is denoted by Siω = R+ × {‘exit’, ‘stay’}.
A potential entrant has to decide whether to stay out or to enter the industry conditional on
the market structure. When a potential entrant decides to enter it pays entry costs (building the
factory) of ce and, consequently, the next period it will be an incumbent. The strategy space of
a potential entrant i is denoted by Siω = {‘stay’, ‘enter’}. At each period, all decisions are made
simultaneously and independently.
The transition probabilities pi, which assign to every market structure and decisions taken a
new market structure, are deterministic. In the new market situation, again, decisions have to be
made, profits are earned and a new market situation will result. Since an infinite horizon model is
considered, this procedure goes on and on. Firms maximize total expected profits, where future
profits are discounted by a factor δ.
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The firms know the problem data and this knowledge is common knowledge among all firms.
Moreover, the initial market structure ω0 at period k = 0 is common knowledge to the firms.
Further, the information structure is of perfect recall which means that each firm remembers all
past decisions made by all firms and all past market structures that have occurred.
Note that for this model, in each period a static Cournot game is played. However, contrary
to the static Cournot game, the model does not consist of a single decision, but jumps to the
next market structure and continues dynamically. In its decisions, a firm does not only take into
account the instantaneous profits, but also its opportunities in future stages. Shortly, the main
differences to the normal static Cournot conflict situation is that, here, a situation with repeated
interaction and the possibility of entry and exit is considered.
The model just described is a problem within the class of stochastic games. Just like in the
stochastic game literature we allow firms to randomize their decisions within each time period,
so the class of decision possibilities is enlarged from Siω to Σiω = ∆(Siω). The instantaneous
profits/losses and the transition mapping are extended in the natural Von Neumann-Morgenstern
way.
A stationary strategy for firm i is a history and time independent policy which depends on
the market structure only. In the sequel, a stationary strategy for firm i will be denoted by
ρi = (ρiω)ω∈Ω. If firm i decides on stationary strategy ρi, every time that the system has market
structure ω, firm i selects its decision according to ρiω.
The Bellman equation which determines the expected discounted value of future net cash
flows, when the initial market structure is given by ω and the firms have stationary strategies
ρ = (ρi)i∈N , is given by
U i(ω, ρ) = ui(ω, ρω) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)U i(ω¯, ρ).
A stationary strategy-combination is a stationary equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium in sta-
tionary strategies.
From here on, the analysis is restricted to the class of stationary strategies and thereby to the
class of stationary equilibria. In addition to the motivations for restricting attention to stationary
strategies given by Maskin and Tirole (2001), which were mentioned in Chapter 5, stationarity
of the behavior strategies of the firms, coupled with our state space, excludes the possibility to
punish the rival firm. Consequently, none of the results obtained below relies on any form of
punishment strategies by construction.
7.3 Finite stochastic game model
Due to the stationarity assumed and thereby the absence of the possibility to use punishment
strategies, in equilibrium, all active firms produce the static Cournot quantity. Hence, when there
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are mω = #{i ∈ N |ωi = 1} firms active in the market (mω ∈ {0, . . . , n}), each incumbent
produces the static Cournot quantity given by
qCmω =
(a− c)
(mω + 1)b
,
and the instantaneous profit to each of the mω active firms is
uCmω =
(a− c)2
(mω + 1)2b
− cf .
For this reason we can restrict the strategy space of incumbent firms to their dynamic decision
whether to stay active or to exit, i.e. Siω = {‘exit’, ‘stay’}. The model fits in the class of finite
discounted stochastic games as firstly defined in Shapley (1953) and studied in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6, since all firms have now a finite number of pure strategies in all possible market
structures. For the finite discounted stochastic game stationary equilibria exist, as follows from
Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971). Moreover, their number is generically finite,
as is shown in Haller and Lagunoff (2000), and odd as is shown in Chapter 6. From Chapter 6 it
also follows that the set of stationary equilibria can be characterized by a system of polynomial
equations and inequalities, as stated in Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 7.1 A stationary strategy-combination ρ = (ρi)i∈N is a stationary equilibrium for all
possible initial market structures ω ∈ Ω if and only if there are λ = (λi)i∈N and µ = (µi)i∈N
such that
ui(ω, siωj, ρ
−i
ω ) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ωpi(ω¯ |ω, siωj, ρ−iω )µiω¯ + λiωj − µiω = 0,
(siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),∑
siωj∈S
i
ω
ρiωj − 1 = 0, (ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N),
λiωj ≥ 0, ρiωj ≥ 0, λiωjρiωj = 0, (siωj ∈ Siω, ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N).
As for each firm its opponents are identical – except perhaps for their position in the market –
the analysis is further restricted to the class of anonymous stationary strategies.
Definition 7.2 A stationary strategy ρi = (ρiω)ω∈Ω is anonymous if mω = mω¯ and ωi = ω¯i
implies ρiω = ρiω¯.
In words, anonymity yields that firms do only base their decision on the number of incumbents
present rather than on which firms are present. Therefore the state space Ω = {0, 1}n can be
reduced to Ωa = {0, 1} × {0, . . . , n− 1}. A generic element of Ωa will be noted by (b,m). The
first element b is a boolean which tells to each firm whether it is present (b = 1) or not (b = 0).
The second element m gives the number of opponents present (m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}).
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When some firm observes market structure (1,m), it knows that it is an incumbent and that
exactly m of its n − 1 opponents are also incumbents that also observe market structure (1,m);
the remaining (n− 1)−m firms are potential entrants that observe market structure (0,m+ 1).
Similarly, when some firm observes market structure (0,m), it knows that it is a potential entrant
just like (n − 1) − m other firms; the remaining m firms are incumbents that observe market
structure (1,m− 1).
Definition 7.3 A stationary equilibrium that satisfies the anonymity property is an anonymous
stationary equilibrium.
As all firms are identical – again, except for their position in the market – symmetric anonymous
stationary strategies are considered.
Definition 7.4 An anonymous stationary strategy ρi=(ρi(b,m))(b,m)∈Ωa is symmetric when ρi(b,m)=
ρk(b,m) for all i, k ∈ N .
Intuitively, symmetry in addition to anonymity yields that incumbent firms behave the same
when the same number of active opponents is observed, and that potential entrants behave the
same when the same observation about the market structure is made.
Definition 7.5 An anonymous stationary equilibrium that satisfies the symmetry property is a
symmetric anonymous stationary equilibrium.
Trivially, a symmetric anonymous stationary equilibrium is determined by one single symmetric
anonymous stationary strategy which is a best response to itself. Using the knowledge on the
instantaneous profits, the following theorem gives a characterization of the set of symmetric
anonymous stationary equilibria.
Theorem 7.6 A symmetric anonymous stationary strategy ρ constitutes a symmetric stationary
equilibrium for all initial market structures (b,m) ∈ Ωa if and only if there are λ and µ such that
uCm+1 + δ ·
∑
m¯ pi((1, m¯) | (1,m), ρ(1,m), ρ(0,m+1), sstay(1,m))µ(1,m¯) + λstay(1,m) − µ(1,m) = 0,
uCm+1 + δ ·
∑
m¯ pi((0, m¯) | (1,m), ρ(1,m), ρ(0,m+1), sexit(1,m))µ(0,m¯) + λexit(1,m) − µ(1,m) = 0,
λstay(1,m) ≥ 0, ρstay(1,m) ≥ 0, λstay(1,m)ρstay(1,m) = 0,
λexit(1,m) ≥ 0, ρexit(1,m) ≥ 0, λexit(1,m)ρexit(1,m) = 0,
ρstay(1,m) + ρ
exit
(1,m) − 1 = 0,
for all (1,m) ∈ Ωa, and
0 + δ ·∑m¯ pi((0, m¯) | (0,m), ρ(1,m−1), ρ(0,m), sstay(0,m))µ(0,m¯) + λstay(0,m) − µ(0,m) = 0,
−ce + δ ·
∑
m¯ pi((1, m¯) | (0,m), ρ(1,m−1), ρ(0,m), senter(1,m))µ(1,m¯) + λenter(0,m) − µ(0,m) = 0,
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λstay(0,m) ≥ 0, ρstay(0,m) ≥ 0, λstay(0,m)ρstay(0,m) = 0,
λenter(0,m) ≥ 0, ρenter(0,m) ≥ 0, λenter(0,m)ρenter(0,m) = 0
ρstay(0,m) + ρ
enter
(0,m) − 1 = 0,
for all (0,m) ∈ Ωa.
Theorem 7.7 A symmetric anonymous stationary equilibrium exists.
Proof Sketch of proof: (1) Let σ : Σi → Σi be the best response correspondence. Apply
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. (2) Prove by contradiction that there is a best response that only
depends on Ωa, i.e. there is no improvement in Ω. 2
Since in each market structure the instantaneous payoff to a firm is positive when uCn ≥ 0 and
entry costs can be earned back when ce ≤ δ1−δuCn the following theorem is quite trivial.
Theorem 7.8 If uCn ≥ 0 and ce ≤ δ1−δuCn , then always ‘enter’ when absent and always ‘stay’
when present is a symmetric anonymous stationary equilibrium.
Although the equilibrium in last theorem obviously exists, it is not necessarily the unique one. In
the next section we will see that there might exist other equilibria, in fact even other symmetric
anonymous stationary equilibria.
7.4 When there are two firms
This section reports on a surprising result in the simplest possible dynamic model of competi-
tion with entry and exit. There are no sunk costs, hence no barriers to entry, incumbents are
in Cournot competition, entry and exit decisions take the form of mixed strategies, and there is
perfect and complete information. Moreover, the analysis is limited to symmetric anonymous
stationary strategies, thereby ruling out punishment strategies. Whereas one would expect that
the model will quickly display a long-run Cournot duopoly, a different type of equilibrium is
found, namely one in which the market is intertemporally shared between the two firms. When
the firms coordinate on this equilibrium, the probability that this industry structure of alternating
monopoly is observed converges quickly to one, for all reasonable discount factors. Moreover,
this equilibrium Pareto-dominates the Cournot equilibrium. Both firms are able to obtain higher
profits by dividing the market intertemporally between them. This provides an interesting al-
ternative to geographical market division. It has so far been overlooked in the literature, yet it
potentially poses a threat to competitive markets, and as such it possibly is a subject of antitrust
policy concern.
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7.4.1 The model
Suppose there are only two firms, no fixed costs, no entrance costs and discount factor 0.95. So,
n = 2, cf = 0, ce = 0, and δ = 0.95. In Figure 7.1 the stochastic game corresponding to this
specific situation is depicted, where it is assumed, without loss of generality, that the common
factor in the instantaneous profits for all m (here, m equals 1 or 2) is unity. That is, (a−c)2
b
= 1.
This can simply be justified by the choice of units. A firm choosing the strategy ‘in’ will produce
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in out
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Figure 7.1: The dynamic entry-and-exit model as a stochastic game.
in the next period, and a firm choosing strategy ‘out’ will be out of production in the next period.
The instantaneous profits of the firms are given by the tuple in the upper-left part of the cells. The
lower-right part of the cell indicates the next state, reached with probability one – (1, 1) means
for example both firms in, and (0, 1) firm 1 out, firm 2 in.
The set of symmetric anonymous stationary equilibria can be characterized by a system of
polynomial equalities and inequalities as is shown in Theorem 7.6. Since analytically solving
these kind of polynomial systems is often not possible, resort to numerical methods is needed.
Recently, some progress towards this end has been made for finite discounted stochastic games
in general in Herings and Peeters (2000) (see also Chapter 6), in which an algorithm to compute
stationary equilibria for this class of games is developed and is shown to converge almost surely.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods and is implemented by including a
number of subroutines into HOMPACK, a software-package written in FORTRAN to do homotopy-
continuation calculations. All equilibria of this model arising in the sequel can be easily checked
to be equilibria by substituting the relevant variables into the system of polynomial (in)equalities
of Theorem 7.6.
7.4.2 Alternating monopoly
Conventional wisdom quickly leads to the claim that the market dynamics modeled above will
typically result in the two firms sharing the market forever. After all, in the Cournot duopoly sit-
uation, there is a substantial profit over and above the entry costs – here assumed to be zero – for
each firm. Moreover, there is no dynamic limit pricing, which would be fruitless in the absence
of barriers to entry, nor do firms deploy punishment strategies, as they cannot by construction.
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And indeed it is the case that ‘always stay when active’ and ‘always enter when not active’ or,
alternatively, ‘produce in the next period no matter what the current market structure is’, is a
symmetric anonymous stationary equilibrium, as is claimed in Theorem 7.8.
Table 7.1 displays, these equilibrium strategies for each firm in each state, as well as the
expected total discounted profits to the firms by coordinating on this equilibrium for each possible
initial state. Irrespective of whether initially neither firm, both firms, or one of the two firms is in
equilibrium strategies equilibrium
(initial) firm 1 firm 2 payoffs
state in out in out firm 1 firm 2
(0,0) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.1111 2.1111
(0,1) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.1111 2.3611
(1,0) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.3611 2.1111
(1,1) 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.2222 2.2222
Table 7.1: Stationary Cournot equilibrium with two active firms.
the market, each will produce in the next period with probability 1. There is only a slightly higher
payoff for the firm that happened to be first incumbent, enjoying an instantaneous monopoly
profit for a single period, when the initial market structure featured a monopoly.
Apart from this known equilibrium, however, a different stationary equilibrium turns out to
exist, with a fundamentally different nature. Table 7.2 displays for this equilibrium its diagnos-
tics. In this equilibrium, when none of the firms produces today, each will produce tomorrow
equilibrium strategies equilibrium
(initial) firm 1 firm 2 payoffs
state in out in out firm 1 firm 2
(0,0) 0.9306 0.0694 0.9306 0.0694 2.3055 2.3055
(0,1) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.4359 2.5641
(1,0) 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 2.5641 2.4359
(1,1) 0.9306 0.0694 0.9306 0.0694 2.4166 2.4166
Table 7.2: Stationary equilibrium with alternating monopoly.
with probability 0.9306. This means that with probability (1 − 0.9306)2 = 0.0048 no firm will
enter, with probability 0.1292 exactly one – the probabilities are equally split over the two possi-
ble situations – and with probability 0.8660 two firms will be active tomorrow. Similarly, when
in a certain period both firms are active, the next period all market structures can be reached with
positive probability. However, once a firm is the only firm in the market today it will with cer-
tainty stop producing tomorrow, whereas the opponent firm that is not in the market today will
be for sure one period later. The market will, in other words, display an alternating monopoly.
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This dynamic stationary market equilibrium of alternating monopoly is, to our knowledge,
nowhere mentioned in the literature.2 Yet, it is not difficult to come up with examples of markets
that seem indeed to display the type of production planning of the alternating monopolists, and
that have the characteristics of our simple model. Television stations, for example, often alternate
their prime shows, such as news services and sit-coms, intertemporally, so that they do not com-
pete for viewers in the same time slot. Summer events, such as open air pop festivals, or local
fancy fairs, are planned in different weeks of the season. And similarly, major sports games, par-
ticularly important matches such as finals, are planned not to overlap – both within one and the
same sport, but particularly also over different sports. Likewise, it has been observed that large
companies of relatively homogeneous commodities that are only substantially differentiated by
application of marketing methods, such as cola, tend to alternate their advertising campaigns.
None of these alternations in production involve any major entry or exit costs, if any at all. Next
to geographical market division, therefore, intertemporal market division can well be a form of
economic market division that reduces competition, and thus welfare.
7.4.3 Speed of convergence to and robustness of alternating monopoly
Having established its existence, the natural question to ask is how fast the dynamics converges to
the alternating monopoly and how robust the alternating monopoly equilibrium is. One approach
to this question is to consider how long it takes before an alternating monopoly reveals itself,
when both firms coordinate on that equilibrium. A first observation towards this is on the role of
the discount factor δ. For values of δ large enough, the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists
and can be calculated. However, when firms become sufficiently impatient, it no longer pays
to divide the market intertemporally, and the equilibrium disappears. This critical value of δ is
equal to 0.80, which corresponds to an interest rate of 25% per period. For all higher discount
factors, an equilibrium industry structure characterized by an alternating monopoly can be found.
The likelihood of indeed observing an alternating monopoly can subsequently be studied
as follows. Once the industry is in an alternating monopoly situation in a certain period, it
will stay in that equilibrium forever, where at even periods the one firm is active and at odd
periods the other. When the market structure is not a monopoly in a certain period, there is a
positive probability that it will end up in a monopoly next period. Consequently, the cumulative
probability of an alternating monopoly increases in time.
To see the speed with which this likelihood converges to one, consider the Markov process in-
duced by the alternating monopoly equilibrium. Its transition probabilities are illustrated graph-
2Note that equilibrium strategies with alternating actions that exist in repeated games – such as the infinitely
repeated prisoners’ dilemma, where the asymmetrically alternating strategy ‘defect-cooperate-defect-cooperate-etc.’
is a Nash equilibrium – all rely on the Folk Theorem in that they require punishment strategies, which are here absent
by construction. Cf. Chapter 5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995).
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Figure 7.2: Transition-probabilities in market structure.
ically in Figure 7.2 for δ = 0.95. These state-transitions can be caught in the transition-matrix P
defined as
P =


0.0048 0.0646 0.0646 0.8660
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0048 0.0646 0.0646 0.8660

 .
The probability of having a certain market structure after two periods knowing the current market
structure is given in the matrix P 2. When the current market structure is ω, the probability
that the market structure is ω¯ after k periods is given by the value of the matrix cell in row
ω and column ω¯ of the matrix P k. Regardless of what market structure is initially prevailing,
therefore, the probability that an alternating monopoly is found after k periods is at least equal
to P k(1, 2) + P k(1, 3).3
For all periods up to 50 these probabilities have been computed. The resulting data is dis-
played in Figure 7.3, for various values of δ. Clearly, except for values of δ close to 0.80, within
some 50 periods the probability of an alternating monopoly rapidly converges to one. In fact, for
δ = 0.90 the cumulative probability of an alternating monopoly is larger than 0.99 after exactly
50 periods. For δ = 0.95 this is the case after 34 periods, for δ = 0.99 after 27 periods, but
even when δ = 0.85, it takes less than 100 periods for the cumulative probability of observing
alternating monopoly to reach 0.99.
There remains the question how reasonable it is to assume that coordination on the alternating
monopoly equilibrium will happen. Towards answering this, it should be noted that in any game
with multiple equilibria a similar question arises for each particular equilibrium. Hence, for that
matter, the alternating monopoly case is no less likely than the Cournot equilibrium. However, if
3Naturally, it is also at least equal to P k(4, 2) + P k(4, 3). Moreover, computations showed that, in absence of
entry costs, P (1, 2) = P (1, 3) = P (4, 2) = P (4, 3).
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anything, the alternating monopoly equilibrium is strictly more appealing to both firms, as they
each make more profits, irrespective of the initial market structure. In fact, firms are able to
extract close to the cartel profits, whereas a cartel is not sustainable as a stationary equilibrium.
In the case reported on above, where δ = 0.95, the total discounted profits of each firm in the
alternating monopoly equilibrium is at least 8.5% higher than that had in the Cournot equilibrium.
This is when both firms are initially in the market. Compare to this end Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.
The firm that is first in the market in the initial states with one firm raises its payoff 15.5% over the
Cournot profit. On average, the alternating monopoly equilibrium generates a discounted profit
that is almost 12% higher than Cournot profits. For lower values of δ this difference becomes
smaller, and it eventually converges to zero when δ gets very close to 0.80. So, for all values for
which the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists, it is strictly payoff dominant.
7.5 Concluding thoughts
The previous section reported on the possibility, so far unknown, that in the simplest of dynamic
models of entry and exit, where none of the traditional assumptions used to show sustainable
dominant positions, such as barriers to entry, simultaneous entry and punishment strategies are
made, it is possible – and in fact reasonably likely – that an alternating monopoly arises, with
payoffs that approach the cartel outcome, despite the fact that the market allows two firms to
make profit when active, and does not sustain a cartel. Consequently also, consumer welfare is
importantly harmed by the ability of firms to tacitly collude on this intertemporal market division.
Production is decreased below, and prices increased above their duopoly levels, resulting in an
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increase in dead-weight loss.4 Hence, antitrust authorities should be wary of this possible tacit
collusion – that, on top of being tacit, only unambiguously manifests itself in the long-run.
The simplicity of the model strengthens the surprise of our result. Yet, in some directions it
also calls for further inspection. To that end, calculations for a version of the model in which
firms do face (re-)entry costs are performed. As these costs are to be incurred time and again in
the alternating monopoly equilibrium, they are expected to rule out the equilibrium as a possibil-
ity when sufficiently high. It turns out that, with δ = 0.95, modest levels of entry costs of almost
8.5% of the instantaneous monopoly profits still sustain the alternating monopoly equilibrium as
a profitable opportunity.5 With higher (re-)entry costs the alternating monopoly equilibrium no
longer exists, leaving the Cournot equilibrium. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that
slight barriers to entry can, in fact, support a relatively competitive environment. For all entry
costs for which the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists, the latter is strictly payoff dominant.
The introduction of fixed costs, made in every period when producing, does not jeopardize the
results either. That is, the alternating monopoly equilibrium exists for various non-specifically
chosen parameter values. In fact, as fixed costs are incurred in either type of equilibrium, al-
ternating monopoly or Cournot, they have no specific bearing on the issue at hand. Fixed costs
do, however, open possibilities for interesting further research. For example, specifications for
which the Cournot equilibrium involves losses, whereas the alternating monopoly equilibrium
is still sustainable, are found. This is the case when discount factors and fixed costs are suffi-
ciently high. The reason is that monopolists bear the fixed costs only every second period. The
theory of natural monopoly seems, in other words, compatible with firms that serve the market
intertemporally.
Finally, of crucial importance to the result does seem to be the number of potential entrants.
The two firm model studied here generates a two-periodic cycle within the set of states. Yet,
an n-firm extension would accordingly stretch this. When the number of firms increases, an
alternating monopoly equilibrium might on average imply n − 1 periods of being inactive for
each firm, awaiting its turn to dominate the market every nth time. Obviously, this puts the
patience of firms to the test, thereby narrowing the window of parameter values for which the
alternating monopoly equilibrium exists – in the limit, when the number of firms goes to infinity,
eventually closing it. It is, however, very well possible that a different type of equilibrium exists
in an n-firm version of our model, namely one in which clusters of firms tacitly collude on
sharing the market each period with only a restricted number of them. Over time, these clusters
then alternate, again increasing profits at the expense of welfare. The existence-question of these
conjectured stationary equilibria can be answered by solving the general system of Theorem 7.6.
4In fact, since in the linear model under consideration dead-weight loss is half of the total profits between the
market parties, the discounted welfare loss left in alternating monopoly is also almost 12% higher on average than
that in Cournot equilibrium.
5That is, entry costs up to 0.0208 which is 8.33% of normalized profits, which are equal to 0.25.
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Samenvatting
Speltheorie houdt zich bezig met het modelleren en oplossen van conflictsituaties. Van oudsher
wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee takken binnen de speltheorie: de coo¨peratieve spelthe-
orie en de niet-coo¨peratieve speltheorie. De coo¨peratieve speltheorie bestudeert situaties waarin
de betrokken spelers tot bindende afspraken kunnen komen. De niet-coo¨peratieve speltheorie
bestudeert situaties waarin dit niet het geval is. Dit proefschrift richt zich enkel op de tweede tak.
In de niet-coo¨peratieve speltheorie, die de strategische interactie tussen verschillende spelers
bestudeert, gaat de aandacht veelal uit naar het evenwichtsconcept van John Nash. In een Nash
evenwichtssituatie gedragen alle spelers zich optimaal, gegeven het gedrag van de overige spelers
en gegeven dat het gedrag van alle individuele spelers simultaan uitvoerbaar is. Geen enkele
speler zal dus zijn situatie kunnen verbeteren door af te wijken van de actie die hij speelt in de
evenwichtssituatie.
In niet-coo¨peratieve speltheoretische modellen wordt expliciet gemodelleerd dat spelers in
hun overwegingen meenemen hoe andere spelers op hun gedrag zullen reageren. In veel van
dergelijke modellen zijn meerdere evenwichten mogelijk, die zeer verschillende eigenschappen
kunnen hebben. Dit wordt het probleem van multipliciteit van evenwichten genoemd. Ter oplos-
sing van het probleem van multipliciteit zijn er allerlei verfijningen van het Nash evenwichtscon-
cept geı¨ntroduceerd. Een verfijning legt doorgaans additionele eisen op aan een evenwicht en
sluit op deze manier bepaalde evenwichten uit.
De niet-coo¨peratieve speltheorie kent zowel statische spelen als dynamische spelen. Een
statisch spel is een spel dat zich op e´e´n tijdsmoment afspeelt: alle spelers maken een keuze
en afhankelijk van de gemaakte keuzes vindt een uitbetaling aan iedere speler plaats. In een
dynamisch spel moet er op meerdere tijdsmomenten een beslissing genomen worden. Belangrijk
in zulke spelen zijn de informatie die een speler heeft over eerder genomen acties, de duur van
het spel, en de wijze waarop de uitbetalingen gedefinieerd zijn.
Een succesvolle toepassing van de speltheorie op problemen waarin conflictsituaties voor-
komen, wordt vaak belemmerd doordat aanwezige dynamiek de problemen al snel te complex
maakt om analytisch (met de hand) te benaderen. Zelfs wanneer er geen dynamische aspecten
aanwezig zijn, zullen problemen al snel te complex zijn, wanneer het aantal spelers dan wel
het aantal actiemogelijkheden van de spelers toeneemt. Een oplossing hiervoor wordt gevonden
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door nieuwe algoritmen ter berekening van speltheoretische evenwichten te ontwikkelen die ex-
pliciet rekening houden met de factor tijd en die goed implementeerbaar zijn op de computer.
Bovendien dienen dergelijke algoritmen, in het gebruikelijke geval dat er meerdere evenwichten
bestaan, een evenwicht met aantrekkelijke speltheoretische eigenschappen te selecteren.
De eerste klasse van spelen die in dit proefschrift behandeld wordt, is de klasse van statische
spelen, de zogenaamde spelen in normale vorm. Voor deze klasse van spelen is een algoritme
ontwikkeld dat in staat is een Nash evenwicht te berekenen. Ter oplossing van het probleem van
multipliciteit is ervoor gekozen om gebruik te maken van de ‘linear tracing procedure’. De linear
tracing procedure is geı¨ntroduceerd door John Harsanyi en Reinhard Selten en wordt veelvuldig
gebruikt in de door hen geopperde selectietheorie. Het is een wiskundige constructie die subjec-
tieve, a priori verwachtingen transformeert in evenwichtsverwachtingen. Dit proefschrift bewijst
dat de linear tracing procedure voor bijna alle spelen in normale vorm goed gedefinieerd is, een
resultaat dat weliswaar eerder geformuleerd was, maar waaraan sommige experts twijfelden. Dit
resultaat betekent dat het algoritme voor bijna alle spelen een evenwicht kan berekenen.
Voorts wordt er voor deze klasse van spelen een methode beschreven waarmee alle even-
wichten berekend kunnen worden. Wederom berust de methode op een aanpassingsproces dat
triviale oplossingen via paden verbindt met evenwichts-oplossingen. Het berekenen van alle
evenwichten lijkt praktisch onuitvoerbaar door de forse toename van het aantal evenwichten bij
toename van het aantal spelers dan wel het aantal actiemogelijkheden per speler. Daarvoor is het
algoritme zodanig ontwikkeld dat tijdens zijn uitvoering steeds nieuwe evenwichten gevonden
worden. Verder kan de rekentijd aanzienlijk worden verkort door gebruik te maken van parallelle
computers.
Dynamische spelen met volledige informatie die van eindige duur zijn en waar spelers hun
uitbetalingen ontvangen wanneer alle beslissingen genomen zijn, worden spelen in extensieve
vorm genoemd. Voor deze klasse van spelen is het mogelijk het algoritme dat ontworpen is voor
de spelen in normale vorm te gebruiken. Dit kan op twee manieren. De eerste manier is door
het spel in extensieve vorm te herschrijven als een spel in normale vorm door de verschillende
tijdsmomenten waarop een speler een actie moet nemen als afzonderlijke spelers te beschouwen,
maar met dezelfde uitbetaling. De tweede manier is om achteraan te beginnen en voor alle
deelspelen de evenwichten te bepalen. Met behulp van achterwaartse inductie zal een evenwicht
gevonden worden. Dit houdt wel in dat het algoritme herhaaldelijk gebruikt zal moeten worden.
Als laatste type niet-coo¨peratieve spelen komen de stochastische spelen aan bod, of pre-
ciezer, verdisconteerde stochastische spelen met oneindige tijdshorizon. In een stochastisch spel
moeten spelers in iedere periode een beslissing nemen. Afhankelijk van deze beslissingen en
van het toeval, komt een toestand in de volgende periode tot stand. Deze toestand is van invloed
op de mogelijk te nemen beslissingen en de uitbetalingen in die periode. Om dit probleem met
oneindige horizon nog analyseerbaar te houden, zullen kansen op toestandsovergangen condi-
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tioneel op de huidige toestand en de in de huidige periode genomen acties, tijdsonafhankelijk
verondersteld worden. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat strategiee¨n tijdonafhankelijk (stationair) gekozen
kunnen worden. De bedoeling is om zogenaamde stationaire evenwichten te berekenen.
Aangezien we hier wederom met het probleem van multipliciteit te kampen hebben, wordt
de selectie aangescherpt. Naast selectie op stationaire evenwichten wordt een uitbreiding op de
linear tracing procedure gedefinieerd, de ‘stochastic tracing procedure’. Aangezien er meerdere
natuurlijke uitbreidingen mogelijk zijn, moet er een weloverwogen keuze gemaakt worden. Ge-
geven zekere subjectieve a priori stationaire verwachtingen, transformeert de stochastic tracing
procedure deze verwachtingen in stationaire evenwichtsverwachtingen. Opnieuw wordt aange-
toond dat er een pad gevormd wordt. Een bijkomstig resultaat is dat voor bijna ieder stochastisch
spel het aantal stationaire evenwichten oneven is.
Alle onderzochte problemen hebben als overeenkomst dat er paden ontstaan. En wel: stuks-
gewijs gladde paden, beginnend bij een triviale oplossing en eindigend bij een evenwicht. In
alle gevallen is het startpunt van zo’n pad vast te stellen. Indien we een pad vanuit het startpunt
volgen komen we uit bij een evenwicht. Voor het volgen van paden zijn verschillende padvol-
gende methoden voorhanden. In dit proefschrift is voor de implementatie van de algoritmes een
padvolgende methode gebruikt die professioneel geprogrammeerd is in FORTRAN. Het betreft
hier het softwarepakket genaamd HOMPACK. Voor gebruik van dit pakket is het vereist dat het te
volgen pad volledig glad is. Met behulp van een eenvoudige transformatie van variabelen is dit
te bereiken. De numerieke prestaties van de aan numeriek onderzoek onderworpen algoritmen
zijn uitvoerig beschreven.
Als proef op de som is het algoritme ter berekening van een stationair evenwicht voor sto-
chastische spelen toegepast op een concreet probleem uit de economie. Het betreft een ‘market
entry-and-exit’ model. In zo’n model is er op ieder moment een zeker aantal zittende bedrijven.
De zittende bedrijven moeten een beslissing nemen over de hoeveelheid te produceren goederen
en of ze het volgende tijdsmoment actief blijven of uittreden. Simultaan moeten potentie¨le toe-
treders beslissen of ze toetreden tot de markt of uit de markt blijven. Afhankelijk van de gekozen
productiehoeveelheden krijgt ieder zittend bedrijf zijn uitbetaling. Potentie¨le toetreders betalen
toetredingskosten in geval zij er voor kiezen toe te treden. De nieuwe marktsituatie, gegeven
door het aantal zittende bedrijven, hangt af van het huidig aantal zittende bedrijven, de beslissin-
gen omtrent uittreding genomen door de zittende bedrijven en de beslissingen omtrent toetreding
genomen door de potentie¨le toetreders. Gegeven de nieuwe marktstructuur, die dan bij alle be-
drijven bekend is, worden opnieuw beslissingen genomen. Van dit market entry-and-exit model
worden stationaire evenwichten berekend voor verschillende uitbetalingsfuncties. Op basis hier-
van is het mogelijk te onderzoeken hoe marktstructuren zich in de loop van de tijd ontwikkelen,
alsmede wat de effecten zijn van potentie¨le concurrentie op prijzen en welvaart.
De situatie met twee bedrijven, afwezigheid van vaste kosten en toetredingskosten is in de-
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tail onderzocht. Indien de vraagcurve linear is en de markt groot genoeg is om door de twee
bedrijven bediend te worden, valt het te verwachten dat beide bedrijven permanent op de markt
aanwezig zullen zijn. Het herhaalde Cournot evenwicht – resulterende in een situatie waar beide
bedrijven altijd productief zijn en blijven – blijkt inderdaad te bestaan. Echter, na toepassing
van het ontwikkelde algoritme ter berekening van een stationair evenwicht voor stochastische
spelen, blijkt dat er nog een evenwicht bestaat; een evenwicht dat een alternerend monopolie
induceert. Op even perioden zal het ene bedrijf de markt dienen, op oneven perioden het andere.
Het alternerende monopolie staat bedrijven toe bi-periodiek de volle monopoliewinst te grijpen.
Opmerkelijk is dat het alternerende monopolie evenwicht voor beide bedrijven lucratiever is dan
het herhaalde Cournot evenwicht. Dit impliceert dat de bedrijven sterke prikkels hebben om op
dit evenwicht te coo¨rdineren. Dit opmerkelijke resultaat reflecteert nogmaals de potentie van
numerieke methoden, namelijk dat ze nieuwe economische inzichten kunnen verschaffen.
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